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ABSTRACT 
Social controversy is a sustained, mediated debate between at least two 
oppositional parties which is more than just a difference of opinion; rather it is a 
persistent conflict over the political and cultural implications that dominant forms of 
communicative reasoning, practices, and norms have for a public. Simply put, during 
social controversies the norms guiding public life can be negotiated, reaffirmed, negated, 
and/or transformed. This can lead to progressive political, cultural, and/or social change 
in some instances, while establishing or reifying conservative and even oppressive norms, 
practices, and laws in others.  
Building upon Olson and Goodnight‘s (1994) theoretical and methodological 
framework of social controversy, this dissertation argues that scholars should analyze the 
role affect plays in this type of conflict as a means to address the regulation of public 
conduct as well as public discourse. The rhetorical and argumentative significance of the 
affective dimensions of social controversy have been conceptualized and analyzed via an 
examination of emotion-based claims and affective states that have become salient, 
discernable and/or apprehendable during specific public disagreements. Such a 
conceptualization demonstrates that critical insights regarding the norms that guide public 
conduct, the role risk and vulnerability play in the regulation of individuals‘ public 
behavior, and the relationship between affect and citizenship can be gained by focusing 




To highlight the importance of the study of affect in social controversy as well as 
better understand the larger critical significance affect theory has for rhetorical and 
argumentation studies, this dissertation has analyzed the affective dimensions of three 
conflicts. They are: the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse social controversy, the International 
Freedom Center social controversy, and the controversy over the 2004 French ban on 
conspicuous religious attire in public schools. The findings from this dissertation have 
specific and general implications for future work in the field of controversy as well as 
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SOCIAL CONTROVERSY, AFFECT, AND THE SHAME OF ABU GHRAIB 
Introduction 
Controversial. The term has become ubiquitous in contemporary public discourse 
and identifies its subject as the focus of ―intense cultural fascination‖ (Attwood and 
Lockyer 2009). Whether it is used to describe the death of protesters in Libya, 2011 
Wisconsin union laws, or the depiction of teenage life on MTV‘s Skins, the term 
―controversial‖ identify each as presenting an immediate or potential risk. In other words, 
each example is contentious; they arouse emotion, invite objection, and can instigate 
debate cultivating the political, moral, affective, and cultural conditions for social 
controversy. As Goodnight (1991) explains, ―There is great risk to [social] controversy, 
for argument may deny the communication of an other as reasonable; but equally, such 
engagements may make possible mindful opposition by confronting with argument 
differences between interlocutors that have been covered over by rule governed routines, 
formal niceties, or indifferent silences‖ (6). The controversial is risky because it can 
provoke examination of dominant norms and practices that may reveal critical 
discrepancies that result in oppressive acts and customs.  
Ideally, this is what controversial acts, claims, and texts can do. They may be a 




be more inclusive of differing views and more accountable to contemporary conditions of 
radical plurality. As Olson and Goodnight (1994) explain social controversy, ―occupies 
the pluralistic boundaries of a democracy and flourishes at those sites of struggle where 
arguers criticize and invent alternatives to established social conventions and sanctioned 
norms of communication‖ (249). Research on social controversies has traditionally 
focused on the political, cultural, ideological and moral assumptions and implications of 
the argumentative claims made during this type of conflict (Finnegan 2000; Goodnight 
1991, 1999, 2003; Gross 2005; Miller 2005; Olson and Goodnight 1994; Ono and Sloop 
1999; Phillips 1999; Wilson 1995). These dimensions have been emphasized due to the 
immediate and long-term influence they have over the regulation of public discourse via 
the creation and reform of dominant forms of communicative reasoning, practices, and 
norms. Politics, culture, ideology, and morality are not, however, the sole aspects of 
social controversy that wields this type of influence. 
Affect is also an influential aspect of social controversy which is thoroughly 
entwined with the ―traditional‖ dimensions of social controversy, not simply indicative of 
a separate type of ―disingenuous controversy‖ (Fritch et al, 2006). For instance, Greene 
and Hicks (1993) assert that people need to feel ―affectively invested‖ in a controversial 
context to rouse individuals to act. One‘s affective investment ―explains how and how 
much people care about particular practices, meanings, rationalities, and pleasures‖ (177). 
In other words, the political potential of ―the controversial‖ is reliant, to a certain extent, 
on its ability to affectively impact individuals enough to provoke public objection to 




invested individuals, our position on ―the controversial‖ is fleshed out as a relational 
experience that has ―texture and coherence‖ (177). Thus, there are assumptions about and 
implications for affect embedded within claims. The intensity of affective investments is 
one such assumption that effects the regulation of discourse and conduct. The greater the 
intensity of one‘s investment, the greater one‘s stake in the relations, norms, and practices 
embedded within this controversial context.  
Given the role affect can play in social controversy, there remains a dearth of 
research, with some notable exceptions (Deem 2010; Fritch et al. 2006; Greene and Hicks 
1993), which theorize its role and influence. Deem (2010) notes that theories of social 
controversy, as a form of rational-critical discourse, have continually been called ―into 
question for [their] neglect of affect, desire and the body‖ (61). Even though Olson and 
Goodnight (1994) recognize the role and radical potential of nondiscursive (i.e. visual 
and performative) argumentation within social controversies, they do not attribute this to 
the affective dimensions of these claims. Rather, Olson and Goodnight focus on the text 
that accompanies visual images or distill actions into rational-critical enactments 
indicative of the ―traditional‖ dimensions of social controversy. In her analysis of the 
controversy surrounding Time magazine‘s intentionally darkened image of O.J. 
Simpson‘s mug shot, Finnegan (2000) also does not take into consideration the affective 
dimensions of images. Instead, she focuses on the implicit legal and ideological 
―conventions of photographic representation‖ that influence the oppositional arguments 




This study, on the other hand, will give the rhetorical and argumentative role of 
affect in social controversies the scholarly attention it warrants. Affect is a constantly 
emerging, dynamic relation between the sensate experience of the ‗context‘ and the 
visceral reaction of the ‗self‘ that varies in degrees of intensity which influences an 
individual‘s ―ability to affect and a susceptibility to be affected‖ (Massumi 2002, 61). 
Since affect is a sensate-visceral relation that typically occurs nonconsciously, how we 
cognitively recognize and communicate about affect differs from the experience itself.
1
 
When an affect becomes salient, or sensually saturated to the point of consciousness 
through sensate intensity or contrast, it is often linguistically limited to the terms 
―feeling‖ and ―emotions‖. A feeling is the process of cognitive recognition of an affective 
state, i.e. a pattern of visceral reactions to a given sensate context that we are familiar 
with as a specific, significant sensation. Individuals do not ―feel‖ every affective state 
they embody, rather a feeling is the moment when an affect is mentally recognized. 
Emotions, on the other hand, are the concepts that we use to signify the known 
constellation of sensations that we have felt. As intersubjective concepts, emotions such 
as happiness, sadness, grief, shame, and indignation, are imbued with varying levels of 
cultural meaning, ideological symbolism, and political privilege.  
Within social controversy affect becomes salient in two distinct ways: emotion-
based claims and affective states. During social controversy participants make discursive 
and non-discursive claims concerning specific feelings and emotions in relation to the 
topic. Also, the experience of social controversies is saturated with affects, some of 
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 The term nonconscious is used instead of conscious or subconscious as a means to separate this 
act from the cognitive processes associated with the recognition and intentionality typically attributed to 




which become recognizable affective states (i.e., diffuse feelings or moods). This 
proposal will address how the affective dimensions of social controversies can be 
analyzed by focusing on the emotion-based claims made during the debate as well as the 
salient affective states of the conflict. Incorporating affect into existing theories of social 
controversy can give insight into the political significance of affect and its role in the 
regulation of public discourse as well as public conduct. Throughout this project the ties 
between affect and the communicative norms, reasoning, and practices used as regulatory 
technologies will become increasing clear. Since social controversy has the potential to 
provoke the reform of political practices to be more inclusive, and hopefully just, 
theorizing the role affect plays in these conflicts will add to the provocative research on 
the political ties between affect, social justice and citizenship.  
To do so, this chapter will be organized as follows. First, the theory of social 
controversy will be explained through an abbreviated analysis of the debate that arose 
when the Abu Ghraib prison abuse photos were leaked. This analysis will focus on the 
―traditional‖ dimensions of social controversy criticism to emphasis what is left 
unexamined when affect is not incorporated into this type of critique. Then, the affective 
dimensions of social controversy will be further explicated followed by an extension of 
the Abu Ghraib analysis focused on affective states and emotion-based claims. The 
affective dimensions of social controversy deal will the affects, feelings, and emotions 
that play a significant role in the conflict as part of the substance that people are arguing 
about. Within the Abu Ghraib social controversy, the affective state of the images pulled 




central concern in the public discourse. This analysis will include an examination of 
Susan Sontag‘s article ―Regarding the Torture of Others‖ as an affective objection of 
shame. An affective objection is a specific affective state and/or emotion-based claim that 
exemplifying the salient affects that imbue an argument and/or stance during a social 
controversy. After this, a discussion of the research questions driving this study will be 
given which address the implications this project will have on current theories of the 
discursive-based norms of citizenship. Lastly, a preview of chapters outlining the theory 
and methodological framework for this project as well as the case studies being examined 
will be briefly discussed. 
Abu Ghraib and Traditional Social Controversy Criticism 
In May 2003, The New York Times published reports of Iraqi detainee abuse and 
torture at the hands of U.S. soldiers, these reports were the first public news accounts of 
the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison (Lacey). The reports generated little public 
response until the now infamous photos were published on April 28, 2004 by 60 Minutes 
II and then on May 1, 2004 by The New Yorker. The photos, taken between October and 
December 2003, featured Military Police [MP] and other soldiers assigned to night shift 
duty on Abu Ghraib prison‘s tier 1A and 1B physically and mentally abusing their 
detainees. Beatings, forced nudity, extreme stress conditions/positions, mocking of naked 
and dead prisoners, simulated sex acts, and physical intimidation of detainees using guard 
dogs were only a few of the actions depicted in the photos. The images were shocking, 





Shortly after photos‘ publication, two major political and legal inconsistencies 
were revealed. First, the prisoners in tiers 1A and 1B were officially considered civilian 
―troublemakers,‖ terrorist suspects, ―high-risk‖ detainees and ―anyone of intelligence 
interest‖ who were held for interrogation (Schlesinger 2004, 371). Yet, according to U.S. 
intelligence officers, seventy to ninety percent of the detainees at Abu Ghraib were 
wrongfully arrested, including some of the tortured and abused prisoners (Associated 
Press 2004). Secondly, the Bush Administration‘s official stance on the Abu Ghraib 
photos was one of ―righteous indignation‖ (―Abu‖ 2004). The soldiers featured within the 
images were considered a ―few rotten apples‖ that did not accurately reflect U.S. forces 
in Iraqi. These were rogue soldiers—morally monstrous, sexually deviant, and viciously 
depraved—whose corrupt actions were completely their own. As former President Bush 
stated, these soldiers‘ cruel treatment of their detainees ―does not reflect the nature of the 
American people‖ (Curl
 
 2004).  
Despite this characterization, ample evidence had been leaked to the press in two 
of the military‘s own investigations, one by Major General [MG] Taguba which was 
conducted in February 2004
2
, and the other by MG Anthony Jones and MG George Fay, 
indicting a chain of command leading all the way to then Department of Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and the former President himself. In other words, the soldiers 
                                                 
2
 By the time these photos leaked to the public, both the International Committee of the Red Cross 
[ICRC] and the U.S. military itself had already conducted investigations into the allegations of detainee 
torture and abuse. The military investigation, led by Major General [MG] Antonio Taguba, concluded that 
soldiers on the night shift committed ―sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses,‖ and that the issue of 
―illegal abuse‖ was both ―systemic‖ and ―intentionally perpetrated by several members of the military 
police guard force‖ on the detainees in Tiers 1A and 1B of Abu Ghraib. These offenses included, but were 
not limited to, beatings, forced nudity, simulated sex acts, rape, sodomy, and allowing guard dogs to bite 






were simply treating their detainees in a manner U.S. government officials already 
approved of. Regardless of these military report findings, only twelve soldiers were 
court-martialed, eleven of whom were later convicted (Stockman 2004). The 
overwhelming majority of the soldiers convicted were the low ranking officers featured 
in the photos.
3
 Each soldier either pled guilty or was convicted of charges ranging from 
dereliction of duty and failure to protect to cruelty and assault. All of these soldiers had at 
various times stated they were simply following orders from Military Intelligence [MI] 
and Other Government Agencies [OGA—code for the CIA], to ―loosen this guy up‖ and 
―make sure he has a bad night‖ (Taguba 2004, 294). In the end, this did not matter for 
these low ranking soldiers who immortalized their actions on film. No matter who give 
implicit orders to these soldiers, the Abu Ghraib images seemed to capture actions so 
abject the depicted soldiers had to be punished. 
The creation and circulation of the Abu Ghraib images not only provoked 
investigation into the political and legal inconsistencies uncovered by them, they 
ultimately inspired a vast body of public and academic work in an attempt to make sense 
of the torture and abuse that occurred there. This work included over 3,000 news articles 
from major world publications in just one month of the photos‘ publication
4
, 117 books 
                                                 
3
 These soldiers were: Staff Sergeant [SSG] Ivan ―Chip‖ Fredericks; Specialist [SPC] Charles 
Graner; SPC Sabrina Harmon; Private First Class [PFC] Lynndie England; Sergeant [SGT] Javal Davis; 
SPC Megan Ambuhl; and Private [PVT] Jeremy Sivits. 
 
4
 This number was calculated on February 22, 2011 by conducting a search on LexisNexis 
Academic. This statistic represents the results from a keyword search using the term ―Abu Ghraib‖ and was 







, 286 scholarly journal articles
6
, and seemingly countless blog entries, 
webpages, and on-line comments. Three prominent documentary films also delved into 
the intricacies of the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison: Ghost of Abu Ghraib (2007), 
Standard Operating Procedure (2008), and Taxi to the Dark Side (2007). Some 
journalistic investigation focused on revealing the ―truth‖ about the political and legal 
context of the soldiers‘ actions (Danner 2004; Hersh 2004; Strasser 2004), while 
numerous articles express informed positions on the legality and propriety of these acts 
(Dowd 2004a, 2004b; Sontag 2004; Dershowitz 2004a).  
Scholars analyzed the Abu Ghraib prisoner torture and abuse from a feminist 
perspective (Gronnvoll 2007; Philipose 2007); postcolonial perspective (Rajiva 2005; 
Tétreault 2006); social constructionist perspective (Bennett et al. 2006; Smith and 
Dionisopoulos 2008); and postmodernism perspective (Baudrillard 2006; Žižek 2004). 
Given the shocking nature of the images, many researchers performed a visual analysis of 
them (Apel 2005; Eisenman 2007; Mirzoeff 2006; Philpott 2005), while others focused 
on the political nature and implications of actions they depicted (Caton and Zacka 2010; 
Luban 2006). As controversial images, the Abu Ghraib photos and the actions captured 
within them were a ―focus of public fascination,‖ that ―mark[ed] key areas of dispute‖ 
(Attwood and Lockyer 2009, 1). The photos drew people in. Seizing global attention, the 
                                                 
5
 The number of books and book chapters about the events at Abu Ghraib prison was retrieved 
from the Library of Congress website. This statistic represents the results from a keyword search using the 
term ―Abu Ghraib‖ and was limited the search to books written in English.   
 
6
 This number of journal articles about Abu Ghraib was generated via combined search of two 
databases: Communication &Mass Media Complete and Academic Search Complete. This statistic 
represents the results from a keyword search using the term ―Abu Ghraib‖ and was limited the peer-





images provoked conflict and instigated debate that played out in print, broadcast, and 
on-line media as well as various academic outlets. The Abu Ghraib photos inspired this 
bevy of investigation, research, and analysis and yet, in spite of all this, the debates 
surrounding these images of prisoner abuse and torture have not been examined as a 
social controversy.  
―A social controversy,‖ according to Olson and Goodnight (1994), is an 
―extended rhetorical engagement [within the public discourse] that critiques, resituates, 
and develops communication practices‖ and norms (249). This engagement is a 
sustained, mediated debate between at least two oppositional parties which is more than 
just a difference of opinion, but rather a persistent conflict over the political and cultural 
implications that dominant forms of communicative reasoning, practices, and norms have 
for a public. Goodnight (1991) explains that social controversy ―is a creature of the 
between‖ (2); an initial objection flourishes into an interplay of sustained critique and 
frequent rejoinders that illuminates the ―engaged difference‖ between interlocutors (5). 
During a social controversy, arguments not only deal with the issue being debated but 
also the implicit forms of reasoning and dominant procedures that govern public 
discourse. As a form of disagreement, social controversy is ―both an essential condition 
of human existence and a potential good‖ given its ability to provoke debate about these 
privileged forms of communicative regulation (Hicks and Langsdorf 1999, 142).  
This does not assume that regulatory power is strictly repressive; regulating 
norms can be a productive force focused on promoting fairer and more inclusive practices 




Langsdorf 1999). As Olson and Goodnight (1994) conceptualized it, objections are raised 
in an attempt to shift regulatory power from repressive to more democratically productive 
procedures in the hopes of influencing political and cultural change. However, Goodnight 
(1999) later critiques this by asserting that, ―controversy cannot be valorized as resistance 
leading to change causing reform‖ (520). In other words, social controversies not only 
occur when individuals protest oppressive conditions. Individuals and groups may also 
object to reasoning, practices and norms they feel are too progressive and wish to create 
more conservative communicative conditions.  
When leveling objections to communicative rules and norms, opponents typically 
appeal to normative standards of legitimacy and propriety which regulate public 
discourse. Olson and Goodnight (1994) explain objections are raised regarding the 
―legitimacy of procedural rules or the fairness of grounds invoked in asserting a claim 
and establishing the conditions of communicative reasoning‖ (251). Normative standards 
of legitimacy are used as a criterion of judgment when concerns arise regarding whether a 
claim or action is ―morally justifiable and rationally produced‖ (Hicks and Langsdorf 
1999, 140). Objecting to the legitimacy of a practice, form of reasoning, or norm 
implicates it as somehow unlawful, unjust, and/or unreasonable which necessitates 
additional critique and, hopefully, reform. ―[An] objection,‖ Olson and Goodnight (1994) 
continue, ―is more than an opposing statement, because the performance of an argument 
always raises the relational question: Are the implied norms of understanding, testing, 
and adjudicating appropriate for us‖ (251)? Critiquing the propriety of a communicative 




the society that conforms to it. If a norm is indicative of whom we are as a society, 
objections that question normative propriety ask if this norm is also indicative of who we 
want to be.
7
   
Either way, social controversies are ―rich moments of rhetorical invention‖ during 
which attempts are made to (re)direct public discourse via the critique of reasoning and 
regulatory practices (Olson and Goodnight 1994, 273). The regulatory practices that are 
critiqued during social controversies include ―a culture‘s rules and presumptions on who 
gets to talk, what counts as proof, whose language is authoritative, and what norms shall 
govern decisions‖ (Wilson 1995, 204). Although addressing issues of deliberation, Hicks 
and Langsdorf‘s (1999) conceptualization of identity, locution, substance, and forum as 
the four procedural parameters which regulate disagreement can also be used to expand 
upon the types of practices and norms critiqued during social controversy. Accordingly, 
identity-based objections question what this issue says about a public‘s collective identity 
as well as who can speak authoritatively about it. Locution-based objections focus on 
how a public can speak about the issue and reveal the types of communication that are 
privileged within the debate. Substance-based objections critique the dominant forms of 
reasoning that undergird the practices and norms at the center of the conflict. Lastly, 
within social controversies, forum-based objections raise concerns regarding the political 
context of the debate and the implications this has on the progression of the conflict itself. 
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 Ironically, objections are at risk of being overlooked or dismissed if they stray too far from the 
norms they are critiquing and dominant rules of decorum. Thus, although social controversy can espouse a 
radical potential for change within contemporary publics by giving voice to dissenting and dissatisfied 
individuals and groups, a contemporary public‘s normative standards of legitimacy and propriety also can 





During the Abu Ghraib social controversy, political, legal, ideological, and moral 
questions regarding the legitimacy and propriety of the soldiers‘ actions were raised. As 
mentioned earlier, initial investigations mainly focused on the extent to which photos 
depicted soldiers employing U.S. sanctioned interrogation tactics or abusing and torturing 
prisoners. The soldiers claimed they were following orders and ample evidence supported 
this; the victims were alleged terrorists suspected of having Taliban and/or al-Qaeda 
intelligence desperately needed during the U.S. War on Terror (Danner 2004; Hersh 
2004; Tabuga 2004). The soldiers did what they were told they had to do as part of their 
duty to keep America safe. Yet, the images seemed to capture actions that appeared far 
more physically and mentally vicious than prisoner interrogation. This type of behavior is 
illegal in prisons across the U.S., so why is it sanctioned on the battlefield? Had the U.S. 
State Department‘s 2003 Human Rights Report not cited countries such as Burma, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran for the same ―harsh interrogation techniques‖ used at 
Abu Ghraib (Malinowski 2005, 140)?  
The Abu Ghraib social controversy revolved around these questions which 
incorporated additional concerns about the political implications these photos would have 
on America‘s faltering global standing and the U.S. War on Terror. People debated over 
what the tipping point between U.S. sanctioned interrogation tactics and prisoner abuse, 
or worse, torture was. Conflict ensued regarding the legitimacy and propriety of U.S. 
soldiers employing tactics such as beating, stripping, humiliating, and extreme physical 
and mental stressing of prisoners as a means to gather intelligence during wartime. 




intelligence, ideally used to thwart future terrorist attacks, legitimize causing prisoners 
this type of bodily and psychological pain. Sustained opposition arose over the legal, 
moral, political and ideological appropriateness of U.S. soldiers treating prisoners in this 
manner. For some, these images depicted a different type of America—one in which 
there was not a clear distinction between the U.S. military (including the citizens they 
represent) and the terrorist forces we were (and still are) fighting. Whiles others felt the 
situation was being blown out of proportion.  
Within the public discourse, opposing perspectives on these questions were 
framed as conflicting factions of the American public engaged in a prolonged battle over 
the legitimacy and propriety of the actions vividly captured in the Abu Ghraib photos. 
Objections to the abuse depicted in the photos were plentiful and clear; these soldiers 
were illegitimately exploiting their power as captor. Meaning, the Abu Ghraib photos 
depicted soldiers torturing, not simply abusing, their detainees which is not only illegal 
but also politically indefensible and morally reprehensible regardless of the intelligence it 
might generate. People publicly critiqued the U.S. government for being hypocritical. 
How could we sanction this type of military behavior at Abu Ghraib when we have 
publicly reprimanded other countries for similar behavior knowing that it violates the 
Geneva Convention as well as our democratic ideals in prisoner and human rights?  Still 
others objected to the actions captured in the Abu Ghraib photos for fear that this type of 
behavior would fuel further hate-filled acts of terrorism, ultimately putting Americans in 




These hard-line objections were met with opposition by individuals and groups 
that did not believe the actions portrayed in the Abu Ghraib photos were that bad or 
unjustifiable. Some supporters argued that the photographed actions were harsh but that 
what these U.S. soldiers did was not as horrific as what Saddam Hussein had done to his 
own people when Abu Ghraib prison was under his rule. The rationale being that as long 
as our enemies physically and psychologically treat their prisoners worse than our 
soldiers did, our military‘s actions could be considered legitimate and appropriate within 
this context. Others asserted that the pictures simply captured the raw, visceral conditions 
of combat; laws and democratic ideals, although essential in civilian live are not always 
plausible on the battlefield where soldiers are trying to survive. In war, a soldiers‘ need to 
survive is enough justification for the legitimacy and propriety of the actions depicted in 
the Abu Ghraib photos.  
This combination of objections and rebuttals within the public discourse about 
Abu Ghraib highlight what can be considered traditional dimensions of social 
controversy. They address some of the political, cultural, and ideological issues and 
implications surrounding U.S. policy on interrogation, abuse, and torture. Throughout the 
conflict the dominant norms and practices regarding these policies and the reasoning 
embedded within them become more visible, enabling critics to analyze how these 
prevailing conventions influence and regulate public discourse. But what it left behind is 






The Affective Dimensions of Social Controversy 
The leaked photos of abuse at Abu Ghraib prison offer a salient example of how 
affective states can permeate the context of social controversy as well as the types of 
emotion-based claims that can be made during the conflict. Affect is a notoriously 
difficult term to define partially due to the fluidity of the phenomenon. In many ways, 
affect is a perpetual moment of potential becoming; a constantly emerging, dynamic 
relation between the sensate experience of the ‗context‘ and the visceral reaction of the 
‗self‘ that varies in degrees of intensity and ―force-relations‖ which can influence an 
individual‘s ―ability to affect and a susceptibility to be affected‖ (Massumi 2002, 61). 
Affect has a unique interstitial quality; within any given context, the ‗self‘ both unfolds 
into the environment by emitting sensate messages (i.e., sounds, scents, pheromones, etc.) 
while simultaneously infolding sensual information gleaned from the environment. This 
immediate, synergistic interaction is the real-time process of affect which occurs at a 
nonconscious level; the ―self‖ responds to sensate perceptions of a situation at the bodily, 
chemical and neural level before these reactions are cognitively registered. However, 
individuals can become conscious of patterns of affect (i.e., the sensations of the sensate 
experience-visceral reaction relation) in the form of feelings.  
A feeling is the cognitive acknowledgement of a pattern of sensate-visceral 
relations and experienced sensations. Feelings, in this way, cognitively capture affects 
within distinct states of relation; yet there is always an excess of affect that cannot be 
captured in feelings. Individuals do not ―feel‖ every affect they experience rather a 




explains, ―Feelings can be sifted from affects, and better known to consciousness, 
through the deployment of living attention‖ (139). Feelings are recognized through a 
process of discernment; the significance and importance of a feeling is not solely based 
on our immediate sensate-visceral relations but also our history of like encounters 
(including their outcomes and detailed aspects) as well as the qualitative differences 
between them. Therefore, the discernment of a feeling‘s meaning is aided by the memory 
or (re)collection of past experiences that provoked like sensate-visceral relations and 
embodied sensations. These (re)collection of affective experiences are imbued with 
personal significance as well as cultural, ideological, and political importance given the 
context during which they were felt.   
―Feelings,‖ according to Brennan (2004), are ―sensations that have found the right 
match in words‖ (5). People tend to express or convey how they feel through emotional 
language and display.  As Massumi (2002) explains, ―Emotion is the most intense (most 
contracted) expression of that capture‖ of feeling (35). For example, if I sincerely state ―I 
feel happy‖ this literally means the sensate experience of being in a certain environment 
has triggered a pattern of visceral reactions the feeling of which I cognitively recognize 
as happiness because it is a sensation of delight and pleasure. However, emotions are not 
simply subjective states; they are intersubjective concepts representing widely recognized 
feelings which are imbued with cultural meaning, ideological symbolism, and political 
significance. As Massumi (2002) explains an emotion is ―the sociolinguistic fixing of the 
quality of an experience which is…qualified intensity, the conventional, consensual point 




narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning‖ (28). The 
intersubjective nature of emotions also makes affect vulnerable to dominant reasoning, 
practices, and norms as a means of regulation within the public sphere. There are socially 
legitimate and appropriate ways to feel and emotionally act in response to any given 
situation.  
Affects, therefore, ―are integral to our ability to grasp the meaning of a situation 
and to act appropriately in response to it‖ (Johnson 2007, 68). Focusing on the affective 
dimensions of social controversy will highlight the norms regarding affects, feelings, and 
emotions that have been deemed legitimate and appropriate which consequently regulate 
how we address affect in the public discourse as well as how we embody affect and our 
public conduct.
8
 Within social controversies, affects can be publically acknowledged as 
specific feelings or emotions when they reach a point of saliency. Salience occurs when 
the intensity of an affect becomes recognizable; often due to the use of sharp sensual 
contrasts (i.e., loud/soft sounds, hot/cold surfaces, sweet/sour tastes, pungent/faint scents, 
blurry/crisp images), feeling and emotional contrasts (i.e., pleasure/pain, happy/sad) or 
the deep saturation or concentration of an affective state. Within social controversy affect 
becomes salient in two distinct ways: affective states and emotion-based claims.  
Social controversies are not simply an accumulation of tactically based 
oppositional arguments; they are argumentative experiences during which numerous 
                                                 
 8 The term affective encompasses the range of concepts that deal with the conscious and 
nonconscious experience of affect. This includes but is not limited to: affect, sensate-visceral relations, 
sensation, feeling, and emotion. As an adjective, the term affective is used to signify the specific affect-
focus of a given object, act, event, individual, stance, etc. For instance, the term affective investment is 
meant to address a person‘s investments that deal with affect, feelings, and emotions rather than political 
and/or monetary concerns. This is not to say that affective, political, and monetary investments are not 





affective states unfold and are embodied. These states are diffuse feelings, or moods, 
which can provoke and/or permeate the overall controversy. Generally speaking, 
controversial acts, claims, and texts can create an affective state best described as unease; 
there is a sense of physical and mental disquiet and general restlessness that results in 
acts of public objection and rejoinders that culminated in sustained opposition. However, 
these overarching affective states are not the only ones present during a social 
controversy. Affective states function argumentatively in two ways. First, they can act as 
experiential arguments; claims that are sensate-visceral enactments of the conditions of 
one‘s affective experience. As experiential claims, affective states both attest to the 
conditions that provoked this state and act as the grounds for the claim. Second, affective 
states can be affective appeals; diffuse moods that infuse a claim or stance that invite 
audiences to engage in this state either in a similar fashion that echoes it or in a 
(re)actionary manner that implies an affective relation between then.  
Technically speaking, affective states are not only accessible in immediate 
experience. They can also be captured in various forms such as bodies, photos, video, 
audio, music, art, and language. The capture is a representation of an affective state 
caught in a distinct moment that does not, and cannot, fully encapsulate the affect. As 
indicative of an affective state, in distinction from an emotion-based claim, this capture is 
not necessarily limited to one specific emotion. Rather, each capture can convey a 
sensation that does not have an exact emotion that it corresponds to. The capture enables 
affective states to be circulated within the public discourse. Just as individuals discern 




exam their immediate or captured affective states to discern how they feel. When we 
attempt to discern an others‘ affective state via a capture we also need to take into 
consideration how the form of the capture can impact the discernment process. 
During social controversies, affect also becomes salient via discursive and non-
discursive claims regarding specific emotions. For instance, opponents of the proposed 
Wisconsin laws argue that people should feel outrage at the local government‘s attempts 
to undermine public employee unions‘ collective bargaining power. Emotion-based 
claims, like all arguments made during social controversies, are appeals to normative 
standards of legitimacy and propriety regarding how the public should feel, and thus 
behave, in relation to this conflict. As a form of oppositional argument, emotion-based 
claims are used to block dominant enthymemes regarding specific emotions that establish 
the affective dimensions of a controversy. By blocking dominant emotion-based 
enthymemes implicit societal norms about these emotions can be revealed enabling the 
contestation, reevaluation, and renovation of these normative practices. 
Affective objections are specific affective states and/or emotion-based claims that 
advance salient, specific states or emotions that are at issue in the controversy. 
―Objections,‖ as Olson and Goodnight (1994) explicate them, ―are leveled against the 
projection of consensus because all rules of reasoning and division of grounds are said to 
be but rationalizations of oppressive power conditions‖ (251). Likewise, affective 
objections reject the casual recognition and acceptance of an affective state and/or 
dominant norms regarding affect, feelings, emotions, and conduct; instead the legitimacy 




a specific historical, cultural, and political set of conditions is questioned. Affective 
objections are often used in conjunction with critiques that propose alternative means of 
envisioning that which is being objected to. Within the Abu Ghraib social controversy, 
both of these affective dimensions are recognizable.   
Affective State of Pleasure at Pain in Abu Ghraib 
Within the Abu Ghraib social controversy, the intensity of the affective states 
captured in the images as well as the evidentiary status granted to photography demanded 
immediate attention in a manner that news reports alone simply could not provide. Taken 
as a group, the Abu Ghraib photos created an affective state that does not have one 
specific emotional counterpart; rather they oscillate between groups of juxtaposed 
extreme sensations of pain/humiliation/fear and pleasure/delight/enjoyment. The intense 
felt contrast between the detainees‘ pain and the soldiers‘ pleasure was so prominently 
displayed in the Abu Ghraib photos that it became part of what Americans were arguing 
over. In this way, their affective state of pleasure at pain acted as an affective appeal that 
underwrites the Abu Ghraib social controversy.  
The disturbing aesthetics of the Abu Ghraib images are emotionally and viscerally 
jarring; the violence grotesque, the soldiers‘ dispositions crass and garish, the victims 
hurt and humiliated. The over-exaggerated thumbs up further accentuated by latex 
seafoam-colored gloves and the grandiose smiles stretched across U.S. soldiers‘ faces as 
they stand next to battered, bound, hooded, naked and even some deceased detainees 
visually capture a chaotic sensation of comedy in the face of tragedy. Soldiers‘ big toothy 




models‘ wide smiles have become iconic of ―the idea of pleasure‖ of consuming a 
company‘s products (Kotchemidova 2005, 10). The trace of this smile beckons a 
sensation of consumer pleasure, transforming the photos into ads for U.S. involvement in 
Iraqi with the soldiers‘ smiling promotion of the abusive power we wield there. The 
soldiers‘ wide grins and embellished gestures exhibit no remorse or regret but rather 
enjoyment and satisfaction; relishing the recognition of the prisoners‘ twisted bodies, 
anguished expressions and/or hooded faces.  
The composition of the images add to this affective experience; the slightly 
blurred contents feel strangely nostalgic, reminiscent in tone and form of ordinary 
snapshots captured by the point-and-shoot medium of digital photography documenting 
daily life in a manner that can be uploaded, copied, burned, and forwarded to others for 
their consumption and enjoyment. The digital lay photography of the Abu Ghraib soldiers 
highlight ―a shift from photographing others for self-consumption to documentation of 
self for consumption by others‖ (Schwarz 2010, 165). The photos from Abu Ghraib 
prison feel like a type of mediated self-portraiture, taken and circulated by American 
troops, which disclose an America where its citizens are no longer victims of the 
seemingly irrational violence suffered on September 11
th
 but rather the joyful perpetrators 
of physical vengeance. As an affective appeal, the contradiction of affects in content, 
display, and function made the affective state of the Abu Ghraib photos inherently 
controversial. The affective state of pleasure at pain that is captured in the images invited 
viewers to engage in this intensely conflicting mood and, for some people, evoked an 




Emotion-Based Claims and Sontag’s Affective Objection of Shame 
Emotion-based claims raised during the Abu Ghraib social controversy 
questioned U.S. norms regarding what the appropriate response to the soldiers‘ display of 
seemingly cruel enjoyment of the prisoners‘ suffering should be. For some, the images 
seemed to beg the question; should we not feel disgust at the soldiers‘ shamelessness and 
apparent joy in causing pain? Critics argued that, at its core, the Abu Ghraib controversy 
stemmed from the soldiers‘ exaggerated display of pleasure in causing the detainees‘ 
physical and mental suffering (Luban 2006; Sontag 2004; Žižek 2004), and that these 
―literally ‗happy snaps‘ of torture‖ (Ulevich 2004) should result in feelings of disgust 
(Bloom 2004) as well as a ―sort of national shame‖ (Gillespie 2004) due to the soldiers‘ 
violation of the public‘s trust (Wallis 2004). 
During this controversy, Susan Sontag‘s New York Times Magazine article 
―Regarding the Torture of Others‖ serves as an affective objection to the Abu Grhaib 
photos. ―What is illustrated by these photographs‖ Sontag (2004) argues, ―is as much the 
[US] culture of shamelessness as the reigning admiration for unapologetic brutality‖ (29). 
Rather than feel shame at the pain caused by their own hands, these photos demonstrate 
the soldiers‘ sense of pride in their own brutality towards those rendered powerless. The 
complete effrontery to the pain and degradation of these prisoners is exacerbated as a 
performance of ―fun‖ by the soldiers (Sontag 2004, 28). Sedgwick (2003) asserts that 
―shame attaches to and sharpens the sense of what one is . . . it is the place where the 




For Sontag, the grotesque nature of the photos should provoke a sense of shame 
for Americans; a feeling of embarrassment or dishonor at what these soldiers‘ actions say 
about who we are as a nation. However, she is not simply imploring individuals to 
personally feel shame but rather to constitute a public based on a normative standard of 
shame that would compel its members to judge these soldiers‘ actions as illegitimate and 
inappropriate. As Ahmed (2004) explains, it is ―not so much how shame is ―felt‖ by 
nations, but how declarations of shame can bring ‗the nation‘ into existence as a felt 
community‖ (101). This felt community is established by a general acknowledgement of 
―wrongdoing‖; Ahmed (2004) continues, ―the ‗we‘ is shamed by its recognition that it 
has committed ‗acts and omissions,‘ which have caused pain, hurt and loss for indigenous 
others‖ (Ahmed 2004, 101). By calling into question the U.S. ―culture of shamelessness,‖ 
Sontag is calling on the U.S. public to reject the dominant norms of shame that do not 
code these soldiers‘ behavior as illegitimate or inappropriate but instead frame their 
actions as acceptable and even necessary forms of interrogation during wartime. Sontag 
asserts that the soldiers‘ actions are shameful because they are abusive to the point of 
torture; yet that is not the only reason they should provoke shame.  
Embedded within the simple act of taking these photos and circulating them to 
other soldiers, family and friends, is the photographers‘ desire for recognition. In this 
case, the same soldiers were the creators (i.e., photographers), perpetrators (i.e., abusers), 
circulators (i.e. original distributors of the images), and partial subjects of the Abu Ghraib 
photos.
9
 The photos, then, act as a request for acknowledge of the pleasure the soldiers 
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 The Abu Ghraib photos were primarily taken with SSG Ivan ―Chip‖ Fredericks, SPC Charles 




took in displaying their power over these detainees as well as the detainees‘ physical, 
mental, and affective submission to them. Thus, ―the horror of what is shown in the 
photographs,‖ Sontag (2005) eloquently explains, ―cannot be separated from the horror 
that the photographs were taken—with the perpetrators posing, gloating, over their 
helpless captives‖ (26). For Sontag, the physical violence enacted against the detainees 
was only part of what made the Abu Ghraib photos so disturbing. The other disconcerting 
part is the voyeuristic nature in which they were constructed; the soldiers wanted others 
to witness their joyful violence.
10
 Whether it was to share their pleasure, incited anger in 
their enemies or cause further humiliation to their prisoners, the Abu Ghrab photos were 
constructed in a manner that would surely invoke a visceral and emotional response from 
viewers.   
Simply put, the photographed soldiers‘ emotional display sparked a social 
controversy that addressed the relationship between citizenship and affect; U.S. citizens 
argued over what our democratic ideals of American citizenship are and whether or not 
taking pleasure in prisoner torture and abuse fits within this civic framework. In other 
words, democratic ideals of U.S. citizenship not only establish norms and conventions 
regarding political and moral relations, but also relations based on affect (i.e., how we 
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 Grusin (2010) argues that an additional affective component in the Abu Ghraib controversy was 
the manner of photos creation and transmission (i.e. the mediality of digital photography). Grusin asserts 
that taking and disseminating digital photographs is, at its core, an action based in the sensory-emotive 
transmission of affect. In other words, people take, upload, and forward digital photos in order to elicit 
emotional reactions from their recipients. The continual use of this digital media technology has created an 
expected, or premediated, response in audiences—the reception of digital photos is nonconsciously 
assumed to be an affective experience. Grusin argues that this sensory-emotive media-based premediation 
coupled with the intense saliency of affect depicted in the photos was so overwhelming that it resulted in an 
experience of shock at the images of the Abu Ghraib prison abuse. It was as if audiences were given a 
double dose of affect via the sensory-emotive experience of the medium and the aesthetic depiction of the 





should experience our relationship to another at the sensate-visceral, felt, and emotional 
level). Individuals are held accountable to these norms and conventions of affect should 
politically, morally, and affective respond to controversial situations based on these 
ideals. these ideals hold us accountable to. When a social controversy addresses issues of 
affect, the implicit norms and conventions regarding affect are contested. Sontag and 
others who offered affective objections to the Abu Ghraib photos argued that the soldiers‘ 
self-conscious display of joy was grotesque in the presence of such obvious suffering. 
The photos reflected a gross subversion of the affects, feelings, and emotions that the 
soldiers‘ ought to conduct their behavior according to as U.S. citizens. Consequently, 
these image raised questions of just what we, as Americans, are doing in the name of 
democracy during the War on Terror. Thus, affective objections to the Abu Ghraib abuse 
are closely associated with political and moral questions regarding our collective national 
identity.  
During the Abu Ghraib social controversy, determining what affects, feelings, and 
emotions are not only appropriate but, more importantly, legitimate for American citizens 
to experience in relation to the Abu Ghraib images is a main concern. In other words, as 
Americans, should we share in the soldiers‘ shameless pleasure as we witness our troops 
cause incarcerated prisoners‘ physical and mental pain? Is it legitimate for Americans to 
feel joy at brutalizing prisoners in the midst of war? Should we not as ―civilized, 
democratic citizens‖ behave more humanely and, at the very least, feel remorse when 
causing our enemies pain? As even President Bush stated, ―That‘s not the way we do 




how we did things in military detention facilities throughout Iraqi, Afghanistan, and Cuba 
(Stockman 2004). But this time, American citizens felt it.  
Research Questions 
 Within the Abu Ghraib social controversy, the political, moral, and cultural 
significance of affect became an important aspect of the conflict. Even though Abu 
Ghraib provides one of the most salient examples of the affective dimensions of social 
controversy, it is not the only public debate that this occurs. This project will, therefore, 
further conceptualize the affective dimensions of social controversy as affect-based 
normative objection and critique which addresses the role affect plays in the regulation of 
public discourse and conduct. To do so, this dissertation will be driven by the following 
research questions. First, how does considering affect extend and contribute to our 
understanding of the nature and significance of social controversy? Specifically, how do 
the affective dimensions of social controversies emerge and what is their potential to 
critically interrogate the presumptions underwriting dominant norms and conventions that 
regulate public life and establish the cultural politics of affect, feelings, and emotions? 
Second, what can the analysis of these dimensions tell us about relationship between 
affect and citizenship; that is, how is citizenship increasingly being shaped by norms and 
conventions of affect and what are the implications of doing so? Specifically, what 
figures of the citizen are articulated in affective states and emotion-based claims and how 






Preview of Chapters 
This dissertation follows an inductive, progressive format. Each chapter builds 
upon the previous one leading to a discussion of the overall implications and conclusions 
of the study. After explicating the overall theory of affect as it culminates in social 
controversies in chapter two, I turn to the analysis of two specific conflicts. Rather than 
repeatedly applying a formal methodological framework to each case, the analysis of the 
affective dimensions of social controversy is presented separated in chapters three and 
four to facilitate a more in-depth examination of how each can function in social 
controversy. The fifth and final chapter includes a discussion of the overarching findings 
of this project and the implications these conclusion have on theories of democratic 
citizenship.  
Chapter Two 
Chapter two delves into the theoretical and methodological framework of this 
project, beginning with a review of literature on social controversy. Olson and 
Goodnight‘s (1994) work of social controversy is situated as the foundational work and, 
utilizing a generative approach, this framework is expanded upon using four overarching 
constructive critiques and extensions of their theory. These focus on: the separation 
between discursive and nondiscursive claims; the limitations of opposition-based theories 
of argumentation; the need for incommensurate discourses; and the potential for change. 
To aid in the explication of these extensions and critiques, brief examples from the Abu 




This generative approach leads to a discussion of the role affect plays in social 
controversy and further theorizes its affective dimensions. The affective dimensions of 
social controversy deal will the affects, feelings, and emotions that play a significant role 
in the conflict as part of the argumentative substance at issue which have implications for 
germane publics. Developed as a rhetorical and argumentative construct, the affective 
dimensions of social controversy are conceptualized in three-parts. First, the theory of 
affect is discussed addressing its movement as an orienting and galvanizing force. 
Second, in order to operationalize affect for use within rhetorical theory, a number of 
terms are conceptualized in a movement towards a rhetorical lexicon of affect. Finally, a 
more thorough explication of emotion-based claims, affective states, and the relationship 
between them is offered.   
Chapter Three 
 The third chapter focuses on the social controversy surrounding the International 
Freedom Center (IFC)—the proposed, but now defunct, museum that would have been 
built at the World Trade Center (WTC) site. Conceived of as ―a living memorial‖ to 
―freedom‘s power over tyranny, terror, and injustice,‖ the IFC would have told the story 
of 9/11 as one of many struggles for freedom fought throughout the world (IFC 2005, 4). 
Initially, the proposed museum was well received but just one year after the IFC was 
granted a physical space at the WTC site, critics complained that its mission was 
inappropriate for this ―hallowed‖ ground.  
 Analysis of the affective dimensions of this controversy focuses on the emotion-




the IFC‘s proponents‘ rebuttal of this claim. The TBM campaign was led by a coalition of 
9/11 families and first-responder (i.e., firefighter and police) associations who objected to 
the IFC‘s creation at Ground Zero. They argued that the IFC would not be a legitimate or 
appropriate way to memorialize 9/11 and its victims at this site because it would not 
foster feelings of reverence about this tragedy or provoke acts of veneration out of respect 
for the deceased. Members of the TBM feared that the proposed museum would be 
nothing more than a thinly veiled, left-leaning history lesson that would admonish U.S. 
American foreign policy provoking feelings of national shame, rather than reverence, as 
well as promote the plight of other victims of tragedy eliciting empathy for individuals 
other than the September 11
th
 victims. On the contrary, IFC supporters generally assert 
that the WTC site is the most fitting place for a museum honoring freedom. Because of 
the site‘s political and cultural significance, supporters believe that the WTC site should 
engage visitors in an experience of hope, inspiration, and analytic curiosity as a means to 
galvanize them to become more civically engaged. IFC proponents did not put forth any 
one salient emotion-based claim to counter the TBM‘s; rather, they focused on refuting 
what was believed to be the TBM‘s blatant misinterpretation and (re)presentation of their 
mission and goal. The eventual eviction of the IFC from the WTC site reaffirmed the 
dominant norms of respect at sacred site and suggests that even the potential for critical 
engagement of American politics and policies in these spaces is illegitimate and 
inappropriate behavior for U.S. citizens to engage in.  
To examine the affective dimensions of the IFC social controversy, New York 




and analyzed. As Matthew Schuerman of the New York Observer noted, these regional 
news outlets, as if drawing lines in the proverbial sand, offered passionate and biased 
coverage of the conflict. The New York Times who, at first critiqued the IFC as a 
possible ―front for a Republican White House,‖ later supported the proposed museum 
(Schuerman 2005). The Daily News and Newsday also ―came down firmly in favor‖ of 
the IFC (Schuerman 2005). Whereas the New York Post proclaim themselves to be "true 
to the opposition,‖ by waging a relentless campaign against the IFC (Schuerman 2005). 
This news discourse is supplemented with texts created by the Lower Manhattan 
Development Corporation (LMDC), the IFC and the TBM campaign. Each of these 
organizations were major stakeholders in the controversy and their documents offered 
deeper insights into their stances as well as background information into the conflict. 
Chapter Four 
 The fourth chapter focuses on the affective states that infused the social 
controversy surrounding the 2004 French ban on conspicuous religious attire in public 
schools. This controversial law prohibits public school students from wearing 
ostentatious religious clothing and symbols including, but not limited to, Islamic veils or 
hijab, Jewish kippa or skull caps, large Catholic crosses, and Sikh turbans. Although this 
law bans all of these types of religious dress, hijab has been considered its main focus 
since French-Islamic schoolgirls are the largest population effect by it. Thus, the 
proposed law reignited a longstanding social controversy regarding the legitimacy and 




 During the Loi n* 2004-228 social controversy, the affective dimension were 
most salient in the affective states of fear and risk that infused the pro-law stance and the 
mood of indignation that imbued the law‘s opponents stance with a type of passionate 
anger. The analysis of these states focuses on how these states act as affective appeals 
that underwrite the oppositional, pro/anti logic of the conflict. Pro-law supporters 
considered hijab a sign of fundamentalism and, thus, argued that it posed a risk to French 
students and national unity which citizens should be fearful of. They argued that banning 
the veil within public school was for the ―greater good‖ as a means to contain Islamic 
fundamentalism and reaffirm the ideal and norms of laïcité, roughly translated to 
secularism, within young citizens. Not surprising, those who opposed the law believed it 
was an unabashed act of Islamophobia that was an unjust infringement on French-Islamic 
girls‘ rights which would worsen racial tensions in France. As an intentional violation on 
its own citizens‘ liberty of conviction, opponents of the law were indignant about the 
blatant injustice of this law as well as the disregard it showed for these schoolgirls‘ 
education.  The approval of the law, in September 2004, signals the predominance of an 
affective state of fear, justifying the strict regulations on students, specifically veiled 
French-Islamic girls.  
 Analysis of this controversy also engages the affective response of one particular 
student, Cennet Doǧanay, as offering an incommensurate claim which is irreducible to 
the pro/anti logic of the conflict. As a veiled French-Islamic student, the law created an 






 Unwilling to decide either the law or her veil, Cennet made the 
difficult decision to shave her head as a means to unveil (to stay at her school) but not 
show her hair (which she believed was the spirit of hijab). At the moment of public 
unveiling her shorn head, Cennet‘s affective state of defiant compliance acts as an 
experiential claim, that testifies to the sensate-visceral impact this law has on the 
everyday lives of young, veiled French-Islamic girls and raised questions regarding the 
legitimacy and propriety of the law considering the harrowing experience it creates for 
these girls.  
 The examination of the Loi n* 2004-228 social controversy is derived from the 
substantial and insightful academic analysis this conflict has garnered  (Bowen 2007; 
Choudhury 2007; Croucher 2006, 2008, 2009; Joppke 2009; Keaton 2006; Volpp 2007; 
Winter 2008). Although a thorough body of scholarship, none of these works explicitly 
examine the affective dimensions of this controversy which this chapter does. On the 
contrary, since Cennet‘s objection has not received any academic attention thus far, 
analysis of her affective response is based on French, Turkish, and English newspaper, 
newswire, and magazine articles that feature stories about her from October 1, 2004 to 
October 1, 2005. Additionally, institutional reports about Cennet made by the Muslim 
Writers Alliance, the Islamic Human Rights Commission, and AKDER Women‘s Rights 
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 My use of Cennet's Doǧanay‘s first name is an intentional attempt to create a more empathetic 
engagement with her claim via the intimate usage of ―Cennet‖ rather than ―Doǧanay‖.  My reference to her 
as ―Cennet‖ is also an attempt for me to make my own affective state salient. In other words, the act of 
examining her affective state of defiant compliance has has oriented me to her, turning me towards her 
experience under the law and appreciating how difficult the decision to shave her head was for her. I mean 
no disrespect by calling her "Cennet," quite the contrary I mean care, respect, and appreciation for her and 




Association Against Discrimination are also analyzed as well as the website Islam Online 
which featured extensive coverage and interviews with her.   
Chapter Five 
The fifth and final chapter offers a review of this project and draw out major 
insights, findings, and implications of this research. From this research, there are three 
substantial findings that have implications for the field of communication. First, the 
affective dimensions of social controversy deal with the regulation of public conduct 
rather than public discourse. Emotion-based claims and affective states pose arguments 
regarding the legitimacy and propriety of the experience of affects, feelings, and 
emotions in given scenarios as well as the types of conduct this experience should 
produce. Thus, these claims address the regulation of conduct – how one should feel 
given the conditions of his/her experience and how one should behave in response to 
these felt conditions. One implication of this is the connection between the affective 
dimensions of social controversy and Foucault‘s theory of governmentality and can 
enable scholars to analyze how controversies can be moments when the public governs 
its own behavior and beckons the state to engage in disciplinary acts.  
Second, the regulation of public conduct was rationalized via the possibility of 
potential risk to national unity and, in the case of the French law, national security. In 
both case studies, when norms or laws restricting the citizenry‘s conduct were proposed, 
they were asserted as a means to create national unity and civility by foreclosing on the 
sensate-visceral experiences that create feelings of vulnerability. Thus, the ties between 




discussion addresses what experiences of risk are seemingly too intense to be publicly 
allowed without jeopardizing a nation‘s cohesion and safety.  
Third, analysis of the affective dimensions of social controversy has two salient 
implications for theories of citizenship. First, given that the affective dimensions of social 
controversy deal with the regulation of public conduct, the outcomes of these conflicts 
illuminate the normative parameters of citizen conduct. These parameters imply that there 
are affective dimensions to citizenship that addresses how a nation‘s citizens should feel 
and conduct themselves in any given situation. Second, emotion-based claims and 
affective states invite individuals to empathetically engage in these arguments which can 
establish a civic relationship of based on recognition as a first step towards civic support 
and action. This project will conclude with a discussion of recent scholarship on 








SOCIAL CONTROVERSY AND ITS AFFECTIVE DIMENSIONS 
Introduction 
Olson and Goodnight‘s (1994) groundbreaking article ―Entanglements of 
Consumption, Cruelty, Privacy, and Fashion: The Social Controversy over Fur‖ lays out 
both a theory and methodological framework of social controversy for analyzing 
oppositional conflicts. Although this essay has enjoyed great notoriety and influence in 
the rhetorical field, it only prompted a small number of published projects that directly 
address or, at least partially, utilize social controversy as a methodological approach 
(Boyd 2002; Dascal 1995, 1998; Deem 2010; Finnegan 2000; Fritch et al. 2006; 
Goodnight 1999, 2003, 2005; Gross 2005; Lyne 2005; Miller 2005; Ono and Sloop 1999; 
Phillips 1999; Wilson 1995).
12
  Consequently, social controversy research remains a rich 
area to expand on as a rhetorical theory and methodological approach. As a case in point, 
this project takes as its starting point Olson and Goodnight‘s theory and methodological 
framework of social controversy as a tactical, argument-focused approach to oppositional 
disagreement that unfolds within public discourse. Using a generative approach to the 
literature on social controversy, four extensions and/or friendly critiques of Olson and 
Goodnight‘s work will be addressed to create a more in-depth methodological framework 
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 According to a preliminary search on Google Scholar since its 1994 publication in the Quarterly 





for this project. These extensions and critiques deal with: the separation between 
discursive and nondiscursive claims; the limitations of opposition-based theories of 
argumentation; the need for incommensurate discourses; and the potential for change. To 
help explicate this critical evolution of social controversy theory and methodological 
approach, brief examples from the Abu Ghraib social controversy will be used.  
Collectively, these critiques will lead to a discussion of the role affect plays in 
social controversy. Considering how integral affect can be to the provocation and 
perpetuation of social controversy, it has only been explicitly theorized by Greene and 
Hicks (1993) and implicitly addressed by Fritch et al. (2006), and DeLuca (1999b). Since 
affect has been undertheorized in this literature, this chapter will include a theory of the 
affective dimensions of social controversy. The affective dimensions of social 
controversy deal will the affects, feelings, and emotions that play a significant role in the 
conflict as part of the argumentative substance that people are arguing about. Just as the 
―traditional‖ dimensions of social controversy address some of the political, cultural, and 
ideological issues and implications of the conflict, the affective dimensions deal with the 
affects, feelings, and emotions that are also at issue and have implications for germane 
publics. The relationship between affect and social controversy will be explicated in three 
parts. First, the concept of affect will be explained in detail. Second, a lexicon of terms 
will be offered to aid in the operationalization of affect for use in rhetorical theory, 
specifically social controversy research. Third, a more in-depth explication of emotion-




Olson and Goodnight’s Theory of and Methodology Framework for Social 
Controversy 
The Theoretical Underpinnings  
Social controversies permeate everyday life. They are common, even at times 
banal, yet significant to the creation, perpetuation, and reform of the dominant 
conventions and norms we collectively live by. As a form of rhetorical criticism, Olson 
and Goodnight‘s (1994) theory of social controversy focuses on the tactical movement of 
oppositional argumentation to determine how claims function in relation to each other 
and dominant communicative norms, practices, and reasoning. By highlighting 
opponents‘ argumentation strategy, Olson and Goodnight were able to analyze the 
implicit and explicit regulation of public discourse that occurs during these types of 
conflicts which, they believe, is a constitutive feature of the contemporary public sphere. 
More than staged critical discussion or publicized differences of opinion, social 
controversy makes the implicit parameters of public discourse discernible and, hence, 
vulnerable to critique.   
The interplay of risk and controversy is valuable, as Wilson (1995) explains, for 
―[o]ne can understand more fully traditional values, procedures, and norms when they are 
at risk‖ (204). This risk makes social controversies replete with potential—arguments are 
raised not simply to garner agreement but instead influence social, cultural, and political 
change. Consequently, these conflicts can have implications for the performance of 
citizenship and the normative standards that guide it. As Fritch et al. (2006) assert 




but, instead, often is a sign of a public capable of evolution, changing in response to 
shifting beliefs, norms, and conditions‖ (192).
13
 Thus, social controversies address 
overarching civic topics and issues such as: democratic participation and inclusion; 
economic dispensation and consumerism; identity politics and grievances; civil and 
human rights; and, lastly, socially just policies and practices.  
Not surprisingly, social controversies can produce ―rich moments of rhetorical 
invention‖ during which opponents may creatively stretch the limits of conventional 
argumentation in an attempt to influence the direction of the conflict and move the public 
in a given social, cultural, and/or legal direction (Olson and Goodnight 1994, 273). Like 
Olson and Goodnight, Dascal (2001) highlights the strategic nature of controversies 
which, he argues, creates a context in which argumentative imagination, creativity and 
innovation are desirable skills since they can bring novelty to longstanding, and possibly 
stagnant, conflicts. For both, the process of rhetorical invention begins with a critical 
objection to taken-for-granted norms, beliefs, and practices that ―spreads quickly to other 
problems and reveals profound divergences‖ between the opponents‘ argumentative 
mentalities, methods, and values (Dascal 2001, 315).
14
 Goodnight (2003) asserts that 
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 This evolutionary possibility was also noted by Dascal (1995, 1996) who asserted that 
controversy is a catalyzing force in the advancement of mathematical and scientific theory as well as 
disciplinary epistemic growth and change. Considered the ―the grand man of the study of controversy‖ 
within philosophy, Marcelo Dascal built a typography of controversy in response to the dichotomy within 
dialogue literature between discussion and dispute (van Eemeren & Garssen 2008, 1). Dascal‘s research 
deals with determining what provoked transformations in the history of scientific and philosophical 
knowledge. In his more recent work, this focus has evolved to include ongoing political controversies in 
hopes of aiding their needed resolution. See Dascal‘s (2007) Traditions of Controversy, for his analysis of 
the Palestinian/Israeli conflict for his foray into politicals. 
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 Dascal (1995) identifies six main characteristics of controversies: the problematic evolves over 
time; presuppositions are continually questioned; opponents enjoy ―hermeneutic freedom‖ when 
interpreting and misinterpreting each others‘ claims; outcomes, interpretations, contextual boundaries, and 




critical stances are based within an ―argumentative predicament‖ that is driven by 
competing claims that demand examination, discussion, and debate (121). 
Enacting an objection to a particular norm raises questions regarding its 
legitimacy and appropriateness for a given public since its constituency is held 
accountable to this standard. ―In [these] predicaments,‖ Goodnight (2003) continues, 
―multidirectional, recursive vectors driving the ―force of the better argument‖ emerge; for 
instance, validity conditions that simultaneously invite reflection, yet demand resolution 
among interlocutors‖ (121). During social controversies each opponent asserts his/her 
claims as valid within a given context. As the conflict unfolds, a public‘s constituents 
judge the validity of competing claims in accordance to the normative standards of 
legitimacy and propriety they collectively want to live by.  
Olson and Goodnight’s Methodological Framework 
Olsen and Goodnight (1994) lay out a specific methodological framework that 
rhetorical critics can apply to social controversies in order to analyze opponents‘ tactical 
arguments and how these claims affect the regulation of public discourse surrounding this 
conflict and similar issues. First, critics need to identify ―the central assumptions put at 
risk in the debate‖ (253). What social conventions and norms are being contested? Who 
is questioning their legitimacy and propriety? What dominant practices, performances, 
and reasons are sanctioned by these conventions and norms? As mentioned in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
arbitrary; and controversies can be productive even if unresolved (Dascal 1995, 17-21). Of these, perhaps 
the most important to communication research is Dascal‘s recognition of the hermeneutic play that occurs 
within controversies. There is a strategic nature to misinterpretations which is used to push an opponent‘s 
agenda and is rationalized via a contextual reframing. Thus, content and context are understood as 
bidirectional; interpretation of one effect what is considered relevant aspects of the other. Dascal (1995) 
concludes that ―[s]uch a bi-directional interaction between context and content is essentially open (rather 
than pre-determined), and constitutes one of the essential conditions for understanding the recurrence of 




previous chapter, the Abu Ghraib social controversy dealt with ―traditional‖ issues 
regarding the legitimacy and propriety of the soldiers‘ actions depicted in the leaked 
photos as well as affect-based issues about how Americans should feel in relation to these 
graphic images.  
Discussion of these assumptions should then lead to an examination of the 
contextual factors that make a specific action, claim, or text a ―site of struggle at this 
historical juncture‖ (253).
15
 Olsen and Goodnight are not necessarily suggesting that 
critics do a historical contextualization of the debate itself but rather a deconstruction of 
the factors that contributed to the political conditions for this social controversy.
16
 For 
instance, an analysis of the Abu Ghraib social controversy need not include a detailed 
historical timelines of the events leading up to the photos being taken and publically 
disseminated. Rather, the contextualization of this conflict would focus on the political 
measures taken legally to rationalize the abusive treatment of these prisoners, the cultural 
normalization of American Islamophobia and hatred, and lastly, the mediated, social 
character of contemporary American military life that enabled the digital capture of these 
actions for easy distribution and circulation.
17
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 Since their analysis of the fur controversy is not based on any one particular event, action, or 
text, Olsen and Goodnight focus on the overall social, economic, cultural, and legal factors that allowed for 




 More recently, Goodnight (2005) has asserted that sustained controversies can mutate over time. 
As he explains, ―The focal issues of a period may shift, but once initiated controversies do not so much die 
out as become dormant, only to reappear in more virulent form later…The study of controversy, then, 




  Explication of the political factors that cultivated the Abu Ghraib controversy would focus on 
the two most infamous ―torture‖ memos drafted by former White House Counsel Alberto Gonzalez and 
former Assistant Attorney General, Jay S. Bybee that offer legal rationales for the use of harsher 
interrogation tactics by characterizing the prisoners as enemy ―combatants‖ rather than enemy ―soldiers‖, 




Lastly, ―the general shape‖ of the oppositional arguments within social 
controversies should be analyzed (253). Within this framework, discursive and 
nondiscursive forms of argument are ascribed different functions and perform distinct 
tasks that work in conjunction with one another. Discursive oppositional arguments 
contest claims, block enthymemes and dispute implied norms. For Olsen and Goodnight 
(1994), dominant communicative conventions and norms retain their political influence 
via enthymetic power; meaning their legitimacy and propriety is assumed and remains 
unquestioned. Discursive arguments attempt to obstruct enthymetic associations through 
critique and refutation of specific claims, actions, or texts that perpetuate the implicit 
normative standards and relations being objected to. As an attempt at delegitimation, 
discursive claims challenge the ―acceptability of the communicative context within which 
the [claim, action, or text] is offered as secured‖ (251). When discursive claims lead to 
normative delegitimation, this cultivates the political and cultural conditions for dominant 
standards to be expanded, renegotiated, and, ideally, reassociated to new, more inclusive 
practices, principles, and forms of reasoning.  
Non-discursive argument, specifically visual images and performance, can be 
used in novel ways to facilitate normative reassociation. ―As the discursive side of social 
controversy may expand opposition, sometimes radically, by questioning the imputed 
grounds of reasonable argumentation,‖ Olson and Goodnight (1994) explain, ―the 
                                                                                                                                                 
the rise in violent acts against Muslims following September 11
th
 as well as a discussion on how Muslims 
were racially profiled by federal, state, and local American authorities due to the heightened affective state 
of fear within the U.S. Finally, the social factors would deal with the increase in the media technology that 
soldiers carry with them on the field which has enabled more candid, private glimpses into soldiers‘ daily 





nondiscursive side works to reconstitute grounds by display of radically recontextualized 
appearances that provoke reexamination of the norms of personal conduct and challenge 
the range of publicly acceptable means of communication‖ (252). Deem (2010) notes that 
the ―radical potentialities‖ Olson and Goodnight assign non-discursive claims are made 
possible through the arguments‘ form, not solely their substance (61). In other words, 
both the performed critique and subversive or ironic imagery make relations of power 
and their cultural, legal, and economic circulatory systems more easily discernable 
bringing the privilege embedded in dominant conventions and norms into sharp relief to 
nondiscursive forms of argument. Within social controversies, embodied and visual 
claims help engage a public‘s political imagination in order to envision communicative 
practices and principles of reasoning guided by a different set of normative standards. 
When faced with the combination of normative deconstruction and reassociation, a public 
is given the opportunity to ―bolster, alter, or abandon the social and communication 
practices in question‖ (Olson and Goodnight 1994, 252). A brief example from the Abu 
Ghraib social controversy can help explicate how Olson and Goodnight apply discursive 
delegitimation and nondiscursive reassociation to argumentative claims.  
It’s Not as Bad as Beheading 
 Maureen Dowd‘s claim contesting the stance that the abuses at Abu Ghraib are 
acceptable because they are not as bad as the tactics terrorists employ is a keen example 
of a discursive attempt at normative delegitimation. Simply put, Dowd (2004a) asks, 
―Should we really be reduced to defending ourselves by saying at least we don‘t behead 




logical framework that approves of any U.S. military action as long as it is slightly less 
barbaric than decapitation. This claim raises that question, in being not quite as violent as 
the ―terrorists‖ have we have vilified and declared war upon the best standard Americans 
should hold their military to? A common, and poignant, nondiscursive argument that 
functions in conjunction with Dowd‘s claim has been made by individuals who, 
mimicking the iconic photo, have  stood in public places on boxes, donning black hoods 
and shrouds with wires dangling from their fingers. One such example is Joseph 
Previtera‘s silent demonstration.  
 Previtera quietly stood next to the entrance of a U.S. Armed Forces recruitment 
office in Boston—an eerie homage to the Iraqi prisoner forced to endure this position and 
a subversive protest of military use of this practice (Dodero, 2004). Explaining that he 
felt ―street theater [would] be more effective in conveying a message than a flier,‖ 
Previtera chose the location because he ―wanted to make people think about what they 
might be called or forced to do if they enlist in the military‖ (Dodero, 2004). As a 
nondiscursive claim, Previtera‘s performance makes viewers literally face the abusive 
actions U.S. soldiers may, under orders, be required to perform. By positing his hooded 
and shrouded body within this public space he meant to attract potential recruits by 
beckoning them to ―be all they can be.‖ Previtera challenges individuals to reassociate 
normative standards of legitimate and appropriate U.S. military action to a higher and 
more ethical standard of conduct. When U.S. military personnel is acting in a manner 
indicative of ―all they can be‖ should not that conduct be more just than simply not 




The Critical Evolution of Social Controversy 
 Scholarly response to Olson and Goodnight‘s theory and methodological 
framework of social controversy has been mostly positive, expanding upon their work 
rather than challenging it. Along these lines, a generative approach is taken to address 
four key extensions and constructive criticism of Olson and Goodnight‘s work. This 
generative approach the literature on social controversy enables a critical evolution of the 
Olson and Goodnight‘s theory and methodological framework in order to create a richer, 
more diverse and nuanced understanding of this type of conflict. To do so, this section 
will address issues regarding discursive and nondiscursive arguments; the limitations of 
―opposition‖; the inclusion of incommensurate discourses; and the potential for change.   
Discursivity and Non-Discursivity 
The distinction between discursive and non-discursive arguments has been 
critiqued by some scholars as a problematic and unnecessary separation (Finnegan, 2000; 
Fritch et al. 2006; Deem 2010). On the positive side, ascribing discursive and non-
discursive claims separate, albeit complimentary, argumentative functions establishes a 
clear typography of social controversy for critics to employ. However, as Fritch et al. 
(2006) argues, these types of ―clean distinctions may obscure the [additional] ways in 
which discursive and nondiscursive arguments may intersect‖ in both productive and 
unproductive ways (193). Interestingly, when Olson and Goodnight theorize social 
controversy they acknowledge how deeply interconnected discursive and nondiscursive 
claims are. They even state that ―[d]iscursive argument has its nondiscursive side,‖ 




completely separate forms, of claims. Yet, when they apply this theory to the fur 
controversy, the separation between discursive and nondiscursive arguments is 
exacerbated (DeLuca 1999a).
18
 The oppositional arguments over fur are analyzed and 
explicated within a three-tier linear, progressive framework; an initial objection evolves 
into a discursive process of unrelenting normative delegitimation that enabled the 
nondiscursive reassociation of the conventions and norms surrounding the use of fur to 
occur. Olson and Goodnight‘s formal application of socontroversy supports Fritch et al.‘s 
critique by inadvertently establishing a formal methodology that privileges discursive 
arguments as the catalyst and precursor to nondiscursive claims as well as imply social 
controversies will lead to progressive political change (DeLuca 1999a; Deem 2010).  
Both Finnegan (2000) and Delicath and DeLuca (2003) assert that nondiscursive 
arguments, such as photographs and image events, are not simply univocal statements or 
secondary claims made to assist discursive claims; they are polysemic texts that can 
incite social controversy. Finnegan (2000) argues that an image can cause social 
controversy due to differing ideological interpretations of its‘ rhetorical symbolism, 
differences in how participants argumentatively use the image, and disparities in how the 
image functions within society. The controversial images from Abu Ghraib prison 
exemplify this; when leaked, they prompted a cacophony of contradicting interpretations 
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 The oppositional arguments made during this controversy become a stance of sustained 
objection that incrementally elevates discursive questions regarding the legitimacy and propriety of the 
―local‖ communicative context to discursive indictments of ―global‖ procedural injustice and, finally, assert 
new, alternative nondiscursive forms of communicative norms, practices, and reasoning that embody this 
position. So, even though Olson and Goodnight‘s theory of social controversy is fairly radical in its 
conceptualization of the argumentative interconnection between discursivity and nondiscursivity, the 
methodological application reinforces a strict division between them as different types of arguments that 





causing a maelstrom of disagreement. For some, these images symbolized anything from 
U.S. Islamophobia driving the War in Iraq, to the brutal nature of war that enables 
prisoner abuse, to America‘s liberal ideology of torture, and even to the soldiers‘ need to 
blow off some steam.
19
 During this controversy, the images were used as evidence of: the 
need for a change in U.S. interrogation policy, the soldiers‘ debauched misconduct, the 
hypocrisy of American democracy, the weakness of Iraqi forces, Americans‘ desire for 
vengeance, and the intense level of stress U.S. military personnel face in the field. There 
are also discrepancies in how the Abu Ghraib photos are believed to function in society. 
For instance, they can act as: a soldier‘s trophy, an interrogation tool, motivation for Arab 
retaliation, and a reminder of U.S. fallibility. 
Delicath and DeLuca (2003) maintain that within society‘s heavily mediated 
environment, image events, or ―staged acts of protest intended for media dissemination,‖ 
are fragmented nondiscursive arguments that dramatically publicize the objections 
individuals have to dominant norms and can instigate social controversy (317). As 
―critique performed through spectacle,‖ multiple image events were staged in objection to 
the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib (321). Between May 2004 and June 2005, individuals— 
like Joseph Previtera—dressed as the prisoners depicted in the photos and demonstrated 
at New York‘s Hunter College, Chicago‘s Water Tower on the Miracle Mile, Pittsburgh‘s 
East Liberty Park, the 2004 Democratic National Convention in Boston, and San 
Francisco‘s Davies Symphony Hall during a speech by then U.S. Secretary of State 
                                                 
 
19
 See Jacob (2004) for a discussion of some of the immediate public response to the leaked Abu 
Ghraib photos. Also see Luban (2006) for an insightful analysis of the ―liberal ideology of torture‖ that 
underwrites both the Gonzalez and Bybee memos that rational using harsher interrogation tactics during the 





Condoleezza Rice. When protesters intentionally donned the guise of Abu Ghraib 
prisoner and publicly enacted the abuse and torture captured in the photos, these 
spectacular displays highlighted these citizens‘ disapproval of the U.S. policies that 
underwrite the abuse and torture. The striking character of these protests can provoke 
candid discussion of implicit and explicit norms guiding the U.S. military‘s interrogation 
tactics and overall conduct during the War on Terror. Since image events can act as 
argumentative fodder, not just definitive claims, they risk being appropriated and 
reframed in ways that modify their interpretation in order to support either side of a 
controversy, which can drastically alter the protestors‘ intended meaning. By expanding 
upon the theory of nondiscursive oppositional arguments, Finnegan (2000) as well as 
Delicath and DeLuca‘s (2003) work exemplifies how social controversy analysis can 
benefit from a less rigid, more critical methodological approach that problematizes the 
binary argumentative division of opposition.   
The Limitations of “Opposition” 
Olson and Goodnight‘s (1994) theory of oppositional arguments assumes that 
claims made during social controversies should be analyzed as part of only two 
dichotomous ―sides.‖ Surprisingly, rather than make the opposing sides within social 
controversy more recalcitrant, they assert that sustained controversy does not necessarily 
result in polemic ―incommensurate positions‖ (252). Instead, the persistent argumentative 
pressure of sustained controversy is simply believed to lead to more creative and 
inventive ―resistance through the transformations and reiterations of discursive and 




conventions and norms of communicative reasoning‖ (Olson and Goodnight 1994, 252). 
Although controversies can lead to innovative, unconventional, and, at times, radical 
arguments, the contest-driven nature of Olson and Goodnight‘s theory does support a 
dualistic mentality that imagines opposition as either acquiescing to or overt resistance of 
dominant norms (Kaufman 1991).  
Kaufman (1991) asserts that stressing adversarial tactics over critical, contextual 
subtlety ―fosters a narrow view of controversy as a zero-sum contest of wits‖ (18). By 
overemphasizing dichotomous opposing positions, Olson and Goodnight‘s method risks 
overlooking the nuance and uniqueness of claims that may, on their surface, appear as 
simple acceptance or resistance (Deem 2010; Ono and Sloop 1999; Phillips 1999; Wilson 
1995).
20
 Deem (2010) calls this the ―compulsion toward reducibility‖ that is provoked by 
a desire to translate what we witness ―to common needs, desires, and even bodies [which] 
leaves remainders that cannot be accounted for within dominant reading structures‖ (60). 
This slippage occurs when Olson and Goodnight ultimately return to traditional norms of 
argumentative effectiveness when analyzing social controversy. Traditional norms of 
effectiveness are problematic when assessing arguments that are difficult to translate or 
often reduced to sentiments that severely alter or simplify their meaning. Irreducible, 
distinctive claims may not receive the critical attention they need for their contextual 
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 Wilson (1995) argues that claims made during a social controversy are, oftentimes, part of 
overarching argument formations. As he explains, ―the term argument may refer to a single assertion or to 
the interaction between individuals, [whereas] an argument formation is a larger linguistic form that 
presents a coherent set of beliefs, perspectives, and normative approaches to human existence‖ (204). This 
may add to the perception of a polemic controversy because although claims can be made from an infinite 
number of perspectives, differing claims may still belong to the same overarching argument formation. 
However, the nuances of each claim should not be overlooked simply because an argument is similar in 





intricacies to be understood and/or appreciated. Judgments of efficacy, which are 
influenced by normative standards of legitimacy and propriety, typically succumb to the 
―sovereignty of [common] meaning‖ (62). Norms of effectiveness that cannot ―account 
for the possibilities of this irreducibility beyond failure‖ do not aptly take into account the 
conditions of radical plurality that characterize contemporary public spheres (Deem 2010, 
61).  
Within the public discourse, the Abu Ghraib social controversy was framed as a 
conflict between those who supported and those who opposed the actions depicted in the 
infamous photos. However, many citizens voiced opinions that did not expressly fit on 
one side or the other; instead, their stances displayed characteristics of both. For example, 
when Dallas resident, Pat Neil, was asked what he thought of the soldiers‘ actions, he 
explained, ―This is war. It‘s not right, but war‘s not right…Given the circumstances, I 
don‘t see how they would not do something—after seeing their buddies dragged through 
the streets. They‘re over there to give the Iraqis freedom, and they‘re getting killed every 
day‖ (Jacobs 2004). Neil disagrees with the ethics of the soldiers‘ actions but he also 
expresses a rational consideration of the extenuating circumstances that may have 
provoked their behavior. Not clearly support for or opposition to prisoner abuse, Neil‘s 
claim risks being reduced to a position of support even though he states ―war‘s not right,‖ 
or possibly being overlooked because it does not clearly articulate or support either 
―side.‖  
To account for the limits of opposition-based theory, Phillips (1999) uses 






 His concern is that the intricate detail and unique texture of 
controversy will be lost when it is assessed in terms of the normalizing ideals of ―genuine 
public presence, genuine deliberation, [and] the force of the better argument‖ that Olson 
and Goodnight attribute to both the contemporary and traditional public sphere (491). 
The combination of these normalizing ideals and the formal application of social 
controversy theory suggest that participants‘ have singular identities, and claims have 
definitive meanings, ―which belies the social polysemy and contestation which give rise 
to social disruption and controversy‖ (491). Phillips, therefore, advocates a postmodern 
approach to social controversy that does not separate dissensus into two opposing sides 
but rather, keep the polysemic character of controversy intact.  
Incommensurable Discourses 
Even though Ono and Sloop (1999) agree with Phillips‘ theory, they argue that 
Phillips‘ analysis of the controversy surrounding the colonial African American burial 
ground accidently excavated in New York City inadvertently contradicts his theory by 
restricting the conflict to oppositional arguments within commensurable discourses. 
Commensurable controversy assume that regardless of how opposite stances are, 
differing positions have a basic level of agreement regarding the issues, individuals, and 
norms that are germane to the conflict. When opponents‘ claims are based in 
commensurate discourses, they typically ―disagree on the outcome of a shared question 
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 Phillips (1999) makes a distinction between what he defines discursive and rhetorical 
controversy. Discursive controversy leaves the communicative norms that undergird the disagreement 
intact whereas rhetorical controversy disables them. In other words, analysis of discursive controversy only 
deals with the topic of the conflict whereas rhetorical also deals with the regulation of discourse as well as 





(e.g., How should this burial ground be treated?)‖ (529; emphasis added). The 
commonalities do not stop here; conflicting positions within commensurable discourses 
can agree upon the argumentative logic that frames the conflict, the dominant parameters 
of normative standards from which claims are judged, and the governing institutions that 
hold some power and/or authority over these matters. Collectively, these similarities can 
facilitate the resolve of social controversy. This does not, however, take into 
consideration positions that are incommensurate with these shared issues, logics, 
normative standards, and institutions.  
When claims are raised from incommensurable discourses, the proponents of 
these stances may not agree with what the driving question of the conflict is, or base their 
arguments within the same logics, normative standards, or institutions as other exponents 
that hold more dominant positions. As examples of incommensurable discourses, out-law 
(Ono and Sloop 1997, 1999), subaltern (Ahmed 1992, 2005b), and minor rhetorics (Deem 
2002, 2010) are irreducible public forms created in relation to dominant discourses, 
without necessarily countering them. These rhetorical forms problematize normative 
standards of legitimacy and propriety not through opposition, but rather deep-seated 
divergence which reveals how and why proponents of these rhetorics have 
disproportionate access to and inclusion in public discourse regarding this issue.  
Ono and Sloop (1999) as well as Deem (2010), therefore, implore scholars to 
include these rhetorics in social controversy analysis. Incorporating out-law, subaltern, 
and/or minor rhetorics in controversy criticism necessitates ―new reading strategies‖ to 




positions or worse, being completely overlooked (Deem 2010, 65). Since critics of social 
controversy analyze how these conflict affect the regulation of public discourse, also 
examining these rhetorics can enable scholars to understand the factors that contribute to 
the marginalization and oppression of incommensurate stances and/or their proponents. 
However, highlighting out-law, subaltern, and minor rhetorics within social controversy 
does put exponents of these discourses at risk of ―further marginalization‖ and the 
―potential for a backlash‖ (Ono and Sloop 1999, 535).  
It may seem strange to identify Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz as a 
proponent of an out-law rhetoric, but one need not be in a position of marginalization to 
hold an incommensurate stance. Incommensurate discourses, specifically out-law 
rhetorics, are not inherently liberal or progressive; they are simply outside the dominant 
argumentative logics that uphold the controversy (Ono and Sloop 1997). Thus, Ono and 
Sloop (1997) explain, ―Critics must remain open to the possibility that the logics of 
judgment they find within out-law [rhetorics] might counter the forms of judgment that 
they would like to see invoked within a given community‖ (62). Proponents of 
incommensurate discourses pose different question, live by different norms, adhere to 
different standards, and/or endorse different institutions than exponents of commensurate 
ones. Within the Abu Ghraib social controversy, Dershowitz does just this when he 
advocates for the use of torture warrants.  
For Dershowitz, the actions at Abu Ghraib prison do not rouse the question what 
interrogation tactics are legitimate or appropriate for U.S. soldiers to employ; this is a 




approve some acts of torture to obtain intelligence about terrorist activity. Dershowitz 
(2004b) explains,  
I took no normative position on whether non-lethal torture should be justified 
under such extreme circumstances [i.e., ticking time-bomb scenario], but I did 
assert that I believed that any democracy would employ non-lethal torture as a last 
resort (if all other inducements and techniques short of torture had failed). I then 
argued that if torture were to be employed, it would be better (or, more precisely, 
less bad) for there to be a warrant requirement as a prerequisite for any use of 
such an abhorrent tactic. (n.p.) 
 
If employed, Dershowitz asserts that torture warrants would make the interrogation 
process more transparent; the use of abusive tactics could be regulated and documented 
enabling a clear chain of command to be held accountable for its use. Torture warrants 
could then end the gross misuse of these tactics by making the practice explicit rather 
than hidden by a shroud of secrecy.  
Dershowitz does not judge the events at Abu Ghraib by normative standards of 
legitimacy or propriety, nor does he adhere to an absolute logic of support for or 
opposition to the use of non-lethal torture interrogation tactics to this controversy. Instead 
he assesses the situation by standards of prudence and the logic of situational necessity. 
Dershowitz asks how the inevitable use of these tactics can be utilized in the most 
democratic manner—being effective tools for gathering intelligence and being employed 
as ethically as possible within these ―extreme circumstances.‖ This argument for torture 
warrants is an out-law rhetoric within the Abu Ghraib social controversy that renders the 
legitimacy and propriety of the common questions, normative standards, and argument 
logics of this conflict uneasy. This (dis)ease was so intense that Dershowitz‘ stance on 




advocates, lay citizens, lawyers, politicians, and journalists. It seems being prudent about 
issues of torture and abuse is incommensurate with both the Abu Ghraib social 
controversy and the general public.  
The Potential for Change  
 Even though these extensions and friendly critiques of social controversy are 
vastly different, most do share one common theme—the belief that these types of 
conflicts are critical moments because of their inherent potential to incite social, cultural, 
and political change (Dascal 1995, 1996; Deem 2010; Fritch et al. 2006; Ono and Sloop 
1999; Phillips 1999; Wilson 1995).
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 Even the most scathing critique, which is posited by 
Phillips (1999), shares this focus; he grounds this critique in a postmodern theory of the 
public sphere. Phillips argues that within transient, fragmented contemporary public 
spheres contradictory articulations are considered disruptive to the ―regularized strategies 
for maintaining discursive and material coherence‖ among this group (495).
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 Once 
disoriented, a public may enter into a process of meaning and subject position 
displacement and redefinition to address what some members argue are equalities and 
deficiencies amongst the group. ―The process of controversy elaborated here,‖ Phillips 
(1999) explains, ―provides[s] momentary opportunities to resist, change, and reform the 
local practices of those involved‖ (495).  
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 Contemporary publics, Phillips (1999) argues, are temporarily composed of fragmented groups 
of individuals; consequently, the meanings of an action, text, or claim as well as the standards of legitimacy 
and propriety from which they are judged are only provisionally situated amongst them. When controversy 
occurs within these publics, members are disoriented by the articulation of contradictory, not necessarily 





 Phillips‘ theory of disorientation with its disruptive tactics of displacement and 
redefinition is strikingly similar to the process of delegitimacy and reassociation that 
Olson and Goodnight (1994) attribute to oppositional arguments. Both are two-step, 
deconstructive methods that first, cast doubt on implicit conventions and norms and 
second, propose alternatives to them. Zulick and Laffoon (1991) note that this 
combination of ―critique and invention‖ is common among ―emancipatory discourse‖ 
which represses dominant enthymematic premises and introduces ―variant understandings 
that reconfigure a current idiom in a preferred direction‖ to incite social, cultural, and/or 
political change (251-252). Despite these similarities, there are three main distinctions 
between Olson and Goodnight and Phillips‘ theories: the ―public‖ context of the 
controversy (i.e., situated/neo-traditional or transient/fragmented); the number of 
conflicting stances (i.e., two or several); and lastly, the consistency of normative 
standards (i.e., enduring or contingent). Regardless of these differences, Phillips as well 
as Olson and Goodnight position political resistance and transform as the aim of these 
analogous processes.  
 In other words, the type of public, the number of positions, nor the consistency of 
normative standards does not necessarily influence the possibility of political change. 
These aspects of social controversy do not account for the felt experience of political 
resistance and transform which underwrites Olson and Goodnight‘s and Phillips‘ 
different, yet inherently similar, processes. Both of these theories establish the same 
affective conditions that provoke moments of social controversy: the force and intensity 




feelings of delegitimacy and/or displacement followed by attempts relieve or soothe these 
feelings via stabilizing acts of redefinition and reassociation. Simply put, if an objection 
does not or cannot create sensations of destabilization and feelings of delegitimation it 
has not instigated social controversy or opened the possibility for political change and 
transformation. As Grossberg (1997) explains, ―Affect defines, then, a condition of 
possibility for any political intervention‖ (161). Even the generative methodological 
framework offered here, which takes into account all of the constructive critiques and 
extensions of the theory of social controversy proffered still does not offer a means to 
examine the underlying felt conditions of the experience of social controversy which can 
provoke change and transformation. Thus, a better indicator of the potential for political 
transformation within the ―emancipatory discourses‖ of social controversy is affect. 
Ruddick (2010) asserts, ―The centrality of affect to a process of collaborative 
emancipation cannot be overstated… [it] is central to understanding the ethico-political 
dimensions‖ of public life (27). Yet, even though feelings of delegitimacy/displacement 
can be attributed to a loss of balance that is experienced due to the sensation of friction 
that occurs during social controversy, the role affect plays in this type of conflict has been 
relatively ignored, or worse, vilified.  
 Fritch et al. (2006) expanded on Olson and Goodnight‘s theory of social 
controversy by conceptualizing disingenuous, or false, controversy. Disingenuous 
controversy occurs when arguments are used to suppress ―dissent and re-center an 
orthodox form of communication‖ that thwarts ―genuine‖ deliberation (201).
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 I believe that conceptualizing a type of controversy that doesn‘t lead to social, cultural, or 




disingenuous controversies specific opposing positions, and the individuals that advocate 
them, are jettisoned from the conflict which leads to the calcification of dominant 
communicative norms and conventions. In these cases, excluding critical stances and 
their proponents from the public discourse is deemed legitimate and appropriate which, 
therefore, appears justified. An ―overripe‖ context can cultivate disingenuous controversy 
because debate about a problematic situation has been so delayed it is difficult (if not 
impossible) to discuss the matter in a rational, critical manner. When a context is 
overripe, Fritch et al. (2006) explains, ―controversy may focus more on an argument‘s 
emotional affects than on its substance‖ that can ―forcefully collapse the discursive and 
nondiscursive components of oppositional argument‖ limiting the possibility for social, 
cultural, or political change (202).  
 The concept of ―overripe‖ context, therefore, implies that when the focus of a 
controversy is emotionally (rather than rationally) driven, the conflict itself becomes 
suspect and its outcome is considered ―false,‖ ―disingenuous,‖ or ―insidious‖ rather than 
―genuine.‖ By vilifying emotion as lacking substance and causing disingenuous 
controversy, Fritch et al. (2006) perpetuate the modernist dichotomy between reason and 
emotion. Even though this dichotomy has long been demystified, the binary between 
reason and emotion continues to haunt argumentation and rhetorical research (Deem 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Goodnight attribute to their theory of social controversy. Stating an objection publicly is a two-step 
gamble; first, will this oppositional claim be taken up, circulated, and debated within the public discourse 
and then, will this critique have a strong enough impact to provoke the social, cultural, and/or political 
change the rhetor is advocating? If one of these ―gambles‖ does not payout, does that mean the controversy 
is false? Perhaps it does not lead to change but it is a historical moment when dominant norms, practices, 
and reasoning are contested. Rather than label a controversy false, why not recognize how normative 
standards of propriety create a requisite level of decorum that impose a form of disciplinary power that 
regulates all types of social controversy. All critical objections are held to certain standard of decorum to be 





2010; Hyde 1982; Micheli 2008). This reason/emotion dichotomy aligns reason within 
the mind deeming it legitimate because it assumes action is the product of a rational, 
critical thought process that is compelled by practical and/or indifferent logic. Whereas 
emotion is aligned with the body deeming it illegitimate because it assumes action is the 
product of base instinct or motivated by concentrated desire that is not rationally assessed 
beforehand. These dichotomous designations establish a typography of social controversy 
enabling scholars to categorize claims but it also drastically limits the conceptual nuance 
needed to flesh out how affect (in this case felt emotions) functions argumentatively and 
rhetorically within controversy.  
 For instance, Fritch et al.‘s theory of disingenuous controversy implies that affect 
does not play a role in social controversy until it somehow overpowers rationality. When 
a proponent‘s emotions become salient within a controversy, it is assumed that the logic 
of his/her actions has been compromised by the intensity of his/her affective state. This 
assumption attributes a cancerous quality to affect as something that can maliciously 
―infect‖ reason and ―incapacitate‖ the transformational potential of controversy. Framing 
affect as either nonexistent or solely as the enemy of reason, overlooks the role affect can 
play in the provocation and perpetuation of social controversy as well as the positive 
feelings and emotions that compel change such as hope and optimism. Affect is a 
constant dimension of social controversy. Whether it acts as the backing, warrant, or 
ground of an argument or even the claim itself, affect occurs in conjunction with reason, 
not in lieu of it. Within social controversy, affect is a multifaceted phenomenon whose 




affective state of a rhetor, to an emotion-based claim made as an objection, to a 
disciplinary force in the regulation of public discourse as well as public conduct, and 
even to a basis for the creation of civic relations. The explication of affect role in social 
controversy is a glaring omission in the theory and methodological framework of this 
type of research that this project aims to correct. 
The Relationship between Affect and Social Controversy 
The Movement of Affect 
 Affect is intricately intertwined throughout the argumentative process of social 
controversy. In short, affect is always a part of controversy yet it varies in force and 
intensity making it more or less salient or evident to researchers. As mentioned in the first 
chapter, affect is an emergent yet transitory relation between sensate environments and 
one‘s visceral (re)actions to them which culminate in the experience of embodied 
sensations. It is a multi-directional relational phenomenon; a perpetual unfolding and 
infolding between the self and its sensual, and inherently social, surroundings that has 
ephemeral physical and mental effects that continually changes and adapts. The 
sensations of affect act as involuntary waves of physiological, biological, neurological, 
and hormonal surges that reverberate throughout one‘s body and mind in conscious and 
nonconscious ways. Massumi (2002) argues that mental registration of corporeal 
sensations is a form of depth perception called mesoperception. Specifically, Massumi 
(2001) claim, ―Mesoperceptive flesh functions as a corporeal transformer where one 
sense shades into another over the failure of each, their input translated into movement 




 In short, affect is experienced as both sensate-visceral relationships that differ in 
force and sensations which vary in intensities compelling, suspending, and/or completely 
impeding movement. Embedded within the force-relations and corporeal intensities of 
affect lays its capacity (i.e., ability and possibility) and power (i.e., strength and 
influence) to propel one into action (Massumi 2002). Affect, therefore, exists ―as 
potential: a body‘s capacity to affect and to be affected‖ is an architectonic element of 
change (Seigworth and Gregg 2010, 2). It is this potential for change that makes the 
affective dimensions of social controversy significant areas to analyze and understand as 
openings for social, cultural, and political change. In other words, within a social 
controversy, affect can cultivate opportunities for transformation by orienting and 
galvanizing publics to alter, renovate, and/or reform the communicative norms and 
conventions that guide public discourse.  
 But, how does an individual ―come to shift its affections (its being-affected) into 
action (capacity to affect)‖ (Seigworth and Gregg 2010, 2)? When individuals are 
―affected‖ by the sensate-visceral experience of their surroundings, it can compel a type 
of orienting movement—a turning towards or away—which adjusts one‘s relational 
position to his/her environment and, more specifically, a particular claim, text, and/or 
event. This orienting movement has a dispositional quality. Brennan (2004) explains, ―By 
disposition, I mean the direction of negative affects such as aggression. The questions 
should be: To whom [or what] is the affect directed‖ and what effect can and/or does it 
have (15)? Affect directs us towards a course of thought and action, mentally and 




political lives. Over the course of time, consistent patterns of affects prime individuals. 
Affective priming occurs when one‘s history of affective experiences nonconsciously 
―activate[s] associated responses in the brain‖ with only limited sensory exposure and in 
some cases only the imagined experience of them (Fockenberg 2008, 137). In this way, a 
person‘s general attitudes towards and judgment of an experience is oriented by a 
combination of immediate affects (regardless of how limited) as well as one‘s corporeal 
history of them since, as Probyn (2005) explains, ―the past is carried somatically, that is, 
in the body‖ (47). 
 Rhetorically speaking, affect‘s orienting capacity is best captured in Aristotle‘s 
conceptualization of pathos, which Hill (1983) explains, ―literally means a state of being 
acted upon, that is, experiencing‖ (45). When individuals employ pathos as an artistic 
proof, they attempt to evoke a specific affective state within the audience that would 
orient listeners to the rhetors‘ claims in a manner intended to elicit a favorable judgment 
from them (Micheli 2008). Interestingly, recent studies in cognitive psychology support 
this ancient rhetorical technique. As Clore and Colcombe (2003) found, ―mood [i.e., 
affective states] influences evaluative judgments‖ but only when this mood is oriented 
towards the object of judgment not when it is simply a general state of affectivity (p. 
346).
25
 By recognizing these ties between affect, persuasion, and judgment, critics can 
―comprehend how a speaker interacts with listeners to bring them to a state of mind 
compatible with his/her aims while at the same time transforming them into a more 
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 Another fascinating finding by Clore and Colcombe (2003) is that blatant attempts at affective 
priming result in contrasting effects, meaning if one is trying to overtly prime someone to have positive 





cohesive group‖ (Smith and Hyde 1991, 451). This cohesion is achieved not solely 
through the commonality of shared experience but also the shared judgments that arises 
from it.   
 Affect not only has the capacity and power to orient individuals, it can also 
galvanize them. Simply put, the force and intensity of affect can, quite literally, move 
people to action. As Massumi (2002) explains, ―Intensity is incipience…the beginning of 
a selection: the incipience of mutually exclusive pathways of action and expression, all 
but one of which will be inhibited‖ (30). Affect opens up a space of limitless possibility 
because there are seemingly endless avenues of movement that can be taken in (re)action 
to sensations and once even the slightest movement occurs, a whole other array of 
seemingly endless potential movements open up. As a galvanizing experience, affect acts 
as a sensate-visceral current that triggers both corporeal and cognitive processes which 
initiates individual‘s emergent actions, expressions, and judgments.  
 Affect does not only mentally and physically orient individuals to controversial 
claims, texts, and/or events—it can also galvanize them to publicly engage in the conflict. 
For instance, Greene and Hicks (1993) assert that individuals‘ participation in social 
controversy is driven, in part, by their ―affective investment‖—the force and intensity of 
the care they feel about the people, events, relationships, issues, and 
social/cultural/political conditions that are germane to the conflict. ―Controversies‖ they 
explain, then ―become those places in which the structure of our affective 
investments…are reproduced, deployed, articulated and re-articulated in order to create, 




more importantly, establish standards of public conduct (177-178). Since the 
phenomenon of affect implies these two forms of movement, the affective dimensions of 
social controversy will address both the regulation of discourse as well as behavior within 
the public sphere.  
My Orientation to and Galvanization about Abu Ghraib 
 I do not remember the exact day or time I was when I first saw the Abu Ghraib 
prison photos, but what I do remember is how I felt. I was reading when I heard the 
words ―abuse,‖ ―soldiers,‖ and ―prisoners‖ from a distant television a friend, Kate, was 
watching. My concentration had been broken, the words rumbled in my head as I read the 
same sentence over and over again. I shifted my position in the chair, moved the book, 
stretched my arms and shoulders and looked down at the page again. As I stared at the 
page, the only words I heard in my head were: What abuse? What’s going on? 
Galvanized by my curiosity, I walked over to the television and just stood there. An 
intense sensation of shock took over paralyzing my body—mouth was agape, eyes 
narrowed, brow furrowed, my right hand strewn over my lips, my left arm stretched 
across my stomach hugging my waist, and my feet inches apart planted on the ground 
pointing towards the screen. I did not move—I could feel my heart beating in my chest, 
my breathing quickened and yet time seemed to stop. It felt as if I was this sensation of 
shock was literally forcing me to cease all activity so that I could stand there intensely 
focused on and completely oriented to the gruesome image from Abu Ghraib in concert 
with the reporters‘ words. I could feel my mind frantically trying to make sense of the 




 As the shock began to dissipate, I experienced waves of jumbled sensations. ―This 
is bad,‖ were the first words I remember Kate saying. I turned my head towards her and 
simply nodded in agreement before sitting down. Staring at the floor, my stomach began 
churning. I felt confused as I mentally ran over the story. Slouched over, hands clasped, 
elbows leaning on knees as I puzzled over the pain and hyper-sexualized humiliation 
captured in those first leaked images in conjunction with the lack of any clear explanation 
as to why these soldiers would do that to their prisoners. But they are in prison . . . They 
could not have been hurting the soldiers . . . It could not be self defense . . . Why were the 
soldiers smiling? Why are they so smug? How could they be enjoying this? Flashes of the 
images involuntarily popped up in my mind as my shoulders tensed and a huge surge of 
heat pulsed through my body. The thought got louder, as if echoing through my mind and 
ricocheting through my body. How Could They Be ENJOYING That? I got up and started 
pacing. I had to move as the sensations of frustration felt like jolts of energy coursing 
throughout my limbs in search of an outlet. Talking aloud to no one in particular, my 
hands violently punctuating my words—I was mad. This should not happen. Soldiers 
should not do that. What is going on in this country, in my country? What have we come 
to? What have we become? I had to do something, say something—I was galvanized. My 
research on Abu Ghraib began at that moment, I read everything I could find and wrote 
my first paper about it just a few months later. This is just a small (re)creation of how my 
affect relations to Abu Ghraib moved me—orienting me to the situation and galvanizing 
me to research it. My relationship to Abu Ghraib has evolved greatly over the years. Now 




my body wilts from the heaviness of sadness and remorse. To further understand how 
affect is mobilized in social controversies, a more in-depth discussion of some key terms 
in affective theory will be given to address their rhetorical and argumentative 
significance. 
Towards a Lexicon of Affect for Rhetoric and Argumentation Studies  
Affect is both continuous and punctual, meaning individuals are continuously 
engaged in affective experiences but they typically do not concentrate on this sensate data 
until powerful sensations hit them all at one—this can spark the process of feeling. The 
term feeling signifies both a pattern of embodied affects that is experienced as a distinct 
and meaningful set of sensate-visceral relations and sensations as well as the cognitive, 
reflexive process that discerns the significance and importance of said patterns. Simply 
put, a ―feeling is a recognized affect, an identified [and identifiable] intensity‖ (Massumi 
2002, 61). While feelings do not capture the full range of affects an individual embodies, 
they do yield insight into how one makes sense from what s/he affectively experiences as 
well as how one evaluates, or judges, it. For instance, when I first witnessed the images 
and news story about Abu Ghraib the jumble of sensations I had eventually evolved into 
a pattern that was clearly identifiable to me—anger. This feeling of anger included with it 
a basic evaluative judgment—soldiers should not enjoy causing their prisoner‘s pain and 
humiliation. As Brennan (2004) explains, ―Feelings are meant to be information about 
whether a state is pleasurable or painful, whether one is attracted to something or averse 
to it. This is the classic and only basis for distinguishing feelings and affects‖ (116). This 




actively works to distinguish significant patterns of feeling out of the seeming chaos of 
affective experience.  
During the process of discernment, there is a shift from the simple mental 
registration of affects to a complex cognitive practice that assigns significance, 
importance, and value to this felt experience (Brennan 2004). Discernment, as a cognitive 
act, can be honed and refined to make one more attuned to his/her affective state. The act 
of discerning patterns of feeling entails four steps. First, one reflects on the sensate-
visceral relations and sensations s/he has or is embodying. Next, one discriminates (i.e., 
makes fine distinctions) between which affects to focus on when considering all that are 
experienced. Then, one assesses these discriminate affective patterns in relation to his/her 
history of like encounters in order, lastly, to appraise the significance, importance, and 
value of this feeling. In other word, ―feelings are tracing a logic in the flesh 
simultaneously with a logic in history‖ (Brennan 2004, 116). In my case, discerning my 
anger was as seemingly instantaneous process.  
The surge of heat, the need to pace, the rapid talking, the loud focused thoughts, 
and the overemphasized gestures is a pattern of sensate-visceral relations and embodied 
sensations I have experiences countless times throughout my life. Separately each of 
these affects could be synecdoches for other feelings (i.e., the rapid talking = anxiety; the 
need to pace = worry). However, when discriminating between these instances of talking 
and pacing in conjunction with the heat, thoughts, and gestures, the pattern can be 
assessed as anger rather than anxiety or worry given my history of these sensations. As 




unfair or unjust. Feelings would be difficult, if not impossible, to discern without the aid 
of one‘s memory of past affective experiences—a matrix of sedimented patterns of affect 
that are created from the day in, day out sensate-visceral relationships and sensations an 
individual experiences which are saturated with personal as well as cultural significance, 
importance, and value.  
 When a feeling attains a level of collective, not solely personal, significance it is 
better known as an emotion. Emotions, therefore, are qualified types of embodied 
feelings (i.e., discernable patterns of affect) that have communicative currency as 
subjective experiences and intersubjective concepts. As intersubjective concepts, 
emotions are ―limited and contained expressions of affects‖ that have been linguistically 
and symbolically fixed within discursive formations and thoroughly imbued with 
cultural, political, ideological, and moral significance and importance (Grusin 2010, 81). 
Although emotions are ―common biological occurrence[s]‖ with shared denotative 
meanings, Probyn (2005) explains that they ―differentiate in their causes and expressions 
at an individual level and within social groups‖ (29). For example, smiling is a universal 
expression of happiness that signifies individuals‘ sense of joy but the reasons why 
people feel happy (i.e., the causes of their happiness) vary greatly.  
 Emotions, then, are affects that have intersubjective, denotative meaning and 
collective significance but also retain their subjective, connotative meaning and personal 
importance. As such, they ―reveal information about value, either value as an agent take 
things or value in the world‖ that makes them ―signs of or sources of vitally important 




Ghraib photos, for example, has collective as well as personal significance. As an 
intersubjective concept, anger has a common definition—a feeling of ―displeasure or 
antagonism, excited by a real or supposed injury or insult to one‘s self or others, or by the 
intent to do such injury‖ (Kassinove and Tafrate 2006, 3). Roused by a perception of 
being wronged, Solomon (1993) explains that anger elicits a ―judgment of personal 
offence‖ that ―often has a moral edge‖ (227). In other words, experiencing anger can be 
understood as an embodied ―accusation or value judgment following from the belief that 
another ―could and should have done otherwise‖‖ (Weiner 2006, 35). However, anger is 
considered a negative emotion since it can provoke individuals to commit acts of 
violence, instigate chaos, and cause others pain. As ―an affective state,‖ Kennedy (1992) 
states that anger is ―experience[d] as a motivation to act in ways that warn, intimidate, or 
attack those who are perceived as challenging or threatening‖ (150). Due to this orienting 
and galvanizing potential for violence, public displays of anger or conducting oneself in 
an angry manner is often deemed illegitimate and inappropriate behavior regardless of the 
perceived slight or injustice.   
 The collective use of and value attributed to emotions makes affect susceptible to 
processes of normativity and regulation. Proveti (2009) argues these norms and 
conventions create ―emotion scripts,‖ which ―indicate culturally specific forms of 
acceptable performances of emotions‖ that are used in socializing and disciplining 
practices (25). In other words, norms and conventions are established regarding 
legitimate and appropriate uses, expressions, and displays of emotion. Individuals learn 




wedding), in response to given actions (i.e., remorse when hurting a friend), and towards 
particular individuals (i.e., reverence to fallen heroes). Adhering to the norms and 
conventions of emotion then becomes ―a marker of being human, biologically and 
socially‖ (Probyn 2005, 33). For example, I have been socialized to know that while it is 
legitimate and appropriate for me to enact my anger over the Abu Ghraib photos by 
researching and writing about it, that writing could not be too emotionally charged with 
anger-related wording or it would not be accepted in academia due to explicit biased. 
Consequently, the parameters of legitimate and appropriate emotional enactment and 
display are implicitly and explicitly policed within the public spheres to ensure people 
conduct themselves ―properly‖ within any given context.  
 Actively policing behavior assumes that one‘s affects, feelings, and emotions can 
be mentally registered or cognitively discerned or apprehended. Affective traces (i.e., 
sensate signs of affects, feelings, and emotions) can be consistently found on the surface 
of the skin and are also emitted into our surrounding via pheromones and other 
secretions, sounds, scents, and vibrations from even the slightest movements. When 
affective traces reach a point of salience, or sensual saturation via force, intensity, or 
contrast, they can be nonconsciously registered or cognitively discerned. For instance, 
―looming‖ sounds, or sounds that move towards an individual, are more salient to that 
person than receding sounds (Hall and Moore 2003). A loud bang in an otherwise quiet 
environment, a bright white cloud in the middle of a pale blue sky, the taste of cool, crisp 
water after two cups of coffee, the scent of gas in one‘s home, and the feel of laying 




information that can provoke affective responses—surprise at the sound, whimsy at the 
sky, refreshed by the water, alarmed at the scent, and relaxed when lying in the sheets.  
 Salience, as Levine and Parkinson (1994) explain, also ―implies an increased level 
of attention‖—the more salient an affect is, the more it rouses our attention; in some 
cases an extremely salient affect can galvanize individuals to narrow and sharpen their 
focus to the origins of the sensate information (343). A case in point is Carskadon and 
Herz‘s (2004) finding that pungent and noxious scents can be salient enough to rouse 
some individuals from even the deepest stages of sleep. Additionally, Turnbull and 
Matisoo-Smith (2002) found that the salience of bitter tastes in vegetables, such as 
spinach, is an underlying cause of children‘s aversion to eating them. Language use can 
also make certain affect, feelings, and emotions salient. For example, although it might 
be affectively accurate to say that the Abu Ghraib photos are disgust-ridden images 
signify the vileness of American Islamophobia from which our former, imperialistic 
interrogation policy were grounded in, I should not say this in a formal research project. 
Considering the emotional scripts that guide both anger and academic research, it is 
inappropriate for me to use this language because my choice of wording not only makes 
my anger about this situation clearly salient, it draws readers attention to my emotional 
state which may cause them to overlook the legitimacy of the claim. In other words, my 
anger makes my claim seem unreasonable to others.  
 When theorizing affect for use within rhetorical and argumentation theory, the 
distinctions between one‘s ability to discern affective states as feelings and/or emotions 




addressed. When discerning one‘s own feelings and emotions, a person reflects upon, 
discriminates, assesses, and appraises his/her immediate affective state in comparison to 
his/her history with like experiences. Discernment assumes recognition; through the 
process of discernment individuals will come to recognize what they are feeling due to 
the intricate, and typically intimate, somatic knowledge they have collected about affects, 
feelings, and emotions throughout the course of their lives. Butler (2010) asserts that 
overarching ―norms of recognition‖ limit what affective state are publicly discernable (5). 
Norms of recognition adhere closely to socio-cultural emotional scripts making either 
clear embodiments of or obvious subversions to these scripts the most easily recognized 
forms of affective states.    
 Apprehension, on the other hand, is a form of sensory perception that does not 
assume recognition. ―It is a form of knowing,‖ Butler (2010) explains, that is ―bound up 
with sensing and perceiving, but in ways that are not always—or not yet—conceptual 
forms of knowledge‖ (5). In other words, apprehension is one‘s ability to understand 
(an)other‘s affective state even if it does not resemble a specific emotional concept or 
script that would be considered ―appropriate‖ given the context. Norms of recognition 
can factor into the process of apprehension, however apprehension is just not completely 
limited to them; apprehending (an)other‘s affective state implies understanding that is not 
confined by dominant conventions (Butler 2010). Apprehension requires a level of 
affective attunement with another—bringing oneself into physical and mental accord with 




is akin to an embodied appreciation for what someone else could be somatically 
experiencing that enables individuals to imagine the conditions that one is living in.    
 The conceptualizations of affect and apprehension lend themselves to a 
(re)thinking of context as a rich and textured sensual, embodied experience that occurs in 
the co-presence of others. Butler (2010) even shifts from discussing the context of a 
claim to addressing conditions of a life. Speaking to the conditions that one lives in 
assumes a fully embodied, affective experience rather than a strictly rhetorical situation. 
―The key here,‖ according to Proveti (2009), ―is to appreciate the ecosocial 
embeddedness of affect. Affect indicates that living bodies…do not negotiate their worlds 
solely—or even for the most part—by representing to themselves the feature of the 
world, but by feeling what they can and cannot do in a particular situation‖ (48; emphasis 
added). It is from within these affect-laden conditions that individuals are oriented 
towards claims, texts, events, and each other, and are also galvanized to think, act, and 
express themselves. By being affectively attuned to the conditions in which (an)other 
lives, individuals can apprehend other  peoples‘ experiences without relegating their 
affective states to common emotional scripts in order to be recognized and/or discerned. 
When one apprehends the conditions of (an)other‘s life, s/he can appreciate the radical 
distinctiveness of the affective states the other person experiences.   
 My anger as a (re)action to the Abu Ghraib images was cultivated both by my 
discernment of the soldiers self-conscious enjoyment and pride as well as my 
apprehension of the prisoners‘ pain and humiliation. For instance, in the image of SPC 




naked and hooded Iraqi prisoners, Graner and England‘s wide smiles, thumbs up, and 
direct stare at the camera are easily discernable expressions of joy and pride. The 
prisoners‘ affective states are a bit more difficult to recognize partially due to my naïveté 
about abuse and torture but also because their faces are both hidden and turned away 
from the camera. Visually, the pyramid of prisoners looks like a ramshackle jumble of 
pieces of men that have blurred together rather than whole and distinct individuals. Pain 
is not clearly displayed in any one prisoner‘s body but being attuned to their conditions 
tells another story. These men have been jailed in a filthy prison, forcibly made to 
publicly strip down, don a hood limiting their sense of sight, sound, smell, and taste, 
climb atop other naked prisoners and stay there as their captors stand behind them to 
photograph the moment for all posterity. Just from this image, I could appreciate the 
severity of these prisoner‘s conditions and apprehend the pain and humiliation they must 
have felt that provoked my feelings of anger. As Ahmed (2004) explains, ―anger‖ can be 
―[felt] when faced with the other‘s pain‖ that allows individuals to ―enter into a 
relationship with the other, premised on generosity rather than indifference‖ (21).  
 The acts of apprehension and discernment cultivate different types of 
appreciation. Since apprehension is based on an assumption of alterity rather than 
recognition, it cultivates an appreciation of difference as a basic condition of life. On the 
other hand, discernment (i.e., the recognition of one‘s own or (an)other‘s feelings and 
emotions) fosters a form of appreciation that is based on familiarity. When reflecting 
upon and discriminating among affective experience, one can discern what s/he already 




that are collective established and followed that aids in the provocation of sensations of 
stability. Discernment, therefore, creates a corresponding sensation of stability—or a 
calmness that is based in the sensual and mental experience of consistency. The question 
is how do ―such norms operate to produce certain subjects as ―recognizable‖ persons and 
to make others decidedly more difficult to recognize‖ (Butler 2010, 6). Analyzing the 
affective dimensions of social controversy can enable critics to examine the norms of 
recognition that guide the conflict and assess how they can lend credence to or 
completely impede the affective objections made by individuals or groups.  
The Affective Dimensions of Social Controversy  
 Strongly based in the rhetorical and argumentative traditions, this chapter‘s 
conceptualization of the affective dimensions of social controversy addresses both the 
persuasive and normative elements of affects, feelings, and emotions as they relate to 
issues of transmission (i.e. circulation) and judgment. Drawing on scholarship about 
affect, pathos, and emotion, the theories of emotion-based claims, affective states, and the 
bi-directional relationship between them will be further developed to attend to the range 
of ways affect functions in and through to social controversy. The force and intensity of 
participants‘ sensate-visceral relations and sensations not only inform their claims, they 
also infuse the conflict with a variety of affects that can become be the argumentative 
substance of objections and rejoinders either in the form of a rational-critical claim or 
salient affective states. In this way, affects, feelings, and emotions play a role in 




and conduct. Addressing the affective dimensions of this type of conflict will ultimately 
lead to a more textured, experience-driven theory of social controversy. 
Emotion-Based Claims 
Drawing on both the collective and personal significance of distinct emotions, 
emotion-based claims assert stances on how members of germane publics could and 
should feel and act in relation to a particular set of conditions. As discursive and/or 
nondiscursive arguments, these types of claims address the norms and conventions (i.e. 
emotional scripts) that guide affective conduct (i.e., behaviors that make given affects, 
feelings, or emotions discernable or apprehendable) amongst members of specific 
publics. As a form of oppositional argument, emotion-based claims are objections to and 
arguments about the normative standards of legitimacy and propriety that are used to 
justify dominant emotional scripts which deal directly with distinct feelings and emotions 
as the substance of proponents‘ stances. Consequently, emotion-based claims focus on 
the regulation of public behavior while still providing insight into parameters of public 
discourse especially in relation to arguments about affect within the public spheres.  
When emotion-based claims act as affective objections, they are used to block 
dominant enthymemes regarding the legitimacy and propriety of specific emotional 
behaviors within the conditions of a given context. For example, Sontag‘s objection to 
Abu Ghaib posits that Americans should feel shame over both what is depicted in the 
images as well as the U.S. culture of shamelessness underpinning the social and political 
conditions that made these photographs possible. By blocking the enthymemes that 




make the norms and conventions guiding affect salient enabling the contestation, 
reevaluation, and renovation of these normative behavioral and discursive practices.   
Sontag‘s objection is an example of what Gilbert (2001) calls ―open emotion,‖ or 
a ―straightforward‖ claim in which emotions themselves are ―the topic of discussion, 
or…consistent with the topic of discussion‖ (241). Although a seemingly simple idea, 
analyzing how one makes rational-critical claims regarding a feeling or emotion is a 
fairly novel concept in argumentation. Within this discipline, Micheli (2008) explains, 
―emotions are [traditionally] seen as the objects of appeals,‖ or attempts to trigger 
specific affective responses, which ―function as external adjuvants to [claims],‖ not the 
arguments themselves (2). Emotions, therefore, are used to arouse affective states as a 
means to enhance a claim; however, the claim itself had nothing, inherently, to do with 
the emotion. This posits emotional appeals, or more specifically pathos, as a supportive 
element of argumentation that is not attributable to the rationale, or logos, of a 
proponent‘s stance. As an ―alternative‖ to this, Micheli (2008) asserts that in some cases, 
―speakers do not so much ‗appeal‘ to emotions as they formulate the reasons why they 
feel (or do not feel) a particular emotion and why this particular emotion should (or 
should not) legitimately be felt‖ (2).  
Emotion-based claims are clearly examples of what Micheli terms as 
―alternative,‖ yet there is no need for such a definitive distinction to be made between 
these types of emotional arguments. When controversies openly deal with the normative 
aspects of affects, feelings, and emotions, it is assumed that the conflict will stimulate 




(re)active affective states within participants. Since affect is a relational phenomenon, the 
affective dimensions of social controversy share this characteristic. They feed off of and 
into each other. Emotion-based claims are grounded in and, more importantly, spring 
from corresponding affective states. In other words, there would be no emotion-based 
claims without an originating affective state. When asserted, emotion-based claims not 
only posit rational-critical arguments, they can also orient audience members by 
provoking the same or reactionary affective states within them. In some cases, these 
corresponding states will have enough force and intensity to galvanize certain individuals 
to publicly support, oppose, or add their perspective to the controversy.  
Since feelings and emotions are both discernable forms of affects, emotion-based 
claims can be fairly easy to recognize. These types of arguments are made salient through 
their use of emotional language as well as easily discernable non-verbal emotional 
expressions and displays. The salience of emotion-based claims is also due, in part, to 
their use of the ―traditional‖ argumentation style of rational-critical debate; claims are 
publicly made that attend to dominant norms and conventions as well as the prevailing 
standards that are used to rationalize them. This conventional process of objection and 
rebuttal is easily recognizable via its adherence to norms of ―reasonable‖ discourse and 
formal argumentation. In this way, emotions are made familiar via a rational and 
intellectual process (Nussbaum 1996). As Fortenbaugh (1975) asserts,  
When men are angered, they are not victims of some totally irrational force. 
Rather they are responding in accordance with the thought of unjust insult . . . 
their behavior is intelligent and cognitive in the sense that it is grounded upon a 





Although there is a cognitive component to the process of feeling and emotions (i.e. 
discernment), the embodied aspects of the affects, feelings, and emotions that are 
addressed in emotion-based claims should not be overlooked when analyzing these 
rational-critical arguments.  
Rush Limbaugh’s Emotion-Based Claim of Levity 
 Rush Limbaugh‘s (re)action and response to public expressions of ―outrage‖ at 
the acts and images of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison is best described as an 
emotion-based claim of levity. For Limbaugh, the force and intensity of public outrage 
about the events at Abu Ghraib is incompatible with the gravity of the situation. As he 
asserts,  
I'm sorry, folks. I'm sorry. Somebody has to provide a little levity here. This is not 
as serious as everybody is making it out to be…we‘re all wringing our hands here. 
We act like, ‗Okay let's just die,‘ you know? ‗Let's just give up. What can we do 
to make these people feel better? Let‘s just pull out of there, and let‘s just go. 
Let's just become a neutral country. Let's just do that.‘ I mean, it‘s ridiculous. It‘s 
outrageous what‘s happening here, and it‘s not—and it‘s not because I‘m out of 
touch; it's because I am in touch, folks, that I can understand. (Meyer 2004, n.p,) 
 
He refutes objections of shame, a la Sontag, by asserting the need for levity, or a 
reduction or lightening of the political importance and significance placed on the 
soldiers‘ actions. In other words, Limbaugh does not believe that Americans should feel 
shame and outrage as a legitimate and appropriate response to the events at Abu Ghraib. 
Even though the term ―levity‖ can mean frivolity, as an emotional state it is best 
described as a feeling of ―buoyancy‖ and ―lightness‖ that can occur after being released 




American‘s shame and outrage, according to Limbaugh‘s stance, are too great of an 
emotional burden for the abuse at Abu Ghraib.  
 Scott (1999) explains that levity can ―suggest [making] something easily 
endurable…to lighten something can also mean to make it clear‖ (217). Limbaugh‘s 
emotion-based claim to levity, therefore, can be understood as an attempt to clarify the 
situation at Abu Ghraib, by reframing it within a different context to release Americans 
from the burden of feeling shame and outrage about the soldiers‘ actions. He does this in 
two ways: by comparison and by suggesting a change of attunement. First, the soldiers‘ 
abuse of their prisoners ―is no different,‖ according to Limbaugh, ―than what happens at 
the Skull and Bones initiation‖ (Meyer 2004, n.p.). In both situations, there are 
individuals in positions of power hurting and humiliating the people under their control 
as a form of induction or hazing for entertainment‘s sake. The initial images did not 
indicate that any prisoners were severely physically injured, so why are we ―going to ruin 
people‘s lives over it, and…hamper our military effort,‖ because these soldiers ―had a 
good time‖ (Meyer 2004, n.p.)? Limbaugh is arguing that feeling shame and outrage over 
something as seemingly banal as the pain and humiliation captured in the Abu Ghraib 
photos is simply not a legitimate or appropriate emotion response for Americans to have.  
 Second, Limbaugh is suggesting a change in our affective attunement so that 
American can instead appreciate the conditions our soldiers must endure just to keep us 
safe. As he argues, ―You know, these [soldiers] are being fired at every day…I don‘t 
understand what we‘re so worried about. These are the people that are trying to kill us. 




2004)? Rather than ground judgments about Abu Ghraib on individual‘s apprehension of 
the abused prisoners‘ conditions, Americans should shift our focus to the collective 
conditions of our U.S. soldiers to apprehend, or understand in an embodied sense, what 
our military has to live through day in and day out. Instead of simply judging the events 
at Abu Ghraib on discernments of the emotions of a few individual soldiers and the 
apprehension of a few prisoners‘ conditions, the American public should appreciate what 
our own soldiers experience before evaluating the prisoner abuse so gravely.  
 Furthermore, Limbaugh does not want the American people to overlook the fact 
that the prisoners in these photos are the same as the ―people that are trying to kill us.‖ 
Instead of experiencing shame and outrage, Limbaugh is suggest that indifference or even 
indignation would be more legitimate and appropriate emotional responses to feel. In 
other words, our soldiers have a right to act this way—they are shot at daily while 
protecting Americans from the dangerous individuals that, he believes, intend to harm all 
of us. Limbaugh‘s emotion-based claims about levity shed some light into the 
relationality of emotion-based claims. His argument for levity becomes clearer when 
taken in conjunction with the force and intensity of the public expressions of outrage and 
appeals to feel shame (e.g., Sontag) over the events at Abu Ghraib. Limbaugh implores us 
to, quite literally, lighten our affective load with regard to the soldiers‘ abuse of their 
prisoners and look at it from a different perspective. His emotion-based claim of levity 
are a rationale and affective appeal to refute the legitimacy and propriety of feeling of 






 Affective states are best described as diffuse moods, or collections of sensate-
visceral relations and sensations that can become salient and gain significance during 
social controversies. Diffuse moods infuse an individual‘s actions, claims, and 
performances, as well as material spaces, texts, events, images, music, and art with a 
diverse range of affects. Because affective states are ubiquitous in everyday life, they are 
not limited to only specific locations, occasions, texts, or individuals. Thus, it is not a 
question of whether or not affective states are present during social controversy but rather 
what affective states become salient during these conflicts and how these states function 
argumentatively.
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 In social controversies, the argumentative significance of affective states is two-
fold: they can functions as experiential arguments and affective appeals. First, when an 
affective state acts as an experiential argument it testifies to a given set of conditions that 
has provoked this felt experience as well as operates as the grounds of this claim. One‘s 
judgment of an affective state as an experiential argument questions the legitimacy and 
propriety of that which created the conditions of this state, not necessarily the state itself. 
Second, affective states also act as affective appeals which infuse a claim and/or stance 
with diffuse moods that underwrite the logic of a social controversy within a politics of 
specific affects, feelings, and/or emotions. In either capacity, affective states are 
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 During critical analysis, naming salient affective states does pose a risk of creating normative 
moods attributed to specific social controversies as well as establish obstacles to the discernment and/or 
apprehension of other diffuse moods present in the conflict. However, not engaging in this type of criticism 
is also a risk; by not engaging in this type of critical analysis, the affective dimensions of social controversy 
may continue to be overlooked in these conflict and the insights into the conditions that provoke these 




invitations to empathetically engage in this mood which can orient and galvanize 
audience to respond by either echoing the state or being (re)actionary to it.  
 Conceptualizing affective states as experiential arguments takes the emergent 
quality of affect as the basis of its claim. In other words, the argumentative significance 
of an affective state is grounded in its testimony to the emergence of a specific mood 
given a particular set of felt conditions. This sensate-visceral testament raises questions 
about the legitimacy and propriety of that which created these felt conditions, provoking 
this affective emergence. Affective states, then, function as both affective objections to 
and critiques of the dominant norms and conventions that enabled the condition‘s 
creation as well as open up the possibility of alternatives to this experience. 
 Take, for instance, the Abu Ghraib image depicting Graner and England behind 
the pyramid of naked inmates. The prisoners‘ affective states of pain, fear, and 
humiliation are testaments to the conditions that provoked these feelings (i.e., being 
imprisoned, forced to strip, hooded, made to crawl on top of other inmates and be 
photographed like this). Judgment of this state questions the legitimacy and propriety of 
that which created these conditions (i.e., the U.S. soldiers and the American 
government‘s policy on interrogation and torture). In other words, are these soldiers‘ 
actions and America‘s interrogation policy legitimate and appropriate given the 
conditions it creates for Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib? These questions can engage 
audiences‘ ―imaginative capacity‖ to envision a situation in which American 




create an alternative to the prisoners‘ current conditions of abuse and torture provoking 
pain, humiliation, and fear (Sci 2009, 49).  
 When analyzing affective states as experiential arguments, the ―form‖ that the 
affective state culminates in will impact how an individual discerns and/or apprehends 
the significance and importance of the felt experience of this state. The form affective 
states can manifest in include, but are not limited to, bodies, material spaces, images, 
discourse, art, music, film, etc. Thus, analysis of affective states also necessitates a 
consideration of the possibilities and limitations the ―form‖ of this state generate. For 
instance, when analyzing the affective states that are salient within a film, critics should 
examine how the conventions of film help create the mood but also establish parameters 
regarding how that state can be apprehended and/or discerned.  
 Within social controversies affective states often culminate and become salient as 
a proponent‘s embodied actions, claims, and performances. However, rather than ―overtly 
privilege the body‘s cultural meaning,‖ focusing on affective states can allow critics to 
―tell the psychosomatic body‘s stories‖ (Probyn 2005, 41). In this way, Probyn explains, 
affect theory ―provides a different kind of gestalt for theories of embodiment‖ (28). The 
extent to which a proponent‘s affective state(s) can be discerned and/or apprehended 
implies an ethical relationship between the participants of a conflict and the individuals 
and/or audiences that bear witness to them. This relationship is not only based on the 
belief that they have ―feelings and interests in common,‖ Garver (1994) explain, ―but 




which means collectively they have the power to change these norms if they deem it 
necessary (132). 
 Within social controversies, affective states also act as affective appeals which 
infuse verbal, visual, embodied, and experiential claims with explicit and implicit moods 
that underwrite the rhetor‘s stance. This conceptualization of affective states is inspired 
by Aristotle‘s theory of pathos, or the rhetorical creation of appropriate states of reception 
for audiences to embody and judge a claim from within. Affective states, as a form of 
pathetic appeal, can be understood as invitations and/or provocations to be moved by the 
diffuse moods that undergird a claim or overall argumentative stance. Analysis of these 
appeals focuses on the affective and emotional logic that grounds the argument and/or 
stance put forth during a social controversy to examine how the participants wants to 
orient their audiences and what these orientation are attuned to and appreciate. 
Examining the combination of affective states offered by opposing sides can offer insight 
into the overall logic of a conflict which highlights how certain groups of affects, 
feelings, and emotions function in relation to create, what Ahmed (2004) calls a cultural 
politics of emotion, in which certain individual‘s and group‘s affective states are more 
valued than others as indicative of the outcome.  
 Individuals can be moved by affective states via the transmission of affect which 
has a physiological component. The transmission of affect, according to Brennan (2004), 
is ―a process that is social in origin but biological and physical in effect‖ (3). It occurs 
when the affective state of one person or the mood of a material space are infolded and 




entrainment of the senses. Immediate audience members consciously and nonconsciously 
soak in the sensory information (secretions, scents, sounds, vibrations, images, etc.) that a 
speaker emits into her/his surroundings that can trigger the same affective states in these 
onlookers. Additionally, when we enter a material space we embody the mood or sensate 
information of that area. When I walk into my local coffee shop, I am bombarded with 
the sensual particulars of this space—the smell of freshly ground coffee, the fast-paced 
Latino music playing in the background, the sunshine that floods the shop with a warm 
golden glow. As soon as I walk in, I experience a sense of comfort.  
 In today‘s mediated society, the transmission of affect is a fairly limiting concept 
due to its dependence on immediacy. For instance, there is no ―immediate audience‖ of 
social controversies since these are wide reaching conflicts that typically address whole 
populations and, even at times, the entire international/global community. However, the 
influence of affective states is not restricted to the transmission of affect. When 
individuals are unable to entrain the affective states of another or physically embody the 
mood of a space, they can still bear witness to rhetorical (re)presentations, or captures, of 
affective states. Captures are types of mediated representations—photos, video, audio, 
music, art, and texts—that portray an affective state; catching this affect within a distinct 
moment or moments.  
 A capture does not, nor cannot, fully encapsulate the original state it (re)creates. 
For instance, a photo of someone sobbing, or a video of an early morning sunrise can 
capture the affective states of an individual‘s sadness or the mood of awe, respectfully. 




of the affective states they (re)present. Yet, in some instances a capture can be even more 
moving that an immediate experience. Since captures narrow one‘s focus on a specific 
moment of an entire experience, these (re)presentations can make an affect, feeling, 
and/or emotion, incredibly salient and, consequently, increases its affective intensity. The 
iconic image of Mohammed Ali standing over Sonny Liston after he knocked Liston out 
in the first round is good example of the power of a capture. As Liston lay on the ground, 
Ali only stood over him for a few seconds as Ali paced the ring taunting Liston to ―get 
up!‖ Ali‘s frustration and anger is more than just palpable, it is jarring in its force and 
intensity. As a mediated (re)presentation, captures can be shared, downloaded, 
forwarded, and circulated throughout publics which makes affective states more widely 
accessible but also makes them susceptible to forces of commodification, reduction, and 
misrepresentation. 
 Affective states may be discernable as specific feelings and/or emotions or 
apprehendable as distinct experiences of affect. In other words, even though there may be 
intersubjective concepts, or emotions, that can describe a given affective state, not all 
affective states have specific emotions that can be ascribed to them. Apprehending the 
affective character of a diffuse mood necessitates a level of attunement to the particular 
sensate-visceral relations and sensations that are or could be experienced when 
embodying it. Consequently, analysis of affective states as argument experiences should 
include a discussion of the different types of attunement and appreciation that are 




 When a person discerns, apprehends, or entrains an affective state, this experience 
can consciously and nonconsciously inspire corresponding moods within this individual 
which has an imaginative aspect. Corresponding moods can be brought about by being in 
the presence of an affective state, remembering a past one, or imagining a scenario that 
could trigger it. Being around a happy person, watching a funny film, or visiting a candy 
factory can provoke feelings of happiness within us. Reminiscing about a good time with 
a past love can arouse a sense of melancholy. Imagining how the families in Joplin, 
Missouri, must feel having lost everything in a tornado, can incite feelings of 
compassion. There are two basic ways that corresponding moods manifest, either in a 
similar fashion or echo of the originating state, or in a relational manner or (re)action to 
it. Echoing an affective state can be brought about via transmission of affect or feelings 
of empathy (i.e., understanding cultivated by vicarious experience). When a person or 
environment‘s given mood triggers a (re)actionary state in another, this (re)action is 
typically a response to an initial judgment of this mood. For instance, the force and 
intensity of public sentiments of shame and moral outrage evoked in Rush Limbaugh a 
negative (re)actionary state of frustration and indignation, as he exclaimed ―it‘s 
ridiculous!‖ (Meyer 2004, n.p.). When analyzing affective states within social 
controversies, critics need to take into consideration the influence these mood can have as 
provocation of echoing or (re)actionary states. Reframing DeLuca‘s theory of body 
rhetoric to highlight the affective states of the advocates he analyzes reveals the 
differences between our conceptualizations as well as briefly showcase the types of 




DeLuca’ Theory of Body Rhetoric and Affective States 
 Although not explicitly theorized, DeLuca‘s (1999b) work on body rhetoric does 
touch on affective states when he addresses the argumentative role vulnerability plays in 
the embodied claims of EarthFirst!, Act Up, and Queer Nation advocates. As a form of 
embodied argumentation, body rhetoric is performed to publicize a marginalized and/or 
oppressed stance in hopes of influencing both the content and regulation of public 
discourse and public conduct. For DeLuca, the use of the body as an argumentative 
conduit is significant because it ―is less focused on an abstract, universalized reason and 
more attuned to the feelings that accompany lived experience‖ (15-16, emphasis added). 
In other words, body rhetoric can make affect more salient by demonstrating the felt 
experience an argument is based within. When protesters utilized their bodies as the ―site 
and substance of the argument itself,‖ DeLuca asserts that they are opposing dominant 
norms ―not through good reasons but through vulnerable bodies‖ (10-11). Even though 
DeLuca attributes the force of these advocates‘ embodied claims to the risk they are 
willing to endure and the vulnerability they experience (similar to an experiential claim), 
he does not theorize how this performance is an affective state that audiences are invited 
to sensually and imaginatively embody. Rather, the protester‘s bodily display of risk and 
vulnerability is solely analyzed as a symbolic text, the meaning of which is attributed to 
the image of what this body is experiencing in this location and what symbolic 
significance this action has in comparison to dominant norms and conventions. 
 By privileging argumentative medium (i.e., the body) as the rhetorically 




between discursive and nondiscursive argument, he also maintains the binary between 
reason and affect, positing nondiscursive claims as unreasonable. Being unreasonable, 
however, is not something to be avoided or rejected, but a way of highlighting the critical 
force of objections to dominant framing. That is, DeLuca embraces the unreasonable as a 
critical alternative; but, even as a form of critique, positing body rhetoric as indicative of 
the unreasonable keeps the reason/affect binary in place. As he (1999b) states, ―to 
understand the force of these groups‘ protests,‖ a critic should analyze how they used 
their bodies to ―[challenge] and [change] the meanings of the world not through good 
reasons but through vulnerable bodies, not through rational arguments but through bodies 
at risk‖ (p. 10). Which is why, in the end, DeLuca seem resigned to the ultimate futility 
of body rhetoric as a form of persuasive appeal, hoping only that some audience members 
will come to the advocates position via identification. 
 An emphasis on affective states, on the contrary, would address how the 
advocates‘ intentional experience of risk, in order to publicize their ideological objection, 
cultivates a sensation of righteous vulnerability—the physical and mental state of being 
open to injury and subsequent pain out of a firm belief in the morality of one‘s stance. 
When witnessing or imagining this state of righteous vulnerability, viewers may be 
seized by a sensation of bodily tension and foreboding best described as feelings of worry 
and anxiety, driven by the emotion of empathy—understanding cultivated by the 
vicarious experience of another. Ideally, it is from within this affective state of vicarious 
vulnerability brought about by the emotion of empathy, that onlookers understand and 




of body and affect could analyze how the sensate-visceral experience of symbolic critical 
performances is judged according to norms of recognizability, such as risk, oppression, 
and blame, to which individuals should adhere in order for their embodied claim to be 
deemed legitimate and appropriate, and therefore seem reasonable and be considered 
justifiable. This will be addressed in more detail in chapter four.  
Joseph Previtera’s Body Rhetoric and the Affective State of Shame 
 Using Joseph Previtera‘s silent protest outside the Boston recruitment office as an 
example of body rhetoric, the public display of his hooded, cloaked, and wired frame can 
be understood as a challenge to the U.S. military‘s employment of harsh interrogation 
tactics. When Previtera uses his young, white, American male body to voluntarily mimic 
the stress positions Abdou Hussain Saad Faleh was forced to physically and mentally 
endure, he highlights the brutal and barbaric nature of the interrogation tactics that has 
been approved by the American government.  
 As a symbolic text, Previtera‘s protest subverts the liberal ideology of torture that 
underwrites the U.S. military‘s employment of these tactics by publicizing the lived 
experience of pain Faleh, and other prisoners like him, suffer through as a justifiable form 
of questioning. Luban (2006) explains, ―The liberal ideology of torture insists that the 
sole purpose of torture must be intelligence gathering to prevent a catastrophe…torture in 
such circumstances is, in fact, little more than self-defense; and that, because of the 
associations of torture with the horrors of yesteryear, perhaps one shouldn‘t even call 
harsh interrogations ‗torture‘‖ (p. 43-4). Previtera places himself in a vulnerable position, 




location. He puts himself at risk of public scrutiny and retaliation to stress the cruelty 
embedded in ―harsh‖ interrogation and the ideological rationale used to justify the U.S. 
military‘s use of this blatant form of abuse and torture. Within a few hours of his protest, 
Joseph Previtera was ―charged with three crimes: disturbing the peace, possession of a 
hoax device and making a false bomb threat‖ (Dodero 2004). Outraged by his arrest, a 
secondary protest was staged at the same recruitment office by a group called ―Baghdad 
to Boston‖ to object to both U.S. approved interrogation tactics as well as the 
infringement on Previtera‘s right to assembly. Shortly after this demonstration, all 
charges against Previtera were dropped, citing them as unconstitutional (Peaceworks 
2004).   
  As insightful as an analysis of Previtera‘s protest as body rhetoric like this can 
be, it only offers a symbolic understanding of his critical performance without addressing 
the affective state of his embodied claims. He is not simply claiming the U.S. approval of 
harsh interrogation tactics is wrong, Previtera‘s embodied critique of the events at Abu 
Ghraib is underwritten by and creates an affective appeal based within his state of shame; 
a painful sensation caused by the conscious recognition of the inappropriateness and/or 
immorality of an action you believe you are, in some way, culpable for. Standing atop a 
milk crate, Previtera‘s body was draped in a black cloak in the hot May sun and hoisted 
inches above passersby like a real life scarecrow with arm lazily extended, white wires 
dangling from his outstretched fingers. He stood this way for over an hour. The hood 
Previtera wore was so heavy and thick he did not see or hear the police as they taped off 




pleasant experience; this was the intentional self-subjection to risk, discomfort, and pain 
out of a sense of intense disapproval provoked by feelings of shame at what U.S. soldiers 
are told to do in our name, and for our protection.  
 The experience of shame washes over one‘s body as a wave of physical heaviness 
that cannot be gotten out from under—like wearing a weighty black cloak and hood in 
the warm spring sun. This heaviness is accompanied by a psychological anguish brought 
about by mental flashes of the mortifying deed repeated over and over again. Previtera‘s 
body stands in for Faleh‘s and acts as a memory trigger, mentally (re)collecting the 
images from Abu Ghraib and reconsidering their significance as the provocation of his 
shame. By creating an argumentative experience that cultivates an affective state of 
shame, Previtera is inviting people to empathize with this experience and vicariously feel 
his shame. The feeling of shame via empathy can compel onlookers to avert one‘s eyes, 
lower one‘s head, feel a panging sensation in one‘s chest, and involuntarily recall mental 
images of Abu Ghraib resulting in the tightening of one‘s throat making both the 
(re)collection and Previter‘s display of this acceptable form of interrogation literally hard 
to swallow. As an attempt to engage onlookers in his experience of shame, Previtera 
enacts the belief that Americans should feel shame in response to the actions depicted in 
the Abu Ghraib photos. Ideally, it is from within this feeling of vicarious shame that 
onlookers, specifically potential recruits, would (re)think what being a U.S. soldier 
should entail and judge Previtera‘s critical performance as a reasonable enactment of 






 Social controversies are fascinating rhetorical and argumentative phenomena. 
Inherent within this type of conflict is the possibility of social, cultural, and political 
change. Simply put, social controversies are moments of potential. Consequently, affect 
plays an important role in social controversy as an orienting and galvanizing force that 
can shift individual in relation to the conflict and incite them to engage in it.  
 Analysis of the affective dimensions of social controversy—emotion-based claims 
and affective states—should be based on the generative methodological framework that 
has been derived from the combination of Olson and Goodnight‘s original article in 
conjunction with the friendly critiques and extensions it inspired. In other words, critics 
should analyze the tactical movements of the emotion-based claims that are asserted 
and/or the specific affective states that become salient enough to be apprehended or 
discerned. When describing these movements, each claim and/or state needs to be 
thoroughly explicated with consideration to the unique aspects of these types of affect 
driven arguments.  
 This examination should include a discussion of the discursive and non-discursive 
elements of each which needs to be firmly grounded in this sensate-visceral relations and 
embodied sensations of the affects, feelings, and emotions addressed. Additionally, 
criticism of the affective dimensions of social controversy should assess the ways that the 
controversy is framed as dichotomous opposition and how this construction glosses over 
some of the nuance participants‘ emotion-based claims and affective states.  Lastly, 




taken into consideration to offer further critical perspective into the controversy. All in 
all, analyzing the affective dimensions of a social controversy will offer critics insight 









THE INTERNATIONAL FREEDOM CENTER SOCIAL CONTROVERSY AND 
TAKE BACK THE MEMORIAL‘S EMOTION-BASED CLAIM OF REVERENCE 
“Affects are…not only indicative of the subjective mood of certain places; they also 
frame the array of activities and practices potentially enactable within that place” (Duff 
2010, 884) 
“What has happened to the value of critique as a democratic value?” (Butler2004, 42) 
Introduction 
 As a communicative process of (re)creating our shared, multi-faceted, and 
frequently conflicted past, public memory and the texts that represent it has inspired an 
impressive range of scholarship over the past twenty years.
27
 This academic fascination is 
driven, in part, by the ―partiality and contestedness‖ of a public form of memory (Blair et 
al. 2010, 18).
28
 National commemorative practices, specifically the creation of public 
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 This form of memory is public in four distinct ways. First, public memory is conceptualized as a 
collective‘s (re)collections of its shared past. There is no singular proprietor of public memories which can 
provoke social controversy when different factions of a public feel a strong sense of ownership to the 
memory of specific events, individuals, and/or groups (Mandziuk 2003). Second, as (re)creations of a 




museums and memorials, are among the most contested public memory texts given their 
prominent status as permanent parts of a country‘s landscape and their role as material 
encapsulations of civic lessons.  
 Collectively, official sites of public memory establish a nation‘s explicit and 
implicit parameters of commemorative legitimacy and propriety through their material 
and aesthetic elements. These sites argue not only that some events are more legitimate 
and, hence, worthy of commemoration than others, but also that there are appropriate and 
inappropriate ways to (re)collect these memories while here. The normative parameters 
of commemorative sites apply to both the symbolic (re)presentations of public memories 
and the experiences individuals engage in while visiting them. In other words, 
individuals‘ memorial experiences are bound by standards of legitimacy and propriety 
that establish dominant emotional scripts regarding how individuals should feel and 
conduct themselves when embodying these (re)creations of the past. This aspect of public 
memory, the affective experiences visitors should have at commemorative sites, has been 
a major issue during the redevelopment of the World Trade Center (WTC) site.  
 Given the significance of the WTC site—nearly 3,000 people died there in the 
worst terror attack on American soil—the public memorializing process regarding the 
                                                                                                                                                 
conflicting, perspectives members have on this past; yet, memorial texts always retain some form of 
partiality. When ―one past out of many possible constructions is represented as the past,‖ the bias and 
prejudice of memorial texts, performances, and sites that are intended to be indicative of a collective‘s 
history often incite social controversy (Miles 1997, 60).   These conflicts ensue because, third, 
commemorative texts are intended for public circulation which not only (re)present a public‘s shared past 
but also function as (re)presentations of this group‘s current perspectives on this past, including what 
members‘ perspectives are valued as part of this public. Disagreement can then ensue over what are 
legitimate interpretations, and thus appropriate (re)presentations, of the past in relation to the present 
norms, conventions, and needs of a public. Therefore, fourth, public memory texts are embedded with the 
dominant norms and standards the group has deemed legitimate and appropriate ways to interpret, 





legitimate and appropriate way(s) to commemorate this tragic event at this infamous 
place has been, not surprisingly, vitriolic. September 11
th
 was a profoundly traumatic and 
moving experience in American history. Intense affective states of sadness, grief, anger, 
fear, hysteria, and melancholy were captured in the stories and images of individual‘s 
experiences who were there — in the towers, on the flights, in the Pentagon, and on the 
accompanying streets. As people from around the world bore witness to these affective 
captures, the global outpouring of sympathy was staggering. Interestingly, the force and 
intensity of the immediate as well as the mediated experience of 9/11, has posed a 
challenge when commemorating these events at the main site of the tragedy. Can we only 
collectively remember such a traumatic event by (re)collecting the mortal and material 
loss experienced and witnessed there? Understandably, social controversy has ensued 
regarding not only how to commemorate these events for all posterity at the devastated 
WTC site but also how individuals should feel and conduct themselves when 
experiencing the public memory texts there.     
 The relationship between the public memory of September 11
th
 and affect theory 
has garnered some academic interest (Grusin 2010, Simpson 2006). Yet, as Blair et al. 
(2010) argue, affect remains an ―underdeveloped‖ although ―central‖ aspect of public 
memory that influences individuals‘ judgments regarding what is ―worthy of 
preservation‖ (7). In response to Blair et al.‘s (2010) claim, this chapter offers an analysis 
of the affective dimensions of the social controversy that arose over the International 
Freedom Center (IFC)—a proposed, but now defunct, museum honoring the concept of 




Bernstein and Peter Kunhardt, envisioned the IFC as an educational museum offering 
exhibits and programs that would have portrayed ―the story of freedom [as] a narrative of 
hope,‖ framing 9/11 as part of a larger network of global struggles to ―powerfully 
illustrat[e] that new challenges to freedom will always arise, that freedom‘s work remains 
unfinished, and that there is a place for all of us in this work‖ (IFC 2005, 2). Initially, this 
proposed museum was well received but in less than a year, critics complained that the 
IFC was not worthy of this ―hallowed‖ ground.  
 Objections to and critiques of this proposed museum were championed by the 
Take Back the Memorial [TBM] campaign, a coalition of 9/11 families and first 
responder (i.e. firefighter and police) associations that eventually garnered support by 
over forty thousand U.S. citizens. TBM members opposed the IFC‘s mission and 
educational programming, which they believed could potentially provoke critique and 
debate about U.S. policy and politics at a site they considered sacred. For them, engaging 
in a commemorative experience that could even possibly result in the denigration of 
America here was akin to sacrilege. Rather, TBM supporters asserted that visitors to the 
WTC site should naturally and solely feel reverence—a deep sense of awe and profound 
respect—when experiencing this hallowed ground and conduct themselves in manner 
respectful of the deceased by venerating—enacting reverence via sincere admiration and 
honor—both the victims and America while there.  
 IFC supporters disagreed and asserted that the WTC site need not be strictly 
bound to feelings of reverence and acts of veneration. They believed that paying tribute 




9/11 since it is a founding principle of American life. Furthermore, honoring freedom 
means engaging visitors in experiences that would provoke sensations of hope and 
inspiration as well as analytical curiosity about the social, cultural, and political 
conditions that lead to acts of terrorism, tyranny, and injustice. Bernstein and Kunhardt 
believed this experience would not lead to the denigration of America; rather it would 
galvanize visitors to be more civically engaged against acts of social injustice and help 
prevent the intolerance and hatred that underwrite terrorism. From June to September 
2005, the social controversy between the TBM campaign and IFC supporters raged on 
until former NY Governor George Pataki heeded the TBM‘s request to ―be a true leader 
and remove the IFC from sacred ground‖ (TBM 2005c). The building pressure from the 
force and intensity of the TBM‘s continued opposition galvanized Pataki to evict the IFC 
from the WTC site on September 28, 2005. He explained, ―Freedom should unify us. 
This center has not‖ (Dunlap 2005b, A1).     
 This analysis of the IFC social controversy asserts that the affective dimensions of 
this conflict are most salient and discernable in the emotion-based claim of reverence 
advanced by the TBM campaign. This claim purports that the experience of being at 
Ground Zero naturally provokes feeling of reverence which ascribes a certain type of 
venerable conduct that visitors should enact while there. Functioning as an overarching 
oppositional argument, the TBM‘s emotion-based claim of reverence is both an affective 
objection to and the ground for their critique of the IFC. The IFC supporters did not have 
a singular overarching emotion-based claim to counter the TBM, instead these 




 For this analysis, 215 articles from the New York Times, New York Post, and 
Daily News that were published between May 1 and November 1, 2005 were examined to 
determine the overall structure and affective dimensions of the IFC social controversy. 
Since the WTC site is in New York City, only regional NY newspapers were used due to 
their extensive coverage of this conflict. Press releases, reports, websites, and other 
documents created by the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation (LMDC), the IFC 
and the TBM campaign were also analyzed. To explicate the critical findings of this 
examination, this chapter will be laid out as follows. First, two ―conditions‖ of the IFC 
social controversy are addressed—the mortal and material devastation incurred at the 
WTC site and the LMDC‘s role in the IFC‘s placement there. Then, the initial objection 
to the IFC, as posited by Debra Burlingame, is discussed as the inspiration for the TBM 
campaign and foreshadowed its stance. This leads to an analysis of the TBM‘s emotion-
based claim of reverence which is explicated as both an affective objection and critique, 
followed by an examination of the IFC‘s rebuttal of it. A discussion of the TBM‘s 
framing of the LMCD‘s deliberative democratic process as incommensurate with their 
stance will be offered next, leading to a discussion of Pataki‘s decision before, finally 
offering some general conclusions about and implications of this critique.   
Conditions of the Controversy: The Site and the Plan 
  Shortly after 9/11, Trimarco and Depret (2005) explained, ―Most newspapers and 
television stations labeled the event a national trauma,‖ with the WTC site as the 
epicenter of this tragic ordeal (30). The devastation at Ground Zero was staggering. As 




Center‘s North and South towers, respectively, the severity of these attacks quickly 
became clear. Of the 2,995 people (including the 19 hijackers)
29
 who died in the attacks 
on September 11
th
, 2,762 individuals (includes 10 hijackers) met their demise at the WTC 
site (NSMM 2011).
30
 According to the 9/11 Commission Report, although hundreds of 
people were ―killed instantly by the [planes‘] impact,‖ literally hundreds more were 
trapped unable to escape prior to the collapse of the towers less than two hours later 
(NCTAUS 2004, 285). In the densely packed streets of lower downtown Manhattan, four 
buildings were completely destroyed, and seven additional buildings as well as two 
pedestrian bridges were damaged, some severely so. Yet, the ruins left by these buildings 
are only the material remains.  
 After the initial 2002 cleanup of ―1.5 million tons of debris‖ from the WTC site, 
approximately ―20,000 pieces‖ of human remains were excavated (Associated Press 
2006). These human remains were strewn across the devastated site, mingled throughout 
the rubble. As Colwell-Chanthaphonh (2011) explains:  
Given the horrifying violence of the World Trade Center‘s destruction, it is all too 
easy to imagine that people simply vaporized, turned incorporeal in a flash. In 
truth, thousands of fragments of human bodies descended with the grey ash of the 
World Trade Center that rained over the city. The human detritus ended up on 
rooftops and in sewers and intermixed with the steel and concrete of the 
skyscrapers. (5) 
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 The breakdown of victims by location is as follows: 1,470 at WTC North, 694 at WTC South, 
87 on American Flight 11 (which hit WTC North), 60 on United Flight 175 (which hit WTC South), 416 on 
duty and 25 off duty First Responders at the WTC site, 125 at the Pentagon, 59 on United Flight 77 (which 






The excavation of human remains at the WTC site has been less than stellar. Of all the 
people who died at there, ―Only 292 ‗whole‘ bodies [meaning anywhere from 75% to 
100% of the corpse]…have been recovered‖ (Colwell-Chanthaphonh 2011, 5). According 
to a January 2010 report by the New York City Medical Examiner‘s Office, ―1,626 
Ground Zero victims‖ have been identified, a total of ―21,744 remains had been 
recovered and 12,768, or 59 percent, had been identified‖ (Esposito 2010, n.p.). Since 
close to 2,000 additional fragments of human remains have been unearthed since the 
initial excavation, many wonder what other remains may have been left behind at Ground 
Zero. Sadly, after almost 10 years, the remains of 1,126 victims still have not been 
recovered while almost 9,000 fragments of victims‘ remains linger at the Medical 
Examiner‘s Office unidentified. Once construction is completed, all remains that are still 
unidentified will be returned to the WTC site where they will be housed at the memorial 
complex. Up until the summer of 2006, the development and construction of the 
memorial complex at Ground Zero was completely under the auspice of the Lower 
Manhattan Development Corporation (LMDC).   
The LMDC’s Plan for the IFC 
 In the wake of September 11
th
, former NY Governor George Pataki and Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg created the LMDC ―to help plan and coordinate the rebuilding and 
revitalization of Lower Manhattan‖ with special attention on the reconstruction of the 
WTC site (LMDC 2007). Since 2002, the LMDC has overseen the development, design, 
and continued implementation of the general plans to rebuild the entire 16 acres of this 




WTC towers once stood which is often referred to as memorial quadrant. Over the years 
the LMDC‘s role, and significance, has diminished greatly, however it was their 
deliberation-based initiatives (i.e., town meetings in NY, on-line dialogues, mass 
mailings to victims‘ families, the creation of eight advisory councils representing the 
major stakeholder groups, etc.) that resulted in the initial reconstruction plans for Ground 
Zero.
31
 From this process, the LMDC found there was an overwhelming consensus—the 
public not only wanted a moving memorial at the site, they also wanted an increased 
cultural presence in lower Manhattan. Specific requests were made to include cultural 
and art institutions to the WTC site in order to revitalize the lower downtown area.   
 In response to this request, the LMDC held an international competition to select 
four institutions to be housed at Ground Zero—two at a cultural complex on memorial 
quadrant and two at a performing arts complex on the northwest quadrant. The LMDC 
offered numerous suggestions for applicants regarding potential uses for the site such as 
―creat[ing] humanities programs and conduct[ing] forums drawing from cultural and 
academic resources‖ to create ―a place of inquiry and discussion‖ (Dunlap 2005d, B8).  
The LMDC also suggested that applicants offer ―international programming…[to] 
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highlight the values of tolerance, diversity and understanding among nations‖ (Dunlap 
2005d, B8). A total of 113 applicants were received and reviewed
 32
 and in July 2004, the 
IFC was announced as one of the four winners.
33
  
 Envisioned as a non-partisan educational museum, the IFC would foster 
―conversations on freedom‖ as a world movement, which the U.S. is a leading part of 
(Pogrebin 2005b, E27). To do so, Bernstein and Kunhardt proposed the IFC as a 
celebration of the ideals of freedom and tolerance by featuring installation on leaders 
such as George Washington, Nelson Mandela, Abraham Lincoln, Mahatma Gandhi, and 
Martin Luther King Jr., as well as national founding documents like the Declaration of 
Independence and the South African Constitution. Initial plans for the IFC also featured 
an exhibit about historic freedom struggles including: the resistance against the gulag in 
the former USSR, the caste system in India, slavery in America, fascism during World 
War II, and apartheid in South Africa. A tribute to all of the countries that lost citizens in 
the 9/11 attacks, was be displayed in the ―Gallery of Nations,‖ which would also feature 
an exhibit about the international outpouring of sympathy following that tragic day 
(Pogrebin 2005b, E27). Lastly, the IFC planned to host an evening educational series; 
―the Aspen Institute helped organize a consortium of universities that [would] each be 
allotted 5 to 10 evenings [per year] for lectures, conferences and other programs‖ at the 
museum (Pogrebin 2005b, E27). 
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 Applicants were an evaluative committee consisting of members of the LMDC, the State 
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 All four of the original cultural and performing art institutions that won the design competition 





 Initially, the IFC was hailed by all NY elected officials as reflective of the pride 
and courage shown in the face of the terrorist attacks on 9/11. When announcing the IFC 
as one of the four winners, Pataki stated, ―The Freedom Center has formed a committee 
of outstanding individuals to create vibrant content on the global quest for what our own 
Declaration of Independence deems the inalienable rights of humanity‖ (Dunlap 2005d, 
B8). However, this original support gave way to harsh criticism beginning in June of 
2005.  
Objections to the IFC 
Debra Burlingame‘s (2005) Wall Street Journal opinion piece, ―The Great 
Ground Zero Heist,‖ was a strong objection to and harsh critique of the legitimacy and 
propriety of the IFC at the WTC site and can be credited as the impetus of the Take Back 
the Memorial campaign. Burlingame, a member of the WTC Memorial Foundation and 
sister of Charles F. Burlingame III the pilot of American Airlines Flight 77 which struck 
the Pentagon, argued that ―Ground Zero has been stolen, right from under our noses‖ by 
the creators of the IFC  and urged the public to ―get it back‖ (A14). In this article, she 
establishes the emotional tone and oppositional structure of the IFC social controversy; 
however, she did not advance any single salient or discernible emotion-based claim.  
Foreshadowing the TBM 
Foreshadowing the TBM‘s stance, Burlingame asserted that the IFC would not 
capture the experience of 9/11 making it disrespectful to those who died there. She also 
launched an ad hominem attack on the IFC supporters, questioning their intentions for 




those who (correctly) believe the IFC is an illegitimate and inappropriate way to 
commemorate the events of 9/11 and those who (mistakenly) believe otherwise. 
For Burlingame, the IFC would act as an obstacle to the personal connection 
people want to this tragedy by ―stubbornly refus[ing]‖ to let visitors relive the trauma of 
9/11 when they come to Ground Zero ―yearning to return to that day‖ (A14). She argued 
that from the moment the attacks occurred, people have been drawn to ―the empty pit of 
Ground Zero‖ which beckons people to come and (re)collect their experience of that day 
as well as pay their respects to the deceased (A14). As Burlingame explained: 
[Visitors] will come because they want to remember what they saw that day, 
because they want a personal connection, to touch the place that touched them, 
the place that rallied the nation and changed their lives forever. (A14) 
  
Since visitors want to relive the trauma of 9/11 while at the WTC site, creating anything 
that would compromise this experience is simply unacceptable. Burlingame argued that if 
the IFC was created there, ―[t]he public will be confused at first, and then feel 
hoodwinked and betrayed‖ (A14).  
Burlingame also insinuated that the IFC creators and board members were amoral 
and anti-American since they proposed building a ―critical‖ museum here. As she 
asserted, the IFC founders and board members are radical liberal ―activists and academics 
[that] are salivating at the prospect of holding forth on the ‗perfect platform‘ where the 
domestic and foreign policy they despise was born‖ (A14). These men and women make 
up a virtual ―Who's Who of the human rights, Guantanamo-obsessed world‖ and are 
associated with such ―radical-left‖ organizations as Human Rights First, the ACLU, 




are opportunist ―ideologues‖ who are trying to ―force-[feed]‖ Americans ―the so-called 
lessons of September 11‖ (A14). ―Rather than a respectful tribute to our individual and 
collective loss,‖ Burlingame asserts, these people want to give visitors ―a slanted history 
lesson, a didactic lecture on the meaning of liberty in a post-9/11 world‖ (A14). As she 
warned, ―do not be fooled into thinking that their idea of freedom is the same as‖ ours. 
(A14; emphasis added).  
The TBM’s Emotion-Based Claim of Reverence 
 Inspired by Burlingame‘s article, Robert D. Shurbet along with a coalition of 9/11 
families groups, created the Take Back the Memorial campaign.
34
 Similar to Burlingame, 
the TBM campaign asserted that the IFC did not have a natural connection to the WTC 
site and, thus, would engage visitors in inappropriate conduct there. Thus, they took up 
Burlingame‘s argument regarding the ―the disturbing and disrespectful plans the IFC has 
for this very sacred site‖—polished and condensed it—transforming it into a clear, 
articulate, and easily accessible emotion-based claim of reverence (Shurbert 2005, n.p.). 
This claim maintained that the legitimate and appropriate affective atmosphere at the 
WTC site naturally is, and should be, one of reverence, which would engage visitors in 
acts of veneration. As Duff (2010) explains, ―Affective atmospheres capture the 
emotional feel of place, as well as the store of action-potential, the dispositions and 
agencies, potentially enactable in that place‖ (881).  
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 Following the publication of Burlingame‘s article, in June 2005, the TBM campaign was created 
by a small assembly of 9/11 victims‘ family groups. But by late September 2005, the campaign had grown 
exponentially and was supported by fifteen 9/11 family groups (making up a decisive majority of victim 
family members), the Uniformed Firefighters Association (22,000 members), the Firemen‘s Association of 
the State of New York (110, 000 members), the Patrolmen‘s Benevolent Association (106,000 members), 
NY Congressman Peter King, former NY Congressmen Vito Fossella and John Sweeney, former NY 





 The TBM‘s emotion-based claim of reverence functions as both an affective 
objection and the grounds for their critique which appealed to the norms of respect in an 
attempt to regulate the public‘s conduct that the WTC site. Their objection to the IFC 
―throw[s] open the question‖ of what the legitimate and appropriate felt experience 
provoked by the WTC site is, while the TBM‘s critique of it attempts to ―free up 
exploration and experimentation with alterior‖ ways to commemorate September 11
th
 
here (Olson and Goodnight 1994, 252). James Slevin, the Vice President of the 
Uniformed Firefighters‘ Association, stated TBM‘s most salient emotion-based claim of 
reverence during a rally at Ground Zero on September 10, 2005. As Slevin asserted:  
All of those who were killed on September 11th need to be remembered at a place 
that will pay homage to their story and show reverence to their memory. We owe 
it to all of the lives lost and to future generations, who will seek to learn of the 
day‘s events, to have a memorial that conveys homage, without the revisionist 
history that cultural institutions like the IFC will attempt to portray. (TBM 2005c) 
 
This claim suggests an affective attunement to and appreciation of the conditions of the 
victims‘ death (i.e., the pain and suffering they must have endured during this shocking, 
violent, and illogical trauma) and their families and friends (i.e., the grief of losing a 
loved one in this horrific manner). For TBM supporters, feeling reverence for the 9/11 
deceased at Ground Zero is the legitimate and appropriate thing to do, in fact, we ―owe 
it‖ to the victims and our fellow citizens. Being reverent at the WTC site implies that 
visitors should conduct themselves in a respectful manner that, in this case, means 
commemorating the victims‘ stories and the events of 9/11 in a strictly positive manner 
without extraneous historical or international framing. In other words, visitors should 




 As an intersubjective concept representative of a discernable affective state of 
feeling, reverence is the experience of sensations of awe combined with fear, melancholy, 
and/or elation in conjunction with the cognitive recognition of one‘s human limitations 
which results in an orientation of profound respect and humbleness. Since one can feel 
reverence in relation to something that frightens, saddens, and/or elates him/her, 
sensations of reverence combine awe with these other feelings that are dependence upon 
the conditions of the experience. Reverence, according to Woodruff (2001), is a virtue, or 
―habit of feeling,‖ that culminates in a ―well-developed capacity to have the feelings of 
awe, respect, and shame when these are the right feelings to have‖ (6-8). Knowing when 
it is ―right‖ to feel reverence is driven, Woodruff (2001) continues, by communal politics, 
not religion, since being reverent ―lies behind civility and all of the graces that make life 
in society bearable and pleasant‖ (5).  
 Experiencing reverence implies that individuals know the dominant norms and 
conventions of respect that guide a collective‘s public conduct in order for them to 
behave legitimately and appropriately in relation to that which they revere. As a virtuous 
affective habit, reverence assumes a level of ethical righteousness; when individuals feel 
reverent they are inclined to do what they believe is ―the right thing‖ (Woodruff 2001, 
62). With regard to the WTC site, conducting oneself in a reverent manner assumes that a 
visitor will venerate the events and victims of 9/11. As the behavioral correlate of 
reverence, veneration is enacted as a heartfelt admiration of someone or thing considered 




worship and idolatry. Performing veneration at Ground Zero suggests paying homage to 
the events of 9/11 in a strictly positive, almost devote, manner.  
Affective Objection—Natural Feelings of Reverence at Ground Zero 
 The TBM campaign believed the WTC site is a sanctified space because the very 
soil there had been consecrated by the blood and ash of all those who died. Eschebach 
(2011) explains, ―Soil from graves or from sites of death is often imagined as a substance 
that carries the spirits of the dead and is thus endowed with an aura of sanctity . . . 
transforming it into a holy site‖ (139). When one visits Ground Zero, this experience 
should naturally be influenced by the sensate-visceral relation of stepping on the same 
soil consecrated by the remains of the 9/11 victims in conjunction of with one‘s personal 
(re)collections of the attacks. This combined sensual and cognitive experience should 
result in sensations of melancholy over this mortal loss and awe at the devastation that 
happened that day. The WTC site is also considered sacrosanct because it is ―the last 
resting place for loved ones whose bodies were not recovered and whose remains are still 
within that hallowed ground‖ (Giuliani 2002, 67). As Rachael O‘Brien, a 9/11 widow and 
TBM member stated, ―I have no remains of my husband, and to me that‘s sacred ground. 
That's the last place he was‖ (Lovett 2005, 8).  
 People will come to the WTC site simply to (re)collect what happened on 
9/11because the site itself, which Pataki likened to ―the beaches of Normandy or Pearl 
Harbor,‖ is diffused with the felt memory of that day (Healy et al. 2005, B1). As a site of 
material and mortal trauma, Ground Zero has an ―emotional geography of place‖ akin to 




Ground Zero, there is a stipulation in the site‘s redevelopment plans stating that nothing 
can be built over the footprints of the WTC towers. The massive outlines of the collapsed 
towers must remain empty for perpetuity symbolizing the site‘s sanctification; an eternal 
reminder of the devastation that occurred there (Foote 1997). ―An environment of ruins,‖ 
Navaro-Yashin (2009) explains, ―discharges an affect of melancholy . . . [and] those who 
inhabit this space of ruins feel melancholic‖ (14). The intentional absence of the towers‘ 
footprints becomes a permanent embodiment of tragic loss, literally mapping the WTC 
site with an affective state, or diffuse mood, of melancholy by ensuring that part of the 
material remains of 9/11 is left behind, built in the ―redeveloped‖ landscape. Infused with 
the melancholy of loss and sensations of awe at the enormity of this physical absence, 
TBM proponents believed that visitors‘ experience at the WTC site would naturally, and 
undeniably, provoke feelings of reverence.  
TBM supporters do not assert that creating a museum to the concept of freedom is 
inherently wrong; rather, they argue that creating it at Ground Zero and framing 9/11 as 
one of many freedom struggles fought around the world is inappropriate considering the 
feelings of reverence individuals should naturally experience at this hallowed site. In 
other words, the IFC simply does not belong here. At a rally on September 11, 2005, one 
TBM member explained: 
The organizers of the International Freedom Center say that in order to understand 
9/11 we must see exhibits about slavery, segregation and genocide and its impact 
around the world . . . This is history that all should know and learn, but not here—
not on sacred ground . . . Nobody is coming to this place to learn about Ukraine 
democracy or to be inspired by the courage of Tibetan monks. They‘re coming for 





The relationship between these historical events and September 11
th
 is an ―artificial 
connection;‖ the IFC‘s creators want to construct a revisionist global history and 
―appropriate 9/11 . . . to promote a decidedly political agenda‖ (TBM 2005a). Stepping 
on the ―sacred‖ ground where thousands died on 9/11 and being in the presence of the 
―ruins‖ there will not make people curious about Ukrainian democracy, it will make them 
feel reverent. Furthermore, feeling reverent here will create an expectation; visitors to 
Ground Zero will expect to learn the historical details of 9/11, not these other freedom 
struggles.  
 If the IFC is created at the WTC site, the TBM asserted, visitors will ―wonder by 
what perverted logic is it appropriate to use this spot to dredge up shameful, painful 
episodes in American [and global] history that have nothing to do with 9/11‖ (―Memo‖ 
2005, 28). Feeling shame, provoked by museum exhibits about America‘s past failures 
(i.e., slavery and WWII internment camps) during which our fellow citizens‘ freedoms 
were forcibly curtailed by our own government, is an inappropriate affective state for 
visitors to Ground Zero to embody here. Feelings of shame at this sacred site can only be 
experienced via an artificial connection to the events of 9/11. The TBM campaign 
suggests, ―If visitors to New York want a lesson in world politics, they can take a taxi 
ride over to the United Nations‖ (TBM 2005a). 
Affective Critique—Enacting Reverence at Ground Zero  
 Even though melancholia may infuse the ruined space of the WTC site, the 
sanctification of Ground Zero assumes that the events that occurred there ―hold some 




sacrifice for community‖ (Foote 1997, 7). Since the sanctity of the WTC site limits what 
visitors can learn from 9/11 to solely positive lessons and the natural experience of 
reverence creates an expectation to only learn about September 11
th
 there, visitor‘s 
conduct is narrowly constricted to acts of veneration. Being respectful at Ground Zero, 
therefore, entails more than mournfully reflecting on the deceased, it also means enacting 
one‘s heartfelt admiration of the moments of courage, kindness, and fortitude that 
occurred in the midst of this tragedy and the days following it. Ground Zero, according to 
the TBM campaign, is the place:  
[W]here our children and grandchildren will go to learn not only about the tragic 
events of that day—the loss of the bright, brilliant and beautiful people who had 
so much to give to future generations—but also the stories of heroism, the 
nation‘s resiliency, the world‘s response and the unprecedented outpouring of 
goodness and humanity. (TBM 2005a) 
 
When enacting veneration at the WTC site the pedagogical lessons of September 11
th
 
take on the traditional ideals of heroism and more importantly, America‘s survival of this 
tragedy. This survival is narrowly framed as immediate reactions to the trauma site and 
initial expressions of sympathy and unity suggesting that 9/11 was a contained historical 
moment in our collective past. September 11
th
 happened; it was mortally, materially, and 
affectively devastating but now it is over and we survived. An underlying assumption of 
this lesson is that 9/11 has no ties to the present—it was a lone incident of which the 
victims and America was the innocent victim.  
 Having ―survival‖ as the historical lesson of 9/11 suggests that there was nothing 
Americans could have done in the past, or should do in the future, to prevent this type of 




Dickinson et al. (2006) assert, ―exercises a double articulation, evoking both a profound 
sense of respect and a distanced, observational‖ orientation (28). Feelings of reverence 
foster an appreciation of and attunement to the conditions of the 9/11 victims‘ deaths and 
orients one towards September 11
th
 without questioning what has happened in the past or 
internationally that may have contributed to the creation of these conditions. Since 
reverence is a sensation of awe and, in this case, melancholy, with a concurrent 
recognition of human limitation, people feel reverence when facing something larger than 
themselves that they ―believe lies outside [their] control—God, truth, justice, nature, even 
death‖ (Woodruff 2001, 3).  
 To assert that visitors to Ground Zero should feel reverence for and enact 
veneration of the victims and America implies that Americans should believe the events 
of 9/11 were simply out of human control; both the September 11
th
 deceased and 
American citizens are blameless victims of the attacks. Given this, it becomes 
disrespectful to raise questions about, or worse, implicate American politics and policy in 
the events of September 11
th
 because it would compromise America‘s and, by 
implication, the victims‘ innocence. ―Respect,‖ according to Deem (2010), is not an ―a-
priori condition‖ of public conduct and discourse; it ―must be demanded, negotiated, and 
delivered in and through argumentative interaction‖ (62). In other words, the parameters 
of ―respectful‖ behavior is challenged and negotiated via claims to the normative 
standards of legitimate and appropriate conduct given the conditions of an experience. 
Thus, the TBM‘s appeals to respectful behavior at the WTC site are attempts to regulate 




additional pain the disrespectful behavior of ―blaming‖ may cause them regardless of the 
veracity or plausibility of the critical claim.  
 TBM proponents believed that the IFC museum experience would jeopardize the 
innocence of America and 9/11 victims by promoting analysis and debate that could 
potentially lead to acts of blame and denigration. That is, the experience of analytical 
curiosity and critical thinking that the IFC founders were proposing for the museum was 
considered risky because it could lead to questions about how American policy and 
politics may have contributed to the conditions leading to September 11
th
. As one 
supporter explains, ―The center intends to create a multimillion-dollar show-and-tell 
emporium allegedly meant to celebrate ―freedom‖—but with no guarantees it won‘t 
quickly degenerate into just one more bash-America venue‖ (―Now‖ 2005, 38). 
Defaming America at this sacred place of national tragedy is illegitimate and 
inappropriate conduct at Ground Zero because it would detract from the solemnity of a 
sanctified site.
35
 As one proponent explained, ―Just as we do not see political rallies at 
Arlington National Cemetery . . .  or performing arts at Oklahoma City National 
Memorial or debate at the Pearl Harbor Memorial, we should not see those activities . . . 
at this sacred site‖ (―Now‖ 2005, 38).   
 This critique of the IFC is an appeal to reaffirm the dominant norms of respect 
that traditionally regulate the public‘s conduct at sacred sites. The dominant norms of 
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 According to the TBM, the evening lecture series that would have been offered at the IFC is 
considered especially susceptible to this type of inappropriate blaming behavior because of its ties to 
―world-class universities‖ which are really just ―Petri dishes for subversive theorizing—the sort of 
corrosive nonsense that may have a place on campus, but which has no business whatsoever at Ground 





respectful behavior at sacred sites are so prominent that on June 26, 2005, Pataki 
implicitly supported the TBM by stepping in and issuing a warning to the IFC founders 
and board. He asserted: 
I view that memorial site as sacred grounds, akin to the beaches of Normandy or 
Pearl Harbor, and we will not tolerate anything on that site that denigrates 
America, denigrates New York or freedom, or denigrates the sacrifice or courage 
that the heroes showed on Sept. 11
th
. (Lovett 2005, 8) 
  
This warning has a regulatory function; critique is rejected out of ―respect for the 
deceased‖ and thus, aids in the disciplining of the past by deeming it illegitimate and 
inappropriate to problematize 9/11 at the site of the tragedy where it should ―naturally‖ 
be (re)collected in a reverent manner.  
 Once Pataki asserted that Ground Zero is indeed ―sacred ground‖ that necessitates 
respectful conduct, the terms of the social controversy changes because the TBM‘s 
emotion-based of reverence is given political and normative leverage. Feeling reverent at 
the WTC site is the legitimate and appropriate result of affectively experiencing Ground 
Zero. The legitimate and appropriate way to act respectfully behave here is not 
demeaning America, New York, freedom, or the sacrifice and courage of the 9/11victims. 
The TBM no longer needed to assert the legitimacy and propriety of their stance; rather 
the onus is on IFC supporters who now had to prove the proposed museum is worthy of 
this sacrosanct place.   
IFC Supporters’ Rebuttal 
 Proponents of the IFC had been put in a difficult position during this social 
controversy. The IFC, one of the winning proposals of a year-long, public competition for 




respect now imposed upon them. To do so, IFC proponents would have to prove this 
proposed museum is not only worthy of a spot at ground zero, but that this sacred ground 
is the most legitimate and appropriate place for it. Since the IFC was on the defensive, 
there is no specific objection/critique format that structured its proponents‘ stance and, 
more importantly, they did not assert any one salient, overarching emotion-based claim. 
Rather, IFC supporters shared one common belief and mission that drove their opposition 
to the TBM‘s plea to evict this museum from Ground Zero. IFC supporters generally 
believed that in response to 9/11, Americans should (re)collect the ideal of freedom that 
underwrites our way of life as fitting tribute to the events of September 11
th
.  They 
asserted that the reaffirmation of an ideal of freedom at the site of this tragedy was a 
means to end the type of hatred and intolerance that affectively undergird terrorism in 
hopes of preventing these types of attacks in the future.  
 Based mostly in claims of refutation, the IFC‘s stance was three-fold. First, the 
IFC has a logical, not artificial, connection to the WTC site. Second, although feelings of 
reverence may be a ―natural‖ response to being at the WTC site, visitors‘ experiences do 
not have to be strictly limited to it. Third, ―survival‖ is not the only lesson to be learned at 
Ground Zero, there are a myriad of lessons to take away from 9/11 and the most 
respectful thing visitors can do is learn as much as possible. For these reasons, IFC 







The Logical Connection 
 The inspiration for the IFC arose from President Bush‘s initial reaction to the 
terror attacks of September 11
th
 when he stated that, ―freedom and democracy [were] 
under attack‖ that day (Bush 2001). Bernstein and Kunhardt, the IFC co-founders, 
believed there was no better place for a museum of freedom than ―at the place where 
freedom was so brutally challenged‖ (Dunlap 2005b, A1). A New York Times editorial 
astutely captured the connection the IFC has to this sacred site by explaining that TBM 
proponents questioned:  
‗Why here?‘ Why imagine creating an institution that would celebrate freedom 
and foster discussion of its meaning, and the meaning of 9/11, within the 
memorial quadrant of ground zero? Wouldn‘t that dishonor the dead? We have 
never thought so. We believe that the site is sacred to more than death. It is sacred 
to life and to the principles—as well as the people—attacked there on Sept. 11, 
2001. (―Keeping‖ 2005, 20) 
 
For the IFC creators and supporters, creating a museum to the concept of freedom at the 
WTC site is a logical response to 9/11 since terrorists attacked this country and what it 
stands for, not specific individuals. Thus, we should honor both the victims and the 
values that were assaulted here. ―Throughout our history,‖ as stated in the IFC‘s Content 
and Governance Report (2005), ―freedom has been the engine driving the American 
experience‖ making it deserving of recognition at Ground Zero (4). IFC creators believed 
that a fitting tribute to the U.S. would celebrate difficult but ultimately triumphant 
moments when individuals‘ freedoms were stripped away, sometimes brutally, provoking 
them to ban together and fight for positive political change.  
 Creating an International Freedom Center at the WTC site also seemed like a 




countries and the attacks had and continue to have worldwide effects. Positioning 
September 11
th
 within a global context, therefore, was not thought to be revisionist 
history. These attacks impacted countries throughout the world; its reverberations are still 
felt in a myriad of ways—military actions, citizen revolts, economic downfalls, security 
precautions, changes in media coverage, etc. Creating the IFC at Ground Zero 
acknowledges that the U.S. is not a nation alone in the world but rather that our actions 
and inactions have global significance, consequences, and implications. As Paula Grant 
Berry, 9/11 widow and member of the IFC board, explained, the proposed museum ―will 
look at 9/11 in the way 9/11 affected the world‖ (Pogrebin 2005b, E27).  
 The international framing of IFC is also reflective of its founders‘ belief that 
―Freedom is essentially a universal quest,‖ and the museum ―ought to be representative of 
the struggle of mankind [sic] rather than of one particular nation‖ (Pogrebin 2005a, E1). 
IFC proponents assert that 9/11 is one such struggle, pitting the U.S. against the threat of 
Islamic Fundamental terrorists. The proposed museum, then, can be considered a 
legitimate and appropriate way to commemorate September 11
th
 as well as promote 
international freedom as the antithesis of global terrorism and other forms of tyranny and 
injustice. As Bernstein explained, ―historically, if you look at the response to tyranny—in 
our view, terror being a modern variant—the only response, and the necessary response, 
and the crucial response is the reaffirmation of the values [i.e. freedom] that are under 
assault‖ (Dunlap 2005c, M37). Consequently, the IFC was designed to engage visitors in 




to the ideal of freedom specifically as a means to oppose ―tyranny, terror, and injustice‖ 
(IFC 2005, 4).  
Only Reverence is Unnecessarily Limiting 
 IFC supporters did not refute the TBM‘s stance that reverence is a ―natural‖ 
affective response to experiencing this site. Rather, they argued visitors‘ experiences at 
the WTC site need not be limited to reverence alone, this place can be open to other 
affects, feelings, and emotions and it should be. Most people‘s experience of 9/11 was 
not restricted to sensations of reverence, so our commemoration to September 11
th
 should 
be reflective of the breadth of this incident. Visitors may feel relief that 9/11 is in the 
past, fear that it may again, sadness at the enormity of this loss, but also an appreciation 
for life when faced of tragic death, love for the people they hold dear, curiosity about the 
historical and global conditions that led to the attacks, inspired to make positive change 
in their lives and the world, and even hope that it things can get better. If the experience 
of being at Ground Zero has the potential to provoke all of these different affects, 
feelings, and emotions, why should reverence be considered the only legitimate and 
appropriate emotion to have there?  
 As a site of public memory, there is no reason to constrain the experience of the 
WTC site to ―please a vocal group of people whose genuine grief has already taken on a 
sharply political edge‖ (―Keeping‖ 2005, 20). Commemorating 9/11 at Ground Zero is a 
collective endeavor and although the victims‘ families and friends were those most 
immediately effected and affected by this tragedy, their experience alone should not 




controversy is ―a battle to determine whether the area where the World Trade Center 
towers once stood will become a vibrant tribute to the American spirit or a place of grief 
only, a public cemetery with no possibility of renewal or regeneration and no vital 
connection to the city around it‖ (―The Governor‘s‖ 2005, A14).  Bernstein, one of the 
IFC founders, believed that the museum could invigorate Ground Zero by creating an 
experience that would be ―thought-provoking and produces a greater sense of reflection, 
rather than something that creates a sense of veneration‖ (Pogrebin 2005a, E1). 
Restricting visitors‘ experience to reverence alone chances losing an opportunity to turn 
the WTC site into a place of global hope, inspiration, and curiosity.  
 When developing the proposal for the IFC, Bernstein explained, ―I had in my 
mind‘s eye an institution like the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. I had seen 
how profoundly it affected the people who visited it (Dunlap 2005c, M37). Together 
Bernstein and his partner, Peter Kunhardt, designed the IFC with the explicit goal of 
creating an intensely affective museum to engage its visitors in feelings of hope—a 
sensation of desire for a specific, typically positive, outcome. They wanted ―the 
International Freedom Center [to] help bring hope and resolve to a place of tragedy and 
grief‖ (IFC 2005, 5). By presenting freedom as a narrative of hope, Bernstein and 
Kunhardt believed visitors would feel inspired to join current struggles for social justice 
and analytical curiosity about the social, cultural, and political conditions that lead to acts 
of terrorism, tyranny, and oppression. To provoke these feelings, the IFC (2005) planned 




September 11 to world history, and…show how, time and again, individuals have been 
crucial to freedom‘s advance, and that the contributions of ordinary people matter‖ (7). 
The Pedagogical Potential of the WTC Site 
 Envisioned as a pedagogical museum, the IFC would offer visitors insights into 
current and historical struggles for freedom from oppression as well as celebrate the types 
of freedom that underwrite democratic life. However, Bernstein explained, the IFC would 
―emphasize questions rather than answers,‖ since ―[o]ur ambition is not to tell you what 
to think, it‘s to make you think‖ (Pogrebin 2005b, E27). Visitors would be challenged to 
critically reflect on the conditions that have lead to acts of injustice, oppression, and 
terrorism. Doing so, IFC supporters believed, would help ―inspire an end to hatred, 
ignorance and intolerance‖ via intercultural understanding (―Memo‖ 2005, 28). IFC 
proponents argued that this museum would show honor and respect to America, New 
York, freedom, and the 9/11 victims, by engaging visitors in a critical and reflective 
experience that may help prevent future attacks. Lessons on heroism and survival do not 
expand our understanding of the 9/11 attacks, they just reinforce a wound culture based 
in feelings of victimhood. Rather, taking on a global orientation to September 11
th
 would 
offer visitors a means to widen and deepen their perspective on this tragedy that does not 
solely focus on victimization. The IFC‘s stance suggests an attunement to and 
appreciation for the conditions of other‘s struggles and oppression, not just the 9/11 
victims alone. Visitors would learn from the commonality and differences between 




9/11 from this perspective may yield insights into the inner workings of injustice and 
provide a means to aid in its reduction or, ideally, prevention.  
 The IFC‘s creators and board wanted visitors to learn from 9/11 not just learn 
about it. As one proponent explained, ―We believe that the power of that site should be 
used to consider what happened that day and to see what lessons we can derive from it, 
not only to mourn the dead‖ (―Keeping‖ 2005, 20).  Limiting the lessons learned from 
September 11
th
 to ideals of heroism and survival would make the WTC site a stagnant 
place filled with well-worn lessons. Richard Tofel, president and CEO of the proposed 
museum, believed that: 
Short-term political correctness [should not snuff] out long-term vision. Instead of 
a memorial site that ―stands the test of time‖ and offers a continuing meditation 
on freedom's oft-threatened lifeline, [TBM supporters want] a 9/11 dead zone 
with 9/11 in perpetual focus. Reverent, yes. Forever Relevant? [I suspect] not. 
(Finn 2005, M2) 
 
Supporters of the IFC believed they had the long-term vision necessary to keep Ground 
Zero a vibrant and civically significant place. However, this opinion was not shared by 
many and, in the end, the IFC would not be able to prove its potential relevance.   
Framing the LMDC’s Deliberative Democratic Process as Incommensurate 
 During the IFC controversy, Mayor Bloomberg‘s stance was considered, by the 
TBM supporters, as incommensurate with the conflict. As New York Times reporter 
David Dunlap (2005b) noted, whenever Bloomberg was asked to comment on the 
conflict over the IFC he always ―recalled the importance of the planning process‖ (A1). 
Bloomberg believed that the deliberative democratic process that the LMDC had put in 




would be respectful enough for the WTC site. For Bloomberg, the decision of what 
should or should not be housed at the WTC site should be the result of a deliberative 
democratic process rather than decided by any one group of people or politicians. As a 
site of a national trauma, Bloomberg asserted that the redevelopment of this site should 
be guided by a collective democratic procedure.   
 For instance, after Pataki‘s warning to the IFC founders and board (which the 
TBM urged), the LMDC requested a revamped report of the IFC‘s proposed 
programming that would describe how the museum would not denigrate America, New 
York, freedom, and the 9/11 victims. Instead of simply taking Pataki‘s vague warning as 
a sign to oust the IFC, the LMDC wanted to give the museums‘ creators an opportunity to 
explain how they could create an engaging museum experience and also guarantee the 
center would not devolve into denigrating debates. On September 23, 2005, the creators 
of the IFC presented the LMDC with a 49 page ―Content and Governance‖ report 
outlining how they planned to create a museum experience that would provoke respectful 
conduct in its visitors.  





 meetings. To assure the procedural fairness of these 
deliberations, the LMDC released guidelines for public participation and hired Peter 
Woodin, an attorney and former Deputy Special Master for the federal September 11th 
Victims Compensation Fund, to mediate these meetings. As Bloomberg explained, he 
personally found the IFC‘s placement problematic but ―It‘s up to the LMDC, in the end. 




read that report carefully and then discuss it and see if you can‘t come to some 
resolution‖ (Gaskell 2005, M2). Unfortunately, the LMDC was never given the 
opportunity to hold their deliberations.  
The TBM refused to take part in the deliberations and felt that the addition of a 
mediator was a ruse. They argued that: 
. . . individual and collective members of the 9/11 family groups, along with 
citizens from the Lower Manhattan community and other interested parties, have 
been meeting in good faith at LMDC-sponsored forums for more than three 
years…If anything, the LMDC has once again demonstrated that it does not 
understand the difference between having meetings and actually listening to the 
public. (TBM 2005b) 
 
Frustrated about deliberation process, the TBM did not believe their concerns were being 
listened to, implying a deep anxiety that the LMDC‘s deliberation process would result in 
the IFC‘s creation at the WTC site. In an attempt to circumvent the LMDC‘s decision-
making authority, the TBM campaign continually called upon Pataki to step in and police 
this situation. This call was a rhetorical strategy to reposition Pataki as the ―real‖ 
authority, who needed to put an end to the LMDC‘s deliberative processes before they 
could decide on the IFC‘s fate. For the TBM, it was time for Pataki to do the right thing 




 Pataki did just that when he announced that he would not 
allow the IFC to be housed at Ground Zero. This decision came just a few hours before 
the LMDC‘s planned deliberations and consequently rendered their entire deliberative 
democratic process a waste of government time and money. Former NY Senator Hillary 




Fossella, Peter T. King and John E. Sweeney all supported Pataki‘s decision. In a 
statement, Pataki released these remarks: 
Freedom should unify us. This center has not. Today there remains too much 
opposition, too much controversy over the programming of the IFC and we must 
move forward with our first priority, the creation of an inspiring memorial to pay 
tribute to our lost loved ones and tell their stories to the world. (Colford 2005, 4) 
 
Pataki had made it clear; the experience the IFC would create for visitors to embody 
would provoke feelings and possible conduct that is illegitimate and inappropriate at the 
WTC site because it breaches the dominant norms and conventions of respect at sacred 
sites. Simply put, the IFC had no place at the WTC site.  
 When asked for his reaction to the IFC‘s eviction, Bloomberg explained, 
―Although I understand Governor Pataki's decision, ‗I am disappointed that we were not 
able to find a way to reconcile the freedoms we hold so dear with the sanctity of the site‘‖ 
(Dunlap 2005b, A1). Even though the LMDC offered their assistance in finding a new 
space for the proposed museum, within forty-two minutes of Pataki‘s statement the IFC 
founders responded by stating they would not move forward with the project. The TBM 
supporters were elated; their emotion-based claim of reverence had prevailed ensuring 
that ―all Americans who will be coming to the WTC [site]‖ will experience ―the story of 
9/11 and that story only‖ which is an ―uplifting story of decency triumphing over 
depravity‖ (Dunlap 2005b, A1). The success of the TBM‘s emotion-based claim of 
reverence as an attempt to narrowly regulate how visitors should feel and conduct 
themselves at Ground Zero is indicative in both Pataki‘s eventual eviction of the IFC and 
the general lack of public backlash. The TBM had gotten their wish—the IFC was 





 In the IFC social controversy, the effectiveness of the TBM‘s emotion-based 
claim of reverence could be attributed, in part, to their claims for the reaffirmation of 
dominant norms rather than the subversion of them. The TBM‘s stance on reverence was 
aligned with the dominant, and very rigid, norms of respect that guide the public 
memorialization of sacred events and individuals. They called upon the public and 
specifically former Governor Pataki to reinforce these norms, which support the 
veneration of victims at sites of tragedy, by evicting the IFC from the WTC site. As 
Deem (2010) explains, ―respect is performed and emerges in acts of public arguments . . . 
[however,] We do not understand how it becomes defined, contested, and reclaimed‖ 
(62). This analysis has offered some insight into how this occurred in the IFC social 
controversy. During this conflict, the public designation of Ground Zero as sacrosanct led 
to the active policing of visitors‘ experience via the reinforcement of the rigid norms of 
respect for and at sacred places.  
 When a tragic event becomes sacred, Fritch et al. (2006) found, ―The victims 
must remain pure to keep the nation pure; they must remain innocent to keep the attacks 
horrible‖ (201). Just the possibility that visitor may question how U.S.‘s politics and 
policy could have contributed to the conditions leading to 9/11, rather than solely feeling 
reverent and venerating America and the deceased, was believed to jeopardize the 
cohesion of American society at a place that should create unity. Simply proposing an 
experience that could potentially result in critical debate about September 11
th
 made the 




Zero and in violation of the norms of respect. This disciplinary function rejects critical 
thinking out of ―respect for the sacred‖ and thus, aids in the solidification of the past by 
deeming it illegitimate and inappropriate to even potentially problematize 9/11 here. 
When ―we confront something that is disrespect;‖ Deem (2010) asserts, ―we fail to see 
that its meaning and effectivity must be understood in a larger context‖ (62). In this 
controversy, the value of the IFC‘s mission and programming could not be appreciated by 
TBM members and supporters due to IFC‘s narrow focus on 9/11 alone. The lack of 
political and public support for the IFC suggests a lack of appreciation for international 
conditions of oppression and injustice. Individuals did not want to be attuned to and 
current and historical struggles for freedom here, implying that others‘ oppression is 
unimportant when (re)collecting September 11
th
.  
 Considering the clarity and cohesiveness of the TBM‘s claim of reverence, the 
IFC‘s lack of an equally salient and unified emotion-based claim to counter the campaign 
made their case weaker and vulnerable to criticism. Although the IFC‘s creators wanted 
to create an affective experience that would provoke feelings of hope, inspiration, and 
curiosity, doing so would also created the opportunity for visitors to question and 
possibly critique American politics and policy. Since the norms about sacred sites are so 
well established, IFC supporters were at a disadvantage because they had to refute the 
TBM‘s appeals for the reaffirmation of an already dominant norm as well as forward an 
overarching emotion-based claim that would not subvert these norms. Furthermore, given 
that the majority of the TBM‘s public supporters were the victims‘ families, friends, and 




legitimacy their stance. During times of national tragedy the loss of life as well as the 
pain and suffering of one‘s fellow citizens is made public, witnessing this can establish 
feelings of empathy for the victim‘s loved ones and a desire to help ease their pain.  
 During this social controversy, the TBM‘s emotion-based claim of reverence and 
the IFC supporters‘ refutations of it were embedded within different forms of attunement 
and appreciation. For instance, support for Pataki‘s resolution of this conflict is indicative 
of a stronger affective attunement to the TBM‘s claim of reverence based in an 
appreciation for the conditions of familial grief and the blameless suffering of 9/11 
victims. It is possible that the mediated coverage of the trauma of 9/11 oriented 
individuals‘ to the 9/11 victims‘ families conditions of grief and galvanized their 
attunement to and appreciation of the TBM‘s stance.
36
 In this way, the affectively 
intensive and force of the 9/11 coverage may have led to a type of felt evidence that 
supported the TBM‘s claim. As Meek (2010) states, when mediated (re)presentations of 
(an)other‘s pain and suffering are powerfully salient and affecting, views can feel as if 
they are virtually ―participating in [this] traumatic experience‖ (173). Views can 
―participate‖ in this trauma by bearing witness to the other‘s pain which is not simply 
watching or seeing, as Rentschler (2004) asserts, ―it is also a form of bodily and political 
participation,‖ an affective engagement with the other‘s pain and suffering based on a 
relation of empathetic imagining (298). Bearing witness to 9/11 creates an affect-based 
civic relationship between the victims, their families, and friends and the larger U.S. and 
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 This suggests that affective attunement and appreciation is related to acts of judgment. 
Judgment of a claim is influenced by how attuned one is to the conditions that undergird the argument and 





global viewing audience because we vicariously experienced their pain and felt their 
suffering. With regard to this controversy, the empathy-driven connection created when 
bearing witness orients the public to the affective conditions victims‘ families and could 
enabling individuals to imagine how they would feel if someone wanted to address their 
deceased loved ones in a critical manner at the site of their tragic death. The TBM‘s 
emotion-based claim of reverence, then, gains a type of felt validity for people who bore 
witness to September 11
th
.   
 The findings of this analysis, therefore, suggest that the success of the TBM‘s 
affective objection and critique of the IFC was aided by the public‘s witnessing of the 
events of 9/11. In the IFC social controversy, the empathetic imagining inherent in the act 
of bearing witness may have galvanized individuals to support the TBM resulting in the 
rigid regulation of the public‘s conduct and discourse at the WTC site. Bearing witness, 
in this case, encouraged the creation of conservative norms and public policy, not just 
progressive political change. Recognizing the potential issues this may cause, Rentschler 
(2004) explains:  
When citizens pay witness to acts of mass violence ‗against our own,‘ it also 
helps define a national community of victims. The concept of witnessing as a 
mass mediated, commemorative experience of others‘ suffering presumes on a 
certain level that people should identify with victims and their suffering, and that 
media representations should ideally capture images and narrative of suffering. 
With victim-identified witnessing, there is no burden to understand the source of 
violence and how to alleviate them. In fact, often the injunction to witness others‘ 
suffering, whether within or outside one‘s imagined community of citizens, can 
be used to increase another group‘s suffering. (301) 
  
Deeming reverence and the veneration of America and the deceased as the legitimate and 




events of 9/11; it also memorializes the U.S.‘s collective victimhood. This is not to say 
that empathetic imagining, inherent in the act of bearing witness, make it an insidious act; 
an emotion that enables one to envision the pain of others and response in a 
compassionate manner should not be condemned. However if acts of citizenship are 
performed based on one‘s ability to empathically imagine another‘s pain and suffering, 
what happens when we cannot or simply do not want to bear witness to the affective 
conditions of (an)other‘s traumatic experience? Can we be attuned to or have the ability 
to appreciate an individual‘s emotion-based claims and/or affective states—enough to 
publically support him/her—when we do not empathetically experience the affective 
conditions of the claim or state? If political decisions are influenced, even partially, by 
one‘s ability to bear witness to the trauma of (an)other, than the relationship between 
affect, witnessing trauma, and the norms of citizenship need to be explored in more 
detail. 
Lastly, even though dominant emotional scripts and norms were reaffirmed 
during the IFC social controversy resulting in the strict regulation of public conduct, this 
conflict should not be considered a false, or disingenuous, controversy. During false 
controversies, Fritch et al. (2006) explain, ―the parameters of public discussion are 
reinforced rather than redrawn‖ (194). They further state that false controversy ―does not 
facilitate the open exchange of ideas, even in the face of uncertain outcomes, but, rather, 
calcifies beliefs and practices and stifles alternate perspectives‖ (Fritch et al. 2006, 201). 
The IFC social controversy, on the contrary, was an active public debate that did not 




visitors should collectively remember 9/11 at the WTC site. Unfortunately, the outcome 
of this conflict was the enforcement of rigid restriction on public discourse and conduct 
rather than the creation of more open, inclusive, and, most importantly, democratic norms 
of respect and respectful behavior. That does not make the IFC social controversy false; it 










THE LOI N* 2004-228 SOCIAL CONTROVERSY AND CENNET DOǦANY‘S  
AFFECTIVE STATE OF DEFIANT COMPLIANCE 
“To ask for recognition, or to offer it, is precisely not to ask for recognition for what one 
already is. It is to solicit a becoming, to instigate a transformation, to petition the future 
always in relation to the Other.” (Butler 2004, 44) 
Introduction 
The Islamic veil and hijab, the Islamic practice of modest dress, is deeply 
imbricated in political debates and social controversies surrounding gender, culture, 
religion, and citizenship (Ahmad 1992, 2005a, 2005b; Grace 2004; Lewis 1996; 
Macdonald 2006; Mernissi 1991, 1992; Vivian 1999; Yeğenoğlu 1998).
37
 One such 
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 In this article, I use the terms ―veil,‖ ―headscarf,‖ and ―hijab,‖ interchangeablely. In France, the 
equivalent term is foulard or voile; however since we considered this an ―American‖ analysis we have 
chosen the former terms which are more dominant stateside. By these terms, I are referring to a type of 
head covering that goes on top of one‘s head, hair, ears and neck but not necessarily an individual‘s face. 
However, the term ―hijab,‖ is Arabic for Islamic modest dress, which ranges from simple head coverings as 
mentioned above to face and full body coverage depending on region and religious sect. For an extensive 
discussion on Islamic modest dress, including tips on purchasing and wearing all forms of hijab, see Saraji 
Umm Zaid‘s website, How to Hijab: Your Comprehensive Guide to the Islamic Dress Code for Women and 
Men, http://www.modernmuslima.com/hijabhow.htm. Zaid not only offers descriptions of each type of 
covering (head, face, and body), she also identifies and explains the extensive variations in coverings 
across regions and sects. For instance, another form of hijab, in addition to the veil, is the niqab, or face 
veil, which covers the entire face with a small opening for the eyes. There is a type of face veil, the 
boushiya, which also covers the eyes. Also, there is full body outer covering, which leaves various amounts 
of flesh exposed, can include loose fitting dresses, sari-like wraps, skirts, tunics, and pants. Since 
September 11
th
, the two types of head to toe coverings most frequently featured in U.S. media are the 
chador (worn in Iran and Iraq) and the burq‘a (worn in Afghanistan and Pakistan). Also, Zaid describes the 





conflict ensued over the 2004 French law banning conspicuous religious attire in public 
schools. On March 15, 2004, former President Jacques Chirac approved Article L141-5-1 
of Loi n* 2004-228 for inclusion in the national Code de l’éducation. This law states, ―In 
public school, colleges and universities, the wearing of signs or behaviors by which 
pupils express openly a religious membership is prohibited‖ (Croucher 2008, 200). 
Included in this national ban are Islamic veils and hijab, Sihk turbans, Jewish kippa (or 
skull caps), and oversized Catholic crosses. More discreet symbols of one‘s conviction 
such as ―small crosses, Muslim Hands of Fatima and Stars of David‖ are allowed 
(Siemon-Neto 2003, n.p.). It only took just over three months for this controversial law to 




 The longstanding social controversy regarding the legitimacy and propriety of 
veiling in French public schools, specifically the creation and approval of the 2004 law, 
have garnered substantial and insightful academic analysis (Allwood and Wadia 2009; 
Bowen 2007; Choudhury 2007; Croucher 2006, 2008, 2009; Joppke 2009; Keaton 2006; 
Volpp 2007; Winter 2008). This research has assessed proponents‘ stances on 
interconnecting issues regarding the norms of laïcité, French Islamophobia, and the 
conceptualizations of French citizenship that underwrite the controversy. Given the 
thoroughness of this scholarship as well as the passionate tone of the conflict, it is 
surprising the affective dimensions of the 2004 social controversy have been overlooked. 
Therefore, this chapter offers an analysis of these dimensions by focusing on the 
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 In France‘s lower house of Parliament this bill was passed by a margin of 494 to 36 with only 





oppositional affective states that infused the conflict; the proponents‘ stance is imbued 
with fear and risk, whereas the opponents‘ stance is saturated with indignation. 
Examination of these affective states, which underwrite the logic of the controversy, 
offers insight into how proponents‘ fear of the potential risk hijab posed to the French 
republic was ultimately justified despite the oppressed conditions the law creates for 
veiled French-Islamic girls.  
 To capture the full range of the affective dimensions of the controversy, this 
chapter will also include an examination of an incommensurate discourse offered by 
Cennet Doǧanay‘s, a veiled French-Islamic student, which is irreducible to the pro/anti 
dichotomous logic of this conflict. Cennet wanted to obey the law and observe hijab 
rather than choose to acquiesce to or completely defy the law. In this section, her 
affective state of defiant compliance will be analyzed as an embodied experiential 
argument that attests to the harrowing felt conditions the law created for her as a veiled 
French-Islamic girl. Frustrated yet determined to reconcile her Islamic belief in hijab with 
the law, Cennet made the painful decision to shave her head as a means to unveil (so she 
could stay at her school) but still not show her hair, which she believed was the spirit of 
hijab. On October 1, 2004 when Cennet arrived at school and publicly unveiled her shorn 
head, her affective state of defiant compliance became salient and made the doubly 
oppressive experience and sensate-visceral impact this law can have on young, veiled 
French-Islamic girls apprehendable. Audiences were invited to engage in this state as a 
means to apprehend the intricacies of Cennet‘s affective experience and judge the 




The social controversy regarding Loi n* 2004-228 and Cennet‘s affective state of 
defiant compliance as an irreducible response to it is a significant case study to analyze 
how incommensurate stances function in relation of commensurate ones. Cennet‘s state 
of defiant compliance poses questions regarding the options available to French-Islamic 
girls who do not want to choose between their education and their veil and invites 
audiences to apprehend the felt conditions of her experience to appreciate the skewed 
―moral economy‖ which she lives within (Hauser 2000, 140). The extent to which the 
conditions of Cennet‘s defiant compliance are apprehended can aid in the cultivation an 
appreciation for the felt oppression of her lived experience under this ban and recognize it 
as a manifestation of injustice which puts the legitimacy and propriety of the law into 
question.  
 Since Cennet‘s objection was a more insulated incident, a number of diverse texts 
were used to (re)create and analyze her affective state of defiant compliance. These texts 
include 19 French, Turkish, and English newspaper, newswire, television transcripts and 
magazine articles that feature stories about Cennet from October 1, 2004 to October 1, 
2005, complied from a search on Lexis Nexis Academic. Cennet is of French and Turkish 
descent; hence the focus on French and Turkish articles and these articles were translated 
to English using Google Translate software. Additionally, institutional reports about 
Cennet made by the Muslim Writers Alliance, the Islamic Human Rights Commission, 
and AKDER Women‘s Rights Association Against Discrimination were also analyzed as 





 This critical reading of the affective dimensions of the Loi n* 2004-228 social 
controversy and Cennet‘s affective state of defiant compliance begins, first, with some 
background on the conditions that led to the controversy. Next, the affective dimensions 
of the Loi n* 2004-228 social controversy is assessed, followed by a discussion of 
Cennet‘s dilemma due to the law‘s implementation. Then, her affective state of defiant 
compliance is analyzed as an embodied experiential argument regarding the oppressive 
conditions of her experience that invites audiences to apprehend the moral economy of 
her situation. Lastly, a brief examination of the public reports and responses to Cennet is 
examined to address how the dichotomous stances of the controversy can obscure the 
public‘s apprehension of her state as one of defiant compliance.  
Conditions of the Controversy: Affairs, Malaise, and Laïcité  
Prior to the Loi n* 2004-228 social controversy and Cennet‘s affective response to 
it, there had been a longstanding conflict regarding the legitimacy and propriety of 
veiling in public schools. Goodnight (2005) asserts that long-term sustained social 
controversies ―do not so much die out as become dormant, only to reappear in more 
virulent form later‖ (27). New reiterations of longstanding conflicts do not simply consist 
of the same claims repeated over again; rather stances can mutate over time since ―[t]he 
focal issues of a period may shift‖ (Goodnight 2005, 27). Historically speaking, the 
controversy surrounding the creation and approval of Loi n* 2004-228 is a reiteration of 






 L’affaires du voile are individual cases of French-Islamic girls refusing 
school officials‘ orders to unveil, typically resulting in court battles over their liberty of 
conviction and the parameters of French citizenship. Each affair and court battle 
prompted a new bout of this longstanding social controversy; thus, long before Cennet‘s 
affective state of defiant compliance functioned as an embodied experiential argument 
regarding her oppressed condition under this law, her body was intricately wound up 
within this sustained conflict. 
Prior to this legislation, the State Council‘s 1996 ruling declared that an outright 
ban of religious attire in public schools was forbidden unless religious dress interfered 
with a school‘s pedagogical mission either because it was used as a reason for 
absenteeism, class disruption or as an act of ―pressure, provocation, propaganda or 
proselytism‖ (Saas 2001, 454).
40
 This decree was enforced at the institutional level; 
hence, each school‘s officials had the authority and flexibility to interpret, implement, 
and discipline students in accordance to it at their discretion. This ruling remained intact 
until a bevy of circumstances gradually led to a fundamental change in public opinion. In 
2003, public and school officials argued that hijab in public schools is a ―basic challenge 
to the State Council‖ because now, simply donning the veil was believed to be an act of 
                                                 
 
39
 Bowen (2007) gives thorough historical account of the original and subsequent ―headscarf 
affairs‖ in his book Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves. The book is an investigation into the origins 
of the seemingly fundamental disconnect between French culture and the Islamic practice of hijab.  
 
40
 Earlier attempts to ban veils in French public schools occurred in 1989, 1992 and 1996. Each of 
these instances was prompted by headscarf affairs; however, until the current law the State Council 1996 
ruling that ―the principle of secularism forbids any discrimination in access to education against pupils on 





proselytism (Bowen 2004, 96). Bowen (2007) argues that two recent l’affaires du voile,
41
 
the 9/11 attacks, and, most importantly, a general feeling of malaise—sensations of 
discomfort and unease—about the economic, social, and political state of the French 
republic were all major factors that led to this change in public opinion and the proposed 
of law.  
Within public opinion, concerns over France‘s economic and political prowess 
were tied to a perceived decline in the republican ideal of laïcité.
42
 Based in notions of 
secularism and neutrality, laïcité refers to the need for a formal separation between 
religion and politics to help ensure that state legislation and judicial rulings are based on 
public order and not private conviction.
43
 ―In principle,‖ Croucher (2008) explains, ―this 
concept insures the neutrality of the State towards religious affairs, and the neutrality of 
the church in political/economic affairs‖ (26). As a ―bedrock principle‖ of French 
citizenship and cultural identity, strict adherence to the norms of laïcité is considered 
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 In 2002-2003, there were two high profile headscarf affairs that added to public and school 
officials‘ insistence that a national ban needed to be created. These were: the 2002 teachers strike at Lycée 
La Martinière Duchère in protest of a student‘s refusal to unveil and the 2003 expulsion of Lila and Alma 
Levy. See Allwood and Wadia (2009) for a good overview of both cases.  
 
42
 In response to the perceived adulteration of laïcité, former President Chirac created The 
Independent Commission of Reflection on the Application of the Principle of Laïcité in the Republic to 
assess the French public‘s views on laïcité and he appointed former education minister Bernard Staci 
commission head; hence the nickname the Staci Commission. Even though the commission ―compiled its 
report [from] the testimonies of some 120 people, including veiled women, heads of French parties, human 
rights organization representatives, intellectuals, and writers,‖ none of its members were advocates of 
veiling or could speak to the experience of veiled Islamic women (Yahmid 2003).  The closest connection 
the commission had to Islam was Muhammed Arkoun. Yet, another commission member later explained, 
―It was unfortunate that there was no one with sensitivity about Islam. René Rémond had that for 
Catholicism and Patrick Weil for Judaism; Muhammed Arkoun has no real ties with the Muslim 
community, things have moved well beyond him‖ (Bowen 116). 
 
43
 The origin of the term laïcité dates back to the French Revolution of 1789 but it gained national 
importance with the 1905 law ―mandating the separation between Church and State‖ which declares ―The 
Republic neither recognizes, nor salaries, nor subsidizes any religion‖ (Croucher 2008, 28). See Croucher‘s 





―essential for a cohesive society,‖ and, consequently, national discord and weakness was 
thought to be a sign of a decline in the enactment and public enforcement of it (Coq 2004, 
25). Laïcité was also a driving force in the creation of a public education system as the 
purveyor of both academic instruction and civic cultivation. To ensure the perpetuation of 
the norms of laïcité, public schools were to teach students the central role this principle 
plays in French society and citizenship.  
Within mediated and political discourse, the connection between the adulation of 
laïcité and veiling became fetishized whereas other possible causes, as well as solutions, 
to the affective state of malaise such as issues of discrimination, poverty and the 
substandard quality of urban schools, were quickly glossed over (Bowen 2007; 
Choudhury 2007). Public schools where pinpointed as the first place adherence to the 
principle, and the norms of laïcité were compromised and needed to be reaffirmed. As 
Laurence and Vaisse (2005) explain, ―Schools lie at the very heart of French political 
identity, and they are the first line of defense of laïcité‖ (164). Public and school officials 
argued that a law completely banning hijab in public schools was needed at the national 
level to ensure students were free from proselytism and France‘s young citizenry could 
learn the value and norms of laïcité undiluted by religion.
44
 Former President Chirac 
agreed and on December 11, 2003, he proposed a law not only banning Islamic veils and 
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 The discourse surrounding this law to ban conspicuous religious attire in French public schools 
hegemonically constrains Muslims simply because they differ from dominant Christian religion. As 
Moruzzi (1994) explains, ―When French intellectuals mount a defense of secular values, they are refusing 
to acknowledge that their version of secularism allows for freedom of religious practice for one hegemonic 
group-who go with their heads uncovered outside of a sacred space and pursue their community devotions 
on Sunday-but not for others-who may believe that the head should always be covered and that the Sabbath 
falls on Friday or Saturday. For members of those religious and cultural communities, French secularism 





hijab, but also other ―conspicuous‖ religious attire such as turbans, kippas, and oversized 
crucifixes, in all public schools, universities and colleges (Croucher 2008).
45
  
 Even in its earliest conception the focus of this law has been hijab since veiled 
French-Islamic girls were the largest population affected by this proposed legislation.
46
 
Ironically, there was a discrepancy between the actual amount of French-Islamic girls 
that were veiled and the perceived risk their presence in public schools posed to the 
continuity of laïcité. Even though the 1996 Council‘s ruling supported students‘ choice to 
display their religious and cultural affiliations, fewer and fewer students were actually 
veiling after it was passed. According to the Ministry of the Interior, in 2003, only 1,254 
Muslim girls attended public school veiled (Laurence and Vaisse 2005). This is a 
significant decrease from the 2,000 veiled students reported in 1994 and only represents 
less than 1% of all French-Muslim women (Laurence and Vaisse 2005). Keaton (2006) 
found that:  
Even more striking are the results of a survey reported by the newspaper Le 
Monde which showed that 91 percent of teachers that they polled had never been 
confronted by a ―veiled‖ student in the schools where they teach, while a reported 
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 This law was adapted by the report given by the Staci Commission with suggestions on how to 
(re)affirm the norms of laïcité in the republic. The ban was not the only suggestion made by the 
commission, in fact, a total of twenty actions were offered; however, it was the only one that was made into 
a law. For example, the commission also recommended that French public schools should observe some 
Jewish and Muslim religious holidays and recommended that companies should adopt the same policy. 
These recommendations were attempts to even out the structural inequality experienced by religious 
minorities since the majority of France‘s public holidays are based on Roman Catholic celebration days. 
The commission also recommended that ―the history of slavery, colonialism and de-colonialism, 
immigration and religion be included in the curriculum‖ as well as programs to make it ―easier for children 
to learn their parents‘ languages, such as Arabic and Kurdish‖ (Broughton, 2003). Yet, only one week after 
this report was presented to former President Chirac on December 11, 2003, a bill was drafted which only 
included the ban on conspicuous religious attire in French public schools. The other recommendations were 




 In France, the Muslim community is one of the largest minority populations over five million 





65 percent had never seen a ―veiled‖ girl in their class in their career. And yet, 76 
percent of teachers polled favored the law banning ―ostensible‖ religious symbols. 
(181) 
   
While public and education officials asserted there was an intense need for a national ban 
on veils and other conspicuous religious attire in public schools, the actual magnitude of 
the issue (i.e., the number of students observing hijab) was continually decreasing.  
Overview of the Affective Dimensions of the Social Controversy 
 The proposed law reignited the longstanding social controversy about veiling 
once again. Oppositional, dichotomous stances on the law were taken and participants 
from both sides appealed to differing norms of laïcité that informed their conflicting 
conceptions of French citizenship and civic conduct. Laïcité, Joppke (2009) explains, ―is 
marked by a tension between being a principle of rights and religious liberties and being 
a principle of national unity and integration: both the defense and the rejection of the 
Islamic headscarf could be done (and historically have been done) in [its] name‖ (33). 
Pro-law supporters asserted the conceptualization of laïcité based in national unity and 
integration; whereas their opponents argued that laïcité could and should support 
citizens‘ rights and liberties by promoting public neutrality rather than secularity. Each 
side asserted the legitimacy and propriety of their conceptualization of laïcité based on 
claims saturated with conflicting affective states. During this controversy, the law 
proponents‘ state of fear infuses their stance regarding the risk that veiling poses in 
public schools and the law‘s opponents state of indignation grounds their stance that the 




two different orientations towards hijab which are attuned to and appreciate different 
form of French citizenship.  
Pro-Law Stance 
 During the social controversy regarding Loi n* 2004-228, pro-law supporters 
argued that veiling in public school posed an immediate and potential risk to France and 
its citizenry which individuals should be fearful of. Banning the veil and other 
conspicuous religious attire from school was necessary to preserve French national 
identity and culture as well as keep its citizenry safe. Fear, as an affective state, is 
experienced as sensations of anxiety which course through the body as one‘s senses 
become more alert, breathing accelerates, and limbs are retracted; preparing the body to 
(re)act when confronted by what is perceived as an imminent danger, risk, or threat. 
When experiencing this affective state, the mind focuses sharply on what it considered 
the source or object of fear to help attenuate one‘s physical and mental distress. The 
emotion of fear ―is felt as an unpleasant form of intensity,‖ which Ahmed (2004) 
explains, has a ―temporal dimension‖ because it is experienced in ―anticipation of hurt or 
injury‖ not immediate pain (Ahmed 2004, 65). Fear prompts (re)actions based in the 
impulse for self-preservation; to save oneself from that which poses a potential risk of 
harm and/or pain.  
The affective experience of risk, on the other hand, is the felt sensation of 
vulnerability which provokes anxiety when exposed to instances of possible injury and 
pain. Similar to fear, risk also has a temporal component; the affective state of risk is a 




dangers his/her is physically, mentally, and affectively left open to (Slovic 2010). Thus, 
there is an interrelated relationship between the affective states of fear and risk. 
Experiences of risk expose one to the possibility of pain which provokes states of fear; 
feeling fear, in turn, can lead to a desire to remove oneself from the experience of risk as 
a relief from the anxiety it provokes (Altheide 2010; Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Lerner 
et al. 2005; Staples 2000). From a national study on fear and risk, Lerner et al. (2011) 
found that feelings of fear can lead to more pessimistic judgments about the force and 
intensity of the experience of risk one is open to, especially in relation to potential acts of 
terrorism. Furthermore, when the emotion of fear is either intentionally or naturally 
primed in an individual, it can intensify existing feelings of being at risk and provoke 
individuals to imaginatively expand upon the realm of potential dangers one is vulnerable 
to. This priming of feat also can create a greater sensation of pressure galvanizing 
individuals to relieve the feeling of risk.   
 Affective states of fear and risk can be experienced as diffuse moods at the 
collective, not just individual, level which can be evoked in public discourse. Collective 
states of fear, Ahmed (2004) explains, are ―concerned with the preservation not simply of 
‗me,‘ but also ‗us,‘ or ‗what is,‘ or ‗life as we know it,‘ or even ‗life itself‘‖ (64). As a 
galvanizing force of national preservation or security, rhetorical fear appeals can and 
have been used to mobilize audiences into action as a means of protection. Altheide 
(2010) argues, ―The prevalence of fear in public discourse can contribute to stances and 
reactive social policies that promote state control and surveillance. Fear is a key element 




control, and prevention of risks‖ (261). Political action that is created and implemented in 
(re)action to fear makes the affective economy, or politics, of fear more salient (Ahmed 
2004). The affective economy of fear ―works to contain the bodies of others‖ as a means 
to restrain or prevent the experience of risk (Ahmed 2004, 67). In other words, the object 
of fear is rationalized as a national danger or risk which justifies actions to restrict, 
contain, and/or control it. As Ahmed (2004) asserts, ―fear functions as a technology of 
governance: the sovereign power either uses fear to make others consent to that power, or 
civil society promises protection, and the elimination of fear, to ensure consent‖ (72).  
Allowing French-Muslim girls to veil in public schools, proponents asserted, 
would create an atmosphere of risk by jeopardizing: students‘ integration into French 
culture, national cohesion and unity, student safety, and gender equality. Supporters of 
the ban argued that donning the veil, as an icon of Islam, is a form of proselytism and a 
sign of French-Islamists‘ girls unwillingness to embrace the Republic which subverts the 
dominant norms of laïcité that promote integration within public schools (Appiah  2004; 
Bowen 2007; Choudhury 2007; Thomas 2006; Vivian 1999). As former President Chirac 
stated when proposing the ban, ―Wearing a veil, whether we want it or not, is a sort of 
aggression that is difficult for us to accept‖ (quoted in Choudhury 2007, 199). For Chirac 
and other law supporters, the sensate-visceral experience of veiling was so intense that 
simply donning the hijab would create a state of aggression and act as a claim of hostility 
toward French culture making the veil inherently anti-French. Thus, banning this 
―aggression‖ within public school was for the ―greater good‖ of France to promote 




Pro-law proponents argued that the ―French tradition explicitly rejects pluralism 
as a public good‖ because it put the nation‘s cohesion and strength at risk (Carle 2004, 
67). Dominant norms of laïcité, they assert, ―can ensure the separation of public and 
private only by refraining from recognizing distinctive cultural and religious identities 
within the public sphere‖ (Wievioka 2004, 29).
47
 From this integration perspective of 
laïcité, citizenship and national identity is intimately bound to French culture; performing 
one‘s citizenship depends, in part, on his/her willingness to both accept and enact French 
as the national culture above all other cultural, ethnic and religious affiliations. The 
experience of unity, then, was dependent on the sense of sight—all citizens had to ―look‖ 
French and publicly enact French customs giving the appearance of a unified nation. The 
more multicultural and religiously diverse French identity appeared to be, law supporters 
argued, the weaker and more vulnerable the nation became. Ahmed (2004) explains, 
―Fear involves reading such [multicultural] openings as dangerous; the openness of the 
[national] body to the world involves a sense of danger, which is anticipated as a future 
pain or injury‖ (69). Hijab in public school, then, put national unity and security at risk 
by making veiled students‘ Islamic identity more visually salient than their French 
identity signifying their intentional resistance to the dominant norms of laïcité and 
aggression towards the French government.  
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 An important critique of laïcité proponents is that strict adherence to this ideal privileges 
Christianity. Of the four types of religious attire addressed by the ban—the hijab, the turban, the kippa and 
the crucifix—all are considered mandatory by their associated religious faith except the crucifix. As Jean-
Arnold Clermont, president of the Protestant Federation of France explains, "people no longer wear huge 
crosses so it is kind of hypocrisy to say that, of course, we are not against Jews or Muslims but against all 
'conspicuous' signs" (Carle, 2004, p. 65). Therefore, Catholics are not truly affected by this law even 





School officials felt they had to mentally and physically protect ―pupils from the 
pressures‖ of veiling since French public schools were considered ―the cradle of 
democratic unity‖ (Bowen 2007, 96-7). As Weil (2004), a member of the Staci 
Commission which researched the decline of laïcité and a pro-law supporter, explains:  
It has become clear that in schools where some Muslim girls do wear the 
headscarf and others do not, there is strong pressure on the latter to ―conform.‖ 
This daily pressure takes different forms, from insults to violence. In the view of 
the (mostly male) aggressors, these girls are ‗bad Muslims,‘ ‗whores,‘ who should 
follow the example of their sisters who respect Koranic prescriptions . . . 
Furthermore, in the increasing number of schools where girls wear the [veil], a 
clear majority of Muslim girls who do not wear the headscarf called for legal 
protection and asked the commission to ban all public displays of religious belief. 
(n.p.) 
 
From this perspective, unveiled French-Muslim girls are innocent victims that are 
consistently exposed to experiences of risk via the felt pressure to veil for religious and 
safety reasons. Law proponents asserted that this pressure was so intense that simply the 
presence of veiled girls put unveiled girls in danger of proselytism and verbal/physical 
violence. Hijab wearing girls and Islamic boys were oppressors that French-Muslim girls 
were pleading for protection from; pro-law supporters believed it was their duty to keep 
these students safe and reduce their fear and risk of being bullied. Yet, French-Muslim 
girls are not the only ones in danger; rather the entire French citizenry is at risk and the 
public school system was the material site of this danger.  
 ―[T]he defense of laïcité in public institutions, particularly in schools,‖ according 
to Allwood and Wadia (2009), ―was presented by many pro-ban supporters as a means of 
protecting French democracy against fanatical ideologies, namely Islamic 




the wearing of a headscarf or the imposition of it on others is much more than an issue of 
individual freedom: it has become a France-wide strategy pursued by fundamentalist 
groups who use public schools as their battleground.‖ Framing ―public school‖ as a 
―battleground‖ implies that there is a war between Islamic fundamentalism and French 
national identity. A fear of what ―fundamentalists‖ would do to the larger French 
citizenry, if they could terrorize young French-Muslim girls, implies a sense of moral and 
mortal urgency. French citizens would be endangering themselves if they allowed girls to 
continue veiling in public schools, since hijab was a ―France-wide strategy‖ used by 
Islamic Fundamentalists plotting to infiltrate and occupy France.  
 From this perspective, veiling was not only an icon of Islamism; it also was an 
embodiment of an intense and radically devout form of Islam that is closely connected to 
fundamentalist sects. As one public school teacher explained, ―In its task of teaching 
general rules, the secular school cannot tolerate having some adolescents voluntarily or 
fearfully bending themselves to the fundamentalism of a community‖ (Graff et al. 2004, 
37). To this teacher, and many others, hijab is not a sign of faith or cultural tradition, but 
rather a political insignia of fundamentalism and a form of patriarchal oppression that 
French-Muslim girls needed to be protected from. Former National Assembly speaker, 
Jean-Louis Debre explained that ―what is at issue here is the clear affirmation that public 
school is a place for learning and not militant activity‖ (―France Votes‖ 2004). The best 
way to reaffirm this distinction, according to pro-law advocates, is pass a national law 
prohibition hijab in public schools; otherwise, students as well as the entire French 





 Opponents of the law, not surprisingly, argued that this proposed legislation was a 
blatant act of Islamophobia; a form of fear specifically oriented towards Islam. The 
disproportionate effect the ban would have on veiled French-Islamic girls was ―proof of 
barely concealed anti-Arab/Muslim racism‖ that ran rampant throughout France 
(Allwood and Wadia 2009, 173). This stance is infused with an affective state of 
indignation in (re)action to the fear that underwrites the law and in its supporters‘ stance. 
The opposition‘s indignation was experienced in (re)action to three perceived injustices. 
First, the law, as an act of Islamophobia, was unjust and would harm French-Islamic 
women and girls. Second, imposition of this ban was an act of forced assimilation which 
infringes students‘ liberty of conviction. Third, it is culturally insensitive and morally 
wrong to assert that hijab is solely a sign of female oppression and patriarchal 
dominance.   
 The affective state of indignation is experienced as a type of anger; a coursing 
heat that surges through the body culminating in a sense of restlessness and intense focus 
on what is cognitively recognized as a morally unjust act committed against oneself 
(Dubreuil 2010). Feeling indignant typically provokes an urge to retaliate in response to 
this perceived injustice. As an emotion, Hattam and Atkinson (2006) explain, indignation 
is a righteous anger that is oriented ―towards the dominant forces that generate, inform, 
and shape discrimination, dehumanization, and human misery‖ (697). For instance, one 
reason critics of the law felt indignant was because public and school officials fixated on 




colonialist mentality and overlooks the rich array of cultural and religious reasons women 
have for veiling (Moorti and Ross 2002, 267). Since indignation is felt in response to 
perceived acts of injustice, the experience of indignation implies a belief in the legitimacy 
and propriety of one‘s anger as the appropriate response to human and civil rights 
violations (Macedo 2004). Prinz (2007) asserts that one generally feels indignation when 
he/she bears witness to public officials‘ failure ―to take care of‖ their citizenry which is a 
violation of societal norms of justice (69).  
 Opponents of the law argued that the intentional infringement of young citizen‘s 
liberty of conviction in public schools was simply a means to attenuate the public‘s fear 
of Fundamentalist Islam regardless of the pain and suffering the ban would clearly caused 
veiled French-Islamic women and girls. Choudhury (2007) explains, ―opponents contest 
the ban itself as an act of discrimination against a marginalized minority and as a law that 
hurts the very people it claims to protect‖ (206). The law‘s opponents felt indignant about 
the government‘s proposal for a national ban that violates the civil rights of its own 
citizenry and scoffed at the claim that this unjust restriction would create a greater sense 
of national unity. They argued that the ―law will stigmatize French Muslims and 
exacerbate already fragile relations between religious and ethnic communities‖ (Abu-
Rabia 2006, 101). A national ban would be an act of forced assimilation, not the seamless 
integration of the Islamic population into the general population (Croucher 2008). 
Creating a situation in which a minority is even further ostracized within the public 
sphere would not lead to a more cohesive society but rather greater separation, 




 The law‘s opponents argued, ―[t]he French value of individual religious liberty 
has . . . been superseded by the perceived threat to national sovereignty and the French 
way of life‖ (Laurence and Vaisse 2005, 167). The injustice of this normative violation of 
citizens‘ liberty of conviction evoked an affective state of indignation in critics‘ which 
galvanized them to propose a change to the dominant norms of laïcité. Critics of the law, 
Keaton (2006) explains, ―support an interpretation of laïcité as the school‘s neutrality 
toward religious beliefs (therefore its equal respect for their expression)‖ and challenged 
the legitimacy and propriety of a law that would add to the material and mental 
oppression of its own citizens (177). Interpreting laïcité as a principle of individual rights 
suggests a form of French citizenship that appreciates liberty, diversity, and social unity 
based in tolerance. Whereas, supporting norms of laïcité based on integration justify the 
denial of students‘ right to a public education and force them to sacrifice their conviction 
in order to receive one.
48
   
 The anti-law stance asserted that ―French republicanism‘s emphasis on individual 
liberty,‖ underwrites French-Muslim girls‘ right to choose whether or not they want to 
veil in public schools; thus, choosing to veil is an enactment of, not an aggression 
towards, French citizenship and culture (Beller 2004, 597). In other words, a girl‘s choice 
to hijab (not the imposition of it) is ―a French thing to do‖ and consequently, supporting 
that choice ―would [also] be a French thing to do‖ (Beller 2004, 597). On January 17, 
2004, in cities across France over 20,000 Muslim women did just that as they protested 
the law chanting ―Not our father, not our husbands, we chose the headscarf!‖ During 
                                                 
48
 This is a fairly ―Americanized‖ understanding of citizenship considering that freedom is one of 




these rallies, protesters‘ indignation was palpable as they ―embraced their simultaneous 
identity as Muslims and French citizens by signing the Marseillaise, wearing headscarves 
featuring the French tricolor, and waving their national identity cards‖ (Choudhury 2007, 
204). For these women, being a French citizen entitled girls their liberty of conviction 
and supported their right to veil, if they choose to do so. Denial of this right would be a 
blatant manifestation of social injustice, making the law an illegitimate and inappropriate 
piece of legislation.  
 Critics also argued that hijab is not a definitive sign of female oppression and the 
proposed law glosses over the multitude of reasons women have for donning the veil. For 
instance, it did not matter if girls veiled as: a refusal to be subjected to the male gaze, 
liberation from westernized standards of beauty, an act of political resistance to 
acculturation, an embodiment of religious beliefs in modesty, a sign of cultural pride and 
tradition, or simply a fashion preference. According to the logic of the proposed law, all 
that mattered was whether or not French-Muslim girls unveiled because they were a 
threat to national unity and the public‘s safety. The anger and frustration caused by this 
intentional reduction in meaning prompted one supporter to assert, ―It is absurd to expect 
a Muslim girl to form a secularized, public identity at school and yet maintain an 
unencumbered Muslim identity at home‖ (Carle 2004, 68). The law not only severs the 
act of veiling from the intricate web of personal, political, cultural and religious reasons 
women hijab, but, critics argued, it also forces a deep separation between their French 
and Islamic identities. Simply put, opponents of the law believed there was no justifiable 




ban. Recognition of this injustice provoked their affective state of indignation which 
undergirded their oppositional stance. Yet, the majority of citizens and public officials 
believed the oppression of this small group of students was justifiable because it was for 
the greater good of the French republic. In this way, Ahmed (2004) explains, ―fear 
work[ed] to restrict some bodies through the movement or expansion of others” (69). 
Epilogue to the Controversy 
 Despite the controversial nature of this proposed law, it was approved by both 
houses of the French Parliament and former President Chirac in only three months. 
Indeed, the law has been deemed legitimate, appropriate, and, ultimately, justified. The 
dominant norms of laïcité as a principle of national secularism promoting national unity 
was reified and allowed the government to deny students a public education if they 
enacted their religious and cultural beliefs by wearing ―conspicuous‖ religious attire in 
schools. This law rigidly regulated the public conduct of French-Islamic girls, French-
Sikh boys, and French-Jewish boys by completely banning veils, turbans, and kippa, 
implying that donning these symbols signified their refusal to integrate into French 
culture.  
 The approval of this law politically and affectively marks veiled French-Islamic 
women and girls as ―fearsome‖ because they are ―a danger not only to one‘s self, but to‖ 
the French way of life which ―justif[ies] violence against‖ them (Ahmed 2004, 64). To be 
appreciated as French citizens, these students would have to publicly sacrifice their 
religious and cultural adherence to these beliefs and customs due to the potential risk they 




affected simply does not matter in the larger scheme of things; their oppression is a type 
of collateral damage experienced for the greater good of the French republic. Veiled 
French-Islamic girls, as the largest population impacted, have disproportionately felt the 
brunt of this law. As Keaton (2006) explains:  
. . . these girls are penalized for the politics of others, people who would sacrifice 
the girls‘ education to their own beliefs, thereby reducing the girls‘ life chances in 
a credential-driven society. Already, those in the outer cities receive a woefully 
inadequate education, and it is only further compromised by this law. Moreover, 
the law contributes to their stigmatization and social exclusion. (183) 
 
The further material and social oppression of veiled French-Islamic girls is justified by 
this law; legalizing the creation of oppressive conditions which they must live within in 
their own country. Given that veiled schoolgirls are the individuals must immediately 
affected by this law, it is surprising that during the controversy they did not have a strong 
public voice in the conflict.  
 Both Tévanian (2005) as well as Allwood and Wadia (2009) found that during 
this controversy the majority of the public discourse was produced by academics, writers, 
politicians, and journalists whereas veiled students themselves as well as their families, 
friends, and teachers received little to no media coverage or public representation. 
Furthermore, the pro-law stance received a larger amount of print and airtime than the 
law‘s opponents; 46% to 38% respectively (Allwood and Wadia 2009, 162). Concerns 
over the affective conditions of veiled French-Islamic girls‘ experiences under this law 
were largely ignored during the Loi n* 2004-228 social controversy. Consequently, 
Allwood and Wadia (2009) assert, ―questions about how schoolgirls affected by the ban 




learning courses, about how their classmates felt, or about the educational future of all 
those affected directly or indirectly by the ban met with deafening silence‖ (162).  
 However, Cennet Doǧanay‘s affective state of defiance compliance can be 
understood as a ―new reiteration‖ of this longstanding social controversy because it 
―unsettle(s) the balances of [these] well-known paths of argument‖ by offering an 
incommensurate, irreducible discourse as an alternative to the dominant pro/anti 
framework (Goodnight 2005, 27). As an embodied experiential argument, Cennet‘s 
affective state of defiant compliance makes the plight of veiled French-Islamic girls 
apprehendable and recognizable as an experience of oppression which enabled audiences 
to appreciate their conditions under this law as a manifestation of social injustice. The 
conditions leading to this state offer insight into how Cennet‘s experience of this new law 
galvanized her to shave her had as an embodiment of her feelings of defiant compliant.  
Conditions of Cennet’s Shorn Response 
 The law first went into effect on September 2, 2004 and Cennet Doǧanay was a 
15 year-old sophomore at the Lycee Louis-Pasteur de Strasbourg, a high school in a 
northeast suburb of Paris. The ban posed a challenge for Cennet. She began veiling in 
sixth grade out of her own conviction and desperately wanted to continue observing the 
Islamic tradition she loved but she also wanted to remain at her school. ―This new law 
broke my heart,‖ she explained, ―I was asked to choose between my religion and my 
studies, between being myself and having a future. Why would the government do that‖ 
(Fouquet 2006, n.p.)? If she simply followed French law and unveiled, Cennet would 




dignity, not just a piece of fabric. It‘s me‖ (Fouquet 2006, n.p.). Conversely, if Cennet 
remained veiled she would have to leave her school and either go to school abroad, which 
was financially impractical, or attend a publicly subsidized private, most likely Catholic, 
school since in 2004 only one private Islamic school existed in all of France even though 
two others were being developed (Bennhold 2008, A6). Cennet could not easily choose 
one situation over another without either compromising her deeply held religious and 
cultural beliefs or, at fifteen, changing schools and possibly moving away from her 
family and friends.  
 Uncertain what to do, Cennet as well as approximately 639 French-Islamic girls, 
arrived at their public schools veiled (Laurence and Vaisse 2005, 170). These girls were 
not allowed to attend classes; instead veiled students began a mandated, individual 
dialogue processes which ―precede[d] the enforcement of all disciplinary procedure‖ 
(Kramer 2004, 58). However, as the former education minister explained, ―this phase 
[was] not, the rules make plain, a time for negotiation‖ (―A Hot‖ 2004, 43). These 
―dialogues‖ were merely a means to facilitate the decision to either: unveil and stay; or 
veil and make other schooling plans. By the end of the year out of the approximate 639 
students that arrived veiled, 48 girls were expelled for hijab, 143 students ―voluntarily‖ 
left the national education system to be home schooled, and the rest, including Cennet, 
unveiled (Laurence and Vaisse 2005, 171).  
 Cennet remained in dialogues for about one month and become desperate for a 
resolution since, in her words, ―there was no time‖ (Doǧanay 2004, n.p.). She had wasted 




As her mother explained, Cennet was determined to find a way ―to go to school like 
everyone else‖ (―Une lycéenne‖ 2004, n.p.; google translation). Reluctantly, Cennet did 
what she felt she had to in order to continue her education at her school as well as honor 
her country, her religion and her culture—she shaved her head. Cennet felt she had ―no 
choice than what I did‖ (Doǧanay 2004, n.p.); the sensate-visceral pressure imposed on 
her by these doubly constricting conditions provoked an array of feelings—sadness, 
frustration, desperation, anger, and resignation—which galvanized her to do the only 
thing she believed appeased both French and Islamic law.  
Cennet’s Affective State of Defiant Compliance 
 For Cennet, shaving her head was a means of survival; the only option available 
to her given the rigid behavioral regulations established by the new law that narrowly 
confined her lived experience to two undesirable choices. The oppressive sensations of 
these conditions provoked a sense of defiance—the sensate-visceral experience of 
frustration and contempt felt in response to imposed restrictions provoking intentional 
and blatant resistive actions. Her defiance was oriented towards the French government 
for imposing these harsh restrictions on her. But, she also felt compliant—the sensate-
visceral experience of yielding to the felt pressure of an imposed restriction—given her 
desire to stay at home and in her school. These combined conflicting sensations created 
an affective state based on the conditions of an embodied contentious struggle; Cennet 
gave her body over to the felt pressure imposed on her by the law while concurrently 





Affective States as Experiential Claims 
 On October 1, 2004, when Cennet publicly unveiled her shorn head, the intensity 
of this experience made her affective state of defiant compliance salient and the 
oppressive conditions of her situation apprehendable. As Cennet stated prior to unveiling, 
―I will respect both French law and Muslim law by taking off what I have on my head 
and not showing my hair‖ (Doǧanay 2004, n.p.). In the context of the controversy, 
Cennet‘s affective state of defiant compliance functions as an experiential argument; it 
raises questions regarding the legitimacy and propriety of the law given the distressing 
and oppressive experience it created for her which lead to her disparaging decision to 
shave her had as an act of ―survival.‖  
 When explicating how her affective state functions as an experiential claim, the 
form this state culminates in effects the way the argument operates. In Cennet‘s case, her 
defiant compliance is most salient as it culminates in her embodied act of publicly 
unveiling her shorn head. The body can be a compelling conduit for affective states; 
bringing to life the sensate-visceral experience of one‘s mood through the flesh while 
placing it on display upon the surface of the skins (Butterworth 2008; DeLuca 1999; 
Dolmage 2009; Hauser 1997, 1999, 2000, 2006; Hawhee 2006; McNaughton 2007; 
Palczewski 1998, 2002; Pezzullo 2003; Ray 2007). As embodied experiential claims, 
affective states act as a type of testimony based in an individual‘s sensate-visceral 
enactment of his/her affective state which can illuminate the ―moral economy‖ this 




Affective states, as embodied experiential arguments, have a demonstrative 
element to them; they create a bodily display of one‘s affective state as a sensate-visceral 
enactment of the felt conditions that provoked this experience. In other words, one‘s 
affective state both testifies to one‘s sensate-visceral experience and, simultaneous, is 
evidence of the felt conditions that provoked it. If the conditions leading to an affective 
state are to be apprehended, ―one needs to mount a convincing claim‖ testifying to the 
sensual experience of it (McNaughton 2007, 142). Thus, the relationship between 
embodied states and testimony is unique. Palczewski (2002) explains, ―A person‘s 
testimony is not the same if repeated by another, and in the very testifying, speakers are 
asking for others to assent not only to the claims, but also to their existence‖ (16). 
Affective states as testimony attests not only to an individual‘s sensate-visceral 
experience but also claims that there is political significance embedded within the 
conditions of this experience which needs public recognition.  
Like body rhetoric, embodied experiential claims are unconventional forms of 
argument which tend to be used by marginalized individuals and groups that do not have 
a strong public voice/presence (Fabj 1993; Delicath and DeLuca 2003; DeLuca 1999; 
Hauser 1999, 2000; McNaughton 2007; Olson and Goodnight 1994). As testimony to the 
oppressive conditions of one‘s experience, the public display of an affective state can 
illuminate the ―moral economy‖ this unjust experience is based within (Hauser 2000, 
140). Barker (2006) explains that a moral economy is ―a set of ethical assumptions 
underpinning‖ acts of resistance towards dominant norms, law, and governing bodies 




reconstructed as part of an ongoing interaction between power and powerlessness‖ 
(Barker 2006, 21). For instance, Hauser (1997) argues that during hunger strikes: 
The fasting body cannot force the authority to cave in, but [the] public display of 
helplessness before a superior power presents itself as paradigmatic for the 
society's moral economy. The strike focuses attention on seemingly misguided 
values that would allow a person to perish rather than negotiate the complaint . . . 
As the physical body diminishes its rhetorical incarnation grows until it is 
massive, touching the conscience of ever enlarging circles of society . . . 
demand[ing] the authority must act. (251) 
  
Apprehension of one‘s affective state as indicative of a skewed moral economy, assumes 
that audiences would deem this embodied experiential claim of injustice legitimate and 
appropriate given the society‘s ethical assumptions and norms of justice. Farrell (2006) 
explains that ―the anticipated response‖ to the moral economy of one‘s affective state 
―required a ‗right appreciation‘ for the suffering‖ that is experienced (81). Empathetic 
engagement in a rhetor‘s affective state can help cultivate the ―right‖ appreciation for it 
as indicative of a skewed moral economy. From within these states, audiences judge 
whether or not an experience is just based upon the force and intensity of risk, blame, and 
oppression felt. In other words, these judgments take into consideration how severe the 
risk felt, how culpable the victim was for this experience, and how intense the oppression 
felt.  
Cennet’s Defiant Compliance as an Embodied Experiential Claim 
At first, Cennet, like several girls, attempted to appease both French and Islamic 
law by wearing a large beret instead of her veil. She explained, ―I felt like I was 
dishonoring my religion, but it seemed to be a good compromise‖ (Fouquet 2006, n.p.). 




religiously sanctioned form of hijab. She hoped wearing a beret instead of her veil would 
be an acceptable enactment of the law since technically she unveiled. Unfortunately, 
berets and other head-coverings were deemed illegitimate and inappropriate behavior for 
French-Islamic girls; yet, non-Muslim students were allowed to wear them (IHRC 2005). 
For school officials, wearing a non-Islamic style headcovering (i.e. beret, bandanna, etc.) 
was not appreciated as an experience of compromise for girls of Muslim heritage because 
covering one‘s Muslim head is only recognized as a sensate-visceral enactment of hijab, 
even though from an Islamic perspective it was not.  
 This situation left Cennet feeling discouraged and desperate. She could not cover 
her head at all since any piece of clothing would be interpreted as hijab. This left her only 
one option if she wanted to comply with the law and still observe hijab—shaving her 
head. French law imposed restrictions on her behavior pressuring her to unveil and her 
own conviction in Islam obligated her to refrain from publicly displaying her hair; being 
bald was the only rational way she could fulfill her duties as a French citizen and an 
Islamist. As Cennet explained, ―Hijab for me is a religious obligation; it‘s a dress of 
honor and dignity‖ Cennet explains, ―If I have shaved my head as I did, that was I do not 
have any other solution to go to my school. I prefer to shave my head than to commit a 
sin‖ (Doǧanay 2004, n.p.). For Cennet, shaving her head was the only practical answer to 
her quandary; it was not what she wanted but rather something she felt she had to do 
given the restrictions forcibly put upon her behavior and experience via the law and self-




 Cennet‘s defiant compliance does not easily fit within the oppositional logic of 
the Loi n* 2004-228 social controversy; she does not simply acquiesce to law 
proponents‘ fear of hijab, nor does she fully defy the law out of indignation. As she 
stated, ―[w]hat I did was not to protest the hijab ban but to look for a quick solution to go 
to the school‖ (Doǧanay 2004, n.p.). Being bald was not intended to be a sensate-visceral 
enactment of an affective state of indignant protest but rather defiant compliance which 
galvanized her to shave her hair as an act of mental and physical survival given the 
increasing disparate conditions of her experience after the law was implemented. Cennet 
believed, ―In Islam, your actions depend on your intentions I, myself, would like to ask a 
question: Is it permissible in Islam, for a girl, to show her hair?!! I have no choice than 
what I did‖ (Doǧanay 2004, n.p.). For Cennet, a sensate-visceral enactment of indignant 
protest would have galvanized her to remaining veiled until she was expelled but she did 
not do this. On the other hand, complete acquiescence would have culminated in her 
unveiling without shaving her hair. Instead, publicly unveiling her shorn head is as an 
enactment of her defiant compliance functions as a form of uncivil obedience. She 
adheres to the legal restrictions imposed upon her conduct by unveiling, but she does so 
in manner that subverts the dominant norms of French civility inherent within the act of 
publicly displaying her female shorn head.  
  In France, the female shorn head carries multiple traces of punishment and 
suffering from World War II. Shortly after the German occupation of France, women 
who were thought to have politically or sexually corroborated with German troops were 




head, then, is reminiscent of this sexed form of punishment and inscribes her sensate-
visceral enactment of defiant compliance with a historical context of civil norms of 
conduct regarding insubordination. Simply put, French women behave uncivilly when 
they corroborate with dangerous enemies that pose a risk to the nation. During WWII, 
this meant providing intelligence to or having sex with German soldiers. In Cennet‘s 
case, it meant being unwilling to completely acquiesce to the ban for the greater good of 
the French republic. Indicative of her sexed punishment for uncivil behavior, Cennet‘s 
shorn female head signifies her insubordination but also is a sensate-visceral enactment 
of the punishment she feels she is being made to live through.   
The Skewed Moral Economy of the Law 
 Empathetically engaging in or positively (re)acting to Cennet affective state of 
defiant compliance illuminates the skewed moral economy created by the new law and 
cultivates an appreciation for her experience as a form of social injustice. Cennet was 
―severely sad‖ as her ―tresses fell in the ground,‖ but she also felt numb having ―prepared 
[her]self, for this moment‖ (Doǧanay 2004, n.p.). Regardless of how heartbroken she felt, 
she believed this was the correct decision for her. Cennet explained that, ―Shaving my 
head was the most powerful thing I‘ve ever done. It was like transforming myself. I felt I 
grew up more on that day than I had in all the years before‖ (Fouquet 2006, n.p.). Cutting 
off her hair was a profoundly affective experience for Cennet. This was not the rebellious 
whim of a fifteen year old, this was deeply significant act. As a sign of femininity and 
sexuality, a woman‘s hair can be used to both gain and resist power (Weitz 2001). Cennet 




her resolve to appease both French and Islamic law and relieve the pressure imposed 
upon her by both.  
 By embodying the limited space left open between French and Islamic law, 
Cennet sensate-visceral enactment of defiant compliance displayed the respect she 
afforded French government while concurrently showing how the state did not appreciate 
her distressing position. As she unveiled, the affective state of Cennet‘s felt experience—
the internal and external struggles she fought due to this law—became as salient as her 
bald head. Her face was resigned but earnest, her eyes sad but no tears, her tone intense 
but not aggressive. A mixture of shock, sadness, anger, disgust, and indifference 
collectively pervaded the scene. Empathetic engagement could evoke sadness or anger in 
response this vicarious experience of her defiant compliance. The felt experience of 
Cennet‘s affective state could make her oppressive conditions under this law 
apprehendable; the injustice of her situation could be felt and judged accordingly. The 
defiant compliance Cennet experienced while publicly unveiling her shorn head 
illuminated the skewed moral economy this law creates by valuing one group‘s fear of a 
potential risk, more than the immediate oppression and injustice of others. In the 
polarizing struggle of the Loi n* 2004-228 social controversy, Cennet‘s affective state of 
defiant compliance exists between the fear and indignation that underwrite the conflict. 
Within this moral economy Cennet, as a veiled French-Islamic girl, had to sacrifice 
something, in this case her hair, if she wanted to enjoy the benefits of French citizenship 




 Although Cennet‘s parents empathetically engaged in her affective experience, 
they did not share her resolve; they experienced shock and horror in (re)action to 
Cennet‘s act of defiant compliance, and anger at the government for creating the unjust 
conditions their daughter had to live within. They could not stand watching their daughter 
suffer like this. As Cennet explains, ―I wandered into the kitchen with my head half-
shaved and asked my mother for help. She burst into surprised tears and couldn‘t. My dad 
came to help. I could tell it was painful for him to see what I‘d done‖ (Fouquet 2006, 
n.p.). Cennet‘s mother, Meryem, found her ―shaved hair . . . horrible,‖ and her father was 
outraged but the situation (Ternisien, 2004, n.p.). Her parents were well aware of the 
stigma of female baldness as ―unsightly and shameful,‖ indicative of an extreme rejection 
of the feminine norms of beauty and unstable behavior (Weitz 2004, 136). For Meryem, 
Cennet‘s shorn head also reminded her of another group of people persecuted for their 
religious and cultural convictions.   
  The iconography of the oppressed shaven head also carries traces of Jewish 
concentration camps where men and women were shorn upon arrival. Her (re)collection 
of shorn Jewish prisoners plagued Meryem, who feared how others would treat Cennet. 
Meryem explained, ―I did not prevent Cennet . . . but later my heart broke when I 
remembered how the Nazis treated the bare-headed women, Jewish women and others 
during the World War II‖ (Yahmid 2004, n.p.). Like these Jewish ―bare-headed women,‖ 
Cennet baldness also signifies distress caused by her religious and cultural convictions. 
Her shaven head bears the trace of shorn concentration camp survivors and Holocaust 




Indelible connotation of innocence, risk, and oppression are embedded within the image 
of the shaven heads and ravaged bodies of these victims and survivors. In this way, 
Cennet‘s shorn head is a sign of a horribly askew moral economy in which she is an 
innocent victim of a national power that has oppressed French-Islam girls by making 
them vulnerable to the mentally and physically distressing conditions of the new law.  
Cennet‘s father, Hikmet Doǧanay, on the other hand, felt anger and indignation as 
a (re)action to Cennet‘s affective experience. Consequently, he contacted the media and 
informed them of his daughter‘s actions and her plan to publicly unveil at school on 
October 1
st
. Hikmet wanted the public to recognize what Cennet was ―compelled to do to 
be able to study‖ (Galpi 2004, n.p.). Hikmet appreciated Cennet‘s experience as the result 
of unjust oppressive conditions that should be recognized as such by the government and 
the public. Empathetically engaging in Cennet‘s defiant compliance, Hikmet 
apprehended the intense pressure she felt that galvanized her actions. He appreciated 
Cennet‘s shorn head as an act of survive within a skewed moral economy that knowingly 
makes young girls suffer simply out of fear of the perceived risk they pose to the 
republic.  
Publicly Apprehending and Perceiving Cennet 
In Cennet Doǧany‘s case, her shorn response to the law did not overturn the ban 
but her affective state of defiant compliance did offer some insight into France‘s skewed 
moral economy that makes French-Islamic girls choose between public education and 
hijab, between French and Islamic culture. The experience of Cennet‘s affective state was 




in their series ―Muslim Women Making History,‖ the Islamic Human Rights 
Commission, and AKDER Women‘s Rights Association Against Discrimination. Cennet 
also spoke on behalf of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty and shared her struggles 
with the law as a veiled French-Islamic girl. Yet, the framing of Cennet‘s affective state 
within the public discourse highlights how her unveiled shorn head ―seen‖ through the 
dichotomous lens of the Loi n* 2004-228 social controversy. This forecloses one‘s ability 
to apprehend the conditions of Cennet‘s defiant compliance and the recognition of the act 
of shaving her head as an act of survival and sensate-visceral testament to her oppressive 
experience under the law.  
 There have been several attempts to reframe Cennet‘s actions as protest (i.e. 
indignant resistance of the ban), as well as manipulation at the hand of Islamic extremists. 
These two interpretations suggest that Cennet‘s defiant compliance is ―seen‖ within the 
dichotomy of acquiescence/resistance to the law rather than understood as a sensate-
visceral enactment of survival under it. Several Muslim newspapers, websites, and 
newswires including the Iran Daily, Islam Online, HaberVitrini.com, Haber 7, and the 
Ihlas News Agency, depicted Cennet‘s actions as an act of protest indicative of her 
resistance of the law (―Cennet‖ 2005, Dökümü 2004, ―Fransa‖ 2005, ―French Muslim‖ 
2004). This framing implies that the image of publicly unveiling a shorn head has the 
appearance of indignation signifying one‘s act of resistance to the law. However, this 
interpretation overlooks how her actions ultimately comply with the French law and 
brush over her desire to reconcile her French citizenship with her Islamic religion. 




imposed upon veiled French-Islamic girls, it does not apprehend how the immediate risk 
of her situation makes her shorn head an act of survival not just resistance.  
Conversely, on the French TV show Let’s Be Direct, the host Emmanuel Chain 
concluded Cennet had been manipulated by Dr. Milcent, a fundamentalist Islamic leader, 
to shave her head in protest. The combination of Cennet‘s words and action were 
perceived as evidence of devious manipulation that the public should be fearful of. Chain 
argued that no fifteen year old girl could have thought of this on her own, and thus, she 
must have been manipulated by a radical fundamentalist to do it (Galpi 2004, n.p.). Two 
days later this same conclusion was reached on another TV show, Arret Dur Images. 
Interestingly, this framing implies that Cennet‘s discursive claim about respect in 
conjunction with her logical decision to shave her head is a sophisticated objection to the 
law. In fact, the appearance of her action is so advanced that it created an experience of 
cognitive dissonance for law supporters and the only logical explanation, within the 
context of the Loi n* 2004-2008 social controversy, is that Cennet was a pawn in the 
maleficent plan of a radical fundamentalist. To consider her claim from any other 
perspective, especially the apprehension of her felt oppressive experience as a means to 
appease both French and Islamic law, would jeopardize the affective logic of the pro-law 
stance and the justification for the law, offering no relief from the intense sensations of 
risk law supporters felt. Rather, perceiving Cennet‘s shorn solution as indicative of 
radical manipulation adds further justification for the law and the restrictions on hijab as 
a means to contain the experience of risk created by the perceived threat of Islamic 




not apprehended or appreciated as she experienced them, rather she is perceived within 
the confines of the controversy‘s logic of indignation and fear.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has analyzed the affective dimensions of the Loi n* 2004-228 social 
controversy and Cennet Doǧanay‘s affective response to it. During this controversy the 
oppositional stances of ―pro‖ and ―anti‖ the law were infused by the affective states of 
fear of the potential risk veiling in public schools posed to the French citizenry and 
republic and, conversely, indignation at the blatant injustice of this law. The affective 
states imbued in these stances underwrote the argumentative logic of the controversy. 
Ultimately, the law was passed justifying the law proponent‘s fear and legitimating the 
immediate oppression of veiled French-Islamic girls as an appropriate way to ensure 
public unity and safety. This was not, however, the end of the longstanding social 
controversy regarding veiling in public schools. Cennet‘s affective state of defiant 
compliance was analyzed as a new reiteration of this controversy that asserted an 
incommensurate stance to the logic of fear and indignation.  
Within this controversy, Cennet‘s defiant compliance which was made salient in 
her act of publicly unveiling her shorn head functioned as an embodied experiential 
argument that attested to the unjust conditions the law imposed upon her. Apprehension 
of the state and the conditions that provoked it could enable audiences to appreciate 
Cennet‘s shorn head as act of survival given this harsh experience. Empathetically 
engaging this state illuminates the skewed moral economy created by this law which 




conviction and freedom from oppression. Unfortunately, the unjust conditions that 
provoked Cennet‘s state of defiant compliance were not always apprehended. Public 
responses to Cennet‘s shorn head signal the perception, not apprehension, of her affective 
state which mirrors the oppositional stances taken during the controversy.  
In these cases, the act of shaving her head was either indicative of Cennet‘s 
indignant protest as a means to resist the law or devious manipulation that the public 
should be fearful of. Thus, even though this chapter celebrates the possibility of political 
transformation rooted in affective states as embodied experiential arguments, it also 
recognizes the ease with which the apprehension and appreciation of these states can be 
constrained by dominant, overarching oppositional stances especially when the rhetor‘s 
body is inscribed within longstanding social controversies. Regardless of how 
immediately effective, rhetorically and affectively compelling, and politically significant 
Cennet‘s response was—she was able to return to her classes, her story was circulated 
worldwide by major news outlets, and she became a spokeswoman for Islamic human 
rights and religious tolerance—the ban remains intact. Seven years later, veiled French-









AFFECT, CONDUCT, RISK, AND CITIZENSHIP 
Introduction 
 During social controversy, the norms guiding public life can be negotiated, 
reaffirmed, negated, and/or transformed. This can lead to progressive political, cultural, 
and/or social change in some instances, while establishing or reifying conservative and 
even oppressive norms, practices, and laws in others. In an attempt to understand how 
and why this happened, Olson and Goodnight (1994) developed a theory of social 
controversy that focuses on political, cultural, and ideological aspects of conflict to 
address differences in the oppositional stances of participants. This critical analysis of 
social controversy highlights the argumentative practices and techniques that are used 
when individuals object to dominant norms and conventions via appeals to normative 
standards of legitimacy and propriety as well as when they propose alternatives to 
existing norms. Examination of these conflicts offers insight into how public discourse is 
regulated and what implications this has for issues of inclusion and exclusion in germane 
publics. 
Building upon this conceptual foundation, this dissertation argues that scholars 
should analyze the role affect plays in social controversy as a means to address how these 




rhetorical and argumentative significance of the affective dimensions of social 
controversy have been conceptualized and analyzed via an examination of emotion-based 
claims and affective states that have become salient, discernable and/or apprehendable 
during specific public disagreements. Such a conceptualization demonstrates that critical 
insights can be gained by focusing on the controversy‘s affective dimensions. To 
highlight the importance of the study of affect in social controversy as well as better 
understand the larger critical significance affect theory has for rhetorical and 
argumentation studies, this final chapter addresses three overarching insights and findings 
from this dissertation that have implications for future work in the field of controversy. 
 This dissertation posed two overarching research questions guiding the 
development of the theoretical and methodological framework used for this project as 
well as the analysis of each case study. The first question aimed to answer how 
considering affect extends and contributes to our understanding of the nature and 
significance of social controversy. Specifically, this project analyzed how the affective 
dimensions of social controversies emerge and what findings critical analysis of these 
dimensions would offer with regard to the presumptions underwriting dominant norms 
and conventions that regulate public life. The discussion about the regulation of public 
conduct as well as risk and vulnerability are explicated in response to this question.  
 The second research question driving this dissertation asked what an analysis of 
these dimensions tells us about relationship between affect and citizenship. In other 
words, how is citizenship increasingly being shaped by norms and conventions of affect 




articulated in affective states and emotion-based claims and how do these dimensions 
serve as sites of ethico-political pedagogy? The final section on affect, citizenship, and 
empathetic engagement addresses this second research question.  
The Regulation of Public Conduct 
 The first major insight from this project is that an analysis of the affective 
dimensions of social controversy addresses the regulation of public conduct as well as 
public discourse. As mentioned in chapter one, more traditional social controversy 
criticism enables scholars to assess the procedural aspects of public discourse and results 
in findings about the identities, locution, substance, and forums that are deemed 
legitimate and appropriate throughout the process. As Wilson (1995) explains, analysis of 
social controversy reveals ―a culture‘s rules and presumptions on who gets to talk, what 
counts as proof, whose language is authoritative, and what norms . . . govern decisions‖ 
(204). Examining the affective dimensions of social controversy offers insight into these 
regulatory parameters and also allows researchers to analyze how aspects of participants‘ 
affects, feelings, emotions, and conduct are managed, controlled, and privileged during 
these conflicts.  
 Emotion-based claims and affective states pose arguments regarding the 
legitimacy and propriety of one‘s experience of affects, feelings, and emotions at given 
sites and in specific scenarios as well as the types of conduct this experience should 
produce. Analysis of these arguments take into account their force, intensity, and logic 
enabling scholars to identify whom and what these claims orient audiences towards, 




of social controversy allow critics to assess the relationship between affect and the 
dominant communicative norms and conventions that are at issue in the conflict to 
analyze how its resolution impacts the regulation of public conduct within given 
situations.  
 For instance, these norms address how we should feel and conduct ourselves at 
public sites; what types of cultural and religious conduct should be allowed in public 
schools; how we should or should not feel in relation to certain controversial actions and 
events. Assessment of the affective dimensions of social controversy enables critics to 
identify whose affective experiences are privileged when judging a claim. Additionally, 
this analysis offers insights into what affective and emotional logics underwrite 
controversies and what impact these logics have when attempting to apprehend affective 
experiences considered illegitimate, inappropriate, or irreducible to dichotomous stances.  
 Analysis of the affective dimensions of the Abu Ghraib social controversy 
focused on claims regarding what the legitimate and appropriate felt response to the 
leaked photos should be. Affective objections, such as Sontag‘s and Previtera‘s, not only 
focused on the abuse and torture depicted in the Abu Ghraib images but also the soldiers‘ 
affective state of pleasure at causing their prisoners‘ pain which is captured in the photos. 
For instance, Sontag‘s emotion-based claim of shame asserts that these images are 
indicative of America‘s ―culture of shamelessness‖ which she believes underwrites the 
soldiers‘ actions and provoked them to visually document it. Sontag is dismayed by the 
affective conditions that brought about the soldiers‘ experience of pleasure when 




pieces, evidencing the soldiers‘ pride at what they had accomplished (i.e., the prisoners 
pain and suffering). Simply put, the soldiers‘ shamelessness and the actions it enabled are 
not anomalies—they are affectively cultivated by U.S. culture.  
 For Sontag, the fact that the images were intentionally taken and circulated to 
soldiers‘ families and friends cannot, and should not, be separated from the horrific acts 
they depicted. Her objection is an appeal to the norms of liberal democracy—it is 
illegitimate and inappropriate for democratic citizens to experience shamelessness at 
feeling pleasure by causing our prisoners‘ pain. Those that affectively objected to the 
photos believe there should be stronger regulations on public conduct imposed by both 
the self and the U.S. government. In other words, the norms of democracy should dictate 
that individuals and the State feel shame at the soldiers‘ actions, take responsibility for 
the culture that bred them, and change the U.S. governmental policies that helped 
cultivate the soldiers‘ behavior. Feeling shame at the soldiers‘ joyful acts of abuse and 
torture and the images that capture it is what U.S. democratic citizens should experience 
when bearing witness to the photos and our governmental actions should reflect that by 
outlawing this behavior, not provoking or permitting it.  
 The eventual court marshal and conviction of eleven soldiers, the majority of 
whom were the low ranking officers depicted in the images, does suggest that these 
affective objections were partially upheld. These soldiers‘ actions were deemed 
illegitimate, inappropriate, and illegal but there were no major changes to the U.S. 
policies that enabled this behavior. Thus, the convicted soldiers were depicted as a ―few 




that these individuals were rogue soldiers—morally monstrous, sexually deviant, and 
viciously depraved—whose corrupt actions were completely their own.  
 This is surprising considering that ―the Pentagon's own probes have 
acknowledged that military commanders, civilian contractors, the CIA and government 
policymakers all bear some responsibility for the abuses‖ (―Introduction‖ 2006, n.p.). The 
highest ranking officer to face criminal charges in connection to the Abu Graib 
controversy was Lieutenant Colonel [LTC] Steven Jordan, supervising Military 
Intelligence (MI) officer at Abu Ghraib. Other higher ranking officers implicated, such as 
former Brigadier General Janis Karpinski and former Brigadier Commander Thomas 
Pappas who were in charge of Military Police (MP) and MIs respectively, were officially 
reprimanded, released from duty, demoted, fined, but not criminally charged.  
 Furthermore, even though some minimal changes were made to America‘s 
official stance on legitimate and appropriate interrogation tactics, the rationale for the use 
of numerous ―harsh‖ tactics remained intact for the duration of former President Bush‘s 
term. On March 8, 2008, Bush even vetoed a bill that would have banned multiple tactics 
used at Abu Ghraib such as beating, electrocuting, stripping, hooding, and waterboarding. 
In his official statement, Bush explained that ―The bill Congress sent me would take 
away one of the most valuable tools in the war on terror, so today I vetoed it. . . . This is 
no time for Congress to abandon practices that have a proven track record of keeping 
America safe‖ (―Bush‖ 2008, n.p.). All in all, while affective objections to Abu Ghraib 




rigid governmental change needed to fully transform the affective conditions that 
provoked the soldiers‘ feelings of pleasure at causing their prisoners pain.  
 Analysis of the affective dimensions of the IFC social controversy yielded 
insights into: how norms of respect guide public conduct at sacred site; what affects, 
feelings, emotions, and behaviors are considered legitimate and appropriate in relation to 
these norms; and how a rhetor‘s affective experience can afford her/him a type of 
privilege when arguing for or against these regulations. Norms of respect help establish 
the parameters of acceptable and justifiable conduct and behaviors in public spaces and 
places. These norms differ in relation to the history, affective atmosphere, purpose, and 
use of a given site and can be challenged, negotiated, reified, or reformed during social 
controversy. During the conflict over the IFC, the norms of respect were guided by the 
history and atmosphere of Ground Zero as a site of collective trauma, its purpose as a 
place of public memory, and its conflicting uses as a means to commemorate 9/11 as well 
as a space to culturally and economically revitalize lower downtown Manhattan. In other 
words, the norms of respect that regulate public conduct at the WTC site are influenced 
by the force and intensity of the tragedy that occurred there and the melancholy 
atmosphere created by its remains and ruins as well as Ground Zero‘s significance as a 
commemorative site of collective remembrance, and, lastly, its need for public approval 
in order to draw visitors and generate revenue.    
  After months of relentless campaigning, the TBM‘s emotion-based claim of 
reverence was taken up by former Governor Pataki‘s who evicted the IFC from the WTC 




establishing strict regulations on public conduct which assert that feeling reverent and 
engaging in acts of veneration are the legitimate and appropriate ways to affectively 
engage in the experience of Ground Zero. According to these norms, the affective 
experience of analytic curiosity and the act of questioning U.S. politics and policy are 
illegitimate and inappropriate conduct at Ground Zero. Rather, respectful conduct is 
driven by feelings of reverence for the mortal and material loss incurred at this site which 
can provoke a cathartic experience when publicly (re)collecting the events of 9/11 there.  
 Interestingly, this narrow regulation on public conduct at Ground Zero subverts 
the dominant norms of contemporary memorial sites. As Blair and Michel (1999) explain, 
―Rather than telling us what to think,‖ contemporary public memorials ―invite us to think, 
to pose questions, to interrogate our experiences and ourselves in relation to the 
memorial‘s discourse‖ (37). Although a dominant norm of memorial conduct, this type of 
critical behavior is inappropriate and illegitimate because it is considered disrespectful to 
the sacredness of the WTC site. This suggests that commemorative spaces of national 
trauma are bound by stricter norms and conventions that establish rigid regulations on 
visitors‘ conduct prohibiting the same sense of analytic curiosity normally cultivated at 
contemporary sites of public memory.   
 The strict regulations imposed upon individuals‘ conduct at the WTC site also 
reveals the privilege allotted to the victims‘ families, friends, and colleagues as 
authorities on the affective experience Ground Zero ―naturally‖ provokes. It is assumed 
that these individuals have a more immediate connection to the trauma of 9/11 via their 




knows how individuals should feel when (re)collecting 9/11 at the site of the trauma, it is 
those who were the most immediately affected by it. This afforded the TBM‘s emotion-
based claim of reverence a type of privilege which positioned victims‘ families as 
authorities on the affective experience of Ground Zero. This implies that anyone without 
the same type of immediate connection to the 9/11 victims should not have the authority 
to decide what affective experiences WTC visitors engage in. Hence, the TBM‘s 
successful circumvention of the LMDC‘s authority to judge the legitimacy and propriety 
of the IFC at the WTC site. The privilege afforded to the TBM as affective authorities 
also implies that the academics and activists are not as knowledgeable about what 
visitors‘ affective experience at Ground Zero should be for lack of an immediate 
connection to the attacks. Thus, IFC supporters do not know the ―right‖ way to 
commemorate 9/11 there. As TBM (2005d) proponents asserted, ―The IFC represents the 
wrong people telling the wrong story‖ (n.p.).  
 Analysis of the affective dimensions of the Loi n* 2004-228 social controversy, 
provides insights into: how norms of laïcité not only regulate students‘ conduct but also 
create oppressive affective experiences for veiled French-Islamic girls; what affective 
states underwrite the creation of these regulations; and how the conditions of some 
individuals‘ affective states are privileged over others in the creation of these regulations. 
The principle of laïcité is a central tenant of French citizenship and is considered a 
lynchpin of national unity. This principle has been interpreted in two conflicting manner 
which imply divergent norms of behavior. Laïcité can either value integration and 




religious attire in public schools or value tolerance and national neutrality as a means to 
promote national unity through the equal inclusion of this type of attire.  
 The approval of a national ban on conspicuous religious attire in public schools 
imposed strict regulations on veiled French-Islamic schoolgirls‘ conduct as legitimate, 
appropriate, and, thus, justified in relation to the integration-based norms of laïcité. 
Consideration of the affective dimensions of the Loi n* 2004-228 social controversy 
highlights how regulations on veiled schoolgirls‘ public conduct created affectively 
arduous conditions these girls have been forced to live within. Banning the practice of 
hijab from public schools puts veiled schoolgirls in a position to decide between 
unveiling or leaving public school which can trigger intense sensations of pressure to 
choose between their religious and cultural beliefs and their desire for a public education. 
The conditions of this sensate-visceral experience is saturated with conflicting feelings 
and emotions such as sadness, anger, worry, confusion, melancholy, indignation, and 
resignation, which veiled girls must negotiate in order to make the decision and even 
then, their decision may not fully relieve the intensity of the affective conditions they are 
now forced to within. Thus, legalizing regulations on public conduct which reaffirm 
integration-based norms of laïcité justify the creation of oppressive affective conditions 
veiled French-Islamic girls are subjected to.    
 From the integration-based perspective of laïcité, veiling was considered an 
intentional rejection of and an implicit aggression towards French culture that 
jeopardized the unity of France‘s citizenry and the public‘s safety. During the Loi n* 




ban on hijab in public schools as a means to attenuate the sensate-visceral experience of 
risk that veiling posed to the French republic and the feelings of vulnerability that 
accompanied it. This fear has a colonist tenor; it is a fear of the physical danger the veiled 
Other (re)presents as a symbol of Fundamental Islam as well as a fear of the dilution of 
French national identity caused by this Other‘s presence in public schools. Since the pro-
law stance is grounded in a politics of fear, this affective state is meant to orient 
audiences away from the felt conditions of veiled schoolgirls and, instead, attune them to 
the larger public as well as French-Muslim girls who felt pressure to veil. The decision to 
legalize a national public school ban on conspicuous religious attire highlights how the 
desire to relieve feelings of fear and reduce the experience of risk are valued and 
privileged more than alleviating opponents‘ feelings of indignation and attenuating the 
oppressive conditions imposed upon veiled French-Islamic schoolgirls.  
 In order for veiled French-Islamic girls‘ experience to be valued, they must 
choose to openly sacrifice their belief in and adherence to religious law and cultural 
customs that are not deemed inherently ―French‖ while at public school. If girls want to 
enjoy the benefits of public education their French citizenship entitles them to, they must 
renounce hijab while at school regardless of how affectively painful and difficult this 
decision would be. In other words, the experience of sacrificing one‘s ―Other‖ identity is 
necessary to assuage the fear and risk associated with hijab; whereas choosing to remain 
veiled reifies the affective state of fear and is perceived as a blatant act of opposition to 
the French state. The rigidity of this affective logic and the privilege afforded feelings of 




and/or discern experiences that are irreducible to the logic of acquiescence and/or 
resistance. Cennet Doǧanay‘s affective state of defiance compliance which became 
salient during her act of publicly unveiling her shorn head is an example of this difficulty.  
 The relationship between affect and the regulation of conduct suggests that there 
is a connection between the affective dimensions of social controversy and theories of 
governementality, which can have implications for future argumentation scholarship. 
Originally conceived by Foucault (2001) as the ―conduct of conduct,‖ theories of 
governmentality address liberal and neoliberal forms of governance which function as a 
diffuse form of power ―structur[ing] the possible field of action of others‖ (341). 
Govermentality, according to Collier (2009), is a form of political rationality ―that shapes 
the ‗conditions of possibility‘ for thinking and acting in a certain way‖ (96). In other 
words, governmentality studies address how collectives problematize and rationalize 
issues and situations facing society to make them knowable and, thus, manageable. Once 
rationalized, political technologies (i.e., means of regulating a populations‘ field of 
possible actions) can be used to manage difficult issues and situations by ―shaping and 
reshaping‖ public conduct into ―regimes of practice‖ (Dean 1999, 18).  
 These regimes normalize individual and collective actions—impacting 
individuals‘ felt conditions—which enables the government of public life by both the self 
and the state. Within the governmentality field, Campbell (2010) argues these theories 
should incorporate an examination of the ―emotional life of governmental power,‖ since 
the politics of affects, feelings, and emotions aid in the mobilization of political 




French ban on conspicuous religious attire to be approved, hijab had to be rationalized as 
a threat that created the conditions of risk to both national unity and security. The law, 
then, is a political technology employed to help the French republic govern this 
problematic situation by creating a ―racialised [sic] emotional regime [of practice]‖ that 
makes the affective conditions of one part of the population more hospitable, while 
creating oppressive conditions for another (Johnson 2010, 499).   
  As a public debate regarding the legitimacy and propriety of actions, events, 
texts, and claims, criticism of social controversy gives a unique look into the governing 
practices of a society. During social controversies, the argumentative rationale of 
oppositional stances become salient, enabling critics to analyze forms of reasoning that 
ground public sentiments regarding the reform, creation, perpetuation, and/or 
transformation of the norms and conventions (i.e. regimes of practice) a population 
collectively lives by. These norms and conventions establish the regulatory processes that 
guide public discourse and the analysis of the affective dimensions of social controversy 
offer insights into the affective and emotional rationality that supports the regulation of 
public conduct. Extending social controversy research to incorporate theories of 
governmentality would enable critics to further conceptualize this type of argumentative 
practice as a political technology that is used to justify the establishment of rigid 
restrictions on one‘s own and other‘s conduct as legitimate and appropriate responses to a 






Risk and Vulnerability 
 In the Abu Ghraib, IFC, and Loi n* 2004-228 social controversies, analysis of 
their affective dimensions illuminated how the rationale for tighter regulations on 
citizens‘ public conduct was rationalized as necessary due to the potential risks and the 
vulnerabilities these actions, or inactions, would create and/or perpetuate. In these case 
studies, when norms or laws restricting the citizenry‘s conduct were proposed, they were 
asserted as a means to create national unity and civility by foreclosing on sensate-visceral 
experiences of risk that provoke feelings of vulnerability. In other words, the experiences 
of risk are seemingly too intense to be publicly permitted without jeopardizing a nation‘s 
cohesion and safety. The affective state of risk engages individuals in a sensate-visceral 
experience of embodied exposure to what is cognitively recognized as a danger or threat, 
provoking sensations of vulnerability. An examination into what participants claimed 
created experiences of risk offers insights into what and who are considered dangerous to 
a public and what implications this has.  
 In the Abu Ghraib social controversy, some affective objections were 
underwritten by feelings of fear over the perceived risk the public circulation of the 
images created. In these cases, individuals feared that upon seeing these images, the 
―Arab Other‖ would retaliate. As stated by school teacher, Rosalind Gittings, ―The Arabs 
already hate us, and now we're giving them even more reason to hate us and get revenge . 
. . it reminds me of images you see from the Holocaust . . . It makes me embarrassed to 
be an American‖ (Jacobs 2004, A1). Gittings‘s felt (re)action of disgust at the soldiers‘ 




embarrassment. She personally does not approve of their feelings and conduct. However, 
her objection to the photos is not solely a moral stance; it is underwritten by both disgust 
and fear. Gittings believed that the public circulation of these photos would create the 
affective conditions necessary to provoke vengeful acts. In other words, the force and 
intensity of the affective state the Abu Ghraib images capture is enough to incite feelings 
of hatred, anger, and desire to cause Americans pain for the suffering we inflicted. This 
implies that some pleas for tighter regulations on public and State conduct are driven by a 
need for a sense of security, not solely out of ethical or ideological obligation.  
 In the IFC social controversy, TBM supporters‘ objection and critique of the IFC 
was based on their assertion that the proposed museum could potentially engage visitors 
in critical thinking regarding U.S. politics and policy from a historical and international 
perspective. According to TBM supporters, provoking critical thinking posed a risk that 
made visitors vulnerable to conflict and division at the very place the nation should feel 
unified via the collective act of publicly commemorating 9/11. This type of critical 
experience was considered, by TBM supporters, to be disrespectful of both the U.S. and 
the 9/11 victims at the site both were attacked because it would undermine the affective 
state of reverence visitors‘ ought to feel while there. Positioned as the opposite of 
reverence, the experience of critical thinking at Ground Zero is a subversion of the norms 
of respect at sacred sites and, therefore, jeopardized the conditions for national unity 
visitors should engage in there.  
 The threat of the IFC is based in its potential to engage visitors in sensations of 




regarding U.S. politics and policy, specifically in relation to 9/11. TBM proponents 
believed that experiencing critical thinking about historical and international struggles for 
freedom would galvanize individuals‘ to question and debate the legitimacy and propriety 
of U.S. governmental action. This experience of critical thinking is what Natanson (1965) 
deems an act of argumentation which puts participants‘ subjectivities (i.e., their sense of 
self) at risk. During moments of argumentation, Natanson (1965) explains, ―[r]isk is 
established when the affective world of the person is disrupted, and this disruption means 
that his [sic] immediate life of feeling and sensibility is challenged and made open to 
challenge‖ (19). Thus, the IFC is threatening because it creates a ―risky‖ situation for 
visitors‘ during which their political beliefs become vulnerable to questions and 
challenges which can provoke individuals to negotiate, reaffirm, and/or transform them.  
 For TBM proponents, the potential risk the critical experience of the IFC could 
pose was too dangerous for the proposed museum to be built at Ground Zero. Feelings of 
reverence and acts of veneration were valued as a means to achieve national unity; 
whereas the experience of the IFC would only cause discordance (regardless of its 
potential to provoke political change). National unity, then, is achieved by (re)presenting 
9/11 from an overtly positive, nationalistic manner that does not historically or 
internationally contextualize the attacks. In order to create the conditions for national 
unity at the WTC site, visitors could not be allowed to engage in an experience of critical 
thinking because it would jeopardize our collective cohesion.  
 The IFC co-creators and board did aspire to create the type of critical experience 




creating this type of ―risky‖ experience was not an act of disrespect to America or the 
9/11 victims. Rather, they believed building a museum that would engage visitors in this 
type of critical experience would be the most respectful way to pay tribute to September 
11
th
. For its supporters, the IFC adhered to the norms of respect because it could 
potentially lead visitors to understand September 11
th
 from a different historical and 
international perspective in hopes of ending the ―hatred, ignorance and intolerance‖ they 
believed underwrote the attacks, helping to prevent future ones (―Memo‖ 2005, 28). 
Thus, there is value (not danger) in problematizing U.S. governmental actions which 
could enable visitors to empathetically engage with the oppressed conditions individuals 
and groups have historically and still continue to struggle against all over the world. For 
IFC supporters, this risk could not happen if public conduct at the WTC site is strictly 
limited to feelings of reverence and acts of veneration.  
 In the end, the IFC‘s eviction from Ground Zero signals the decision to promote 
national unity through reverence and veneration, implying that critically engaging 9/11 at 
the WTC site was simply too much of a risk. Pataki‘s decision to remove the IFC can be 
understood as a form of risk prevention; a means to remove individuals from experiences 
that present a potential risk to the affective state citizens should have at this sacred site. 
As risk prevention, evicting the IFC creates a sense of public security from the division 
critical thinking can cause ensuring a stronger sense of national unity through reverence 
and veneration.     
 During the Loi n* 2004-228 social controversy, the approval of the national ban 




the law‘s supporters who believed hijab posed a threat to the unity and security of the 
French republic. As a visible sign of Islam, the law‘s proponents argued that donning the 
veil made women and girls‘ faith in Islamic religion and culture more salient than their 
embodiment of French culture signifying a division amongst France‘s citizenry. This 
division was considered a major cause of the affective state of malaise that seemed to 
plague France, weakening the republic‘s political, cultural, and economic power. 
Wearing the veil, then, threatened the republic‘s unity and strength and perpetuated the 
public‘s feeling of malaise. For some proponents, hijab did not just signify Islam; rather, 
it was considered an iconic symbol of Islamic Fundamentalism. This stance implies that 
hijab is an extreme practice which only the most zealous believers would engage in. In 
other words, the depth and intensity of faith one must have to either choose the veil or 
impose it upon someone else was considered emblematic of the most radically devote 
sect of Islam—fundamentalism. Perceived as representative of Islamic Fundamentalism, 
hijab provoked a sense of fear at what someone with such radical beliefs potentially could 
do. Considering this, banning hijab in public schools can be understood as a preventative 
measure; a way to stop the progression, or spread, of Islamic Fundamentalism by 
reducing the experience of risk veiling creates. Doing so, would help keep the republic 
unified and safe.  
 Within the wider context of hijab in European nations, Fortier (2008) argues that 
positing veiling as visually symbolic of Islamic Fundamentalism is ―part of an ongoing 
process of organization and systemitization of a disciplining gaze that constructs 




and those who are unwilling to reassure fellow nationals‖ (96). Appreciation for or 
simple consideration of the oppressive material and affective conditions this law puts 
veiled French-Islamic girls in is secondary to the need to ―reassure‖ individuals who 
perceive the hijab as indicative of an Islamic Fundamentalist threat they are fearful of. As 
Weil (2004) stated, ―I admit that the law passed by the French parliament has one 
unfortunate consequence: the right of Muslim girls who freely want to wear the scarf in 
public schools, without pressuring anyone else, is denied‖ (n.p.). Yet, he makes no 
attempt to apologize or empathize with the oppressive condition this creates to veiled 
schools. Instead, Weil (2004) explains that the law was a necessary measure because 
―The historical success of the French model of secularisation, laïcité, rests on its 
guarantee to individuals of state protection against pressure from any religious group‖ 
(n.p.).  
 Imposing strict regulations on veiled French-Islamic schoolgirls‘ behavior as a 
preventative measure is meant to lessen individuals‘ exposure to the sensate-visceral 
experience of the risk posed by hijab. Reducing the possibility of this experience is an 
affect-based form of security; it is an attempt to decrease the number of conditions in 
which this risk, and the fear associated with can be provoked. Simply put, it lessens the 
chances individuals have to feel risk and fear in relation to hijab. The preventative aspect 
of this law is also denoted by the specific group of people most affected by the law—
veiled schoolgirls. Restrictions on veiling were imposed upon children and young adults 
at public institutions where both academic and civic lessons were to be learned. As a 




and being taught French civic lessons may prompt an affective change in these girls and 
young women, galvanizing them to stop practicing hijab altogether.  
 Cennet‘s Doǧanay‘s affective state of defiant compliance, as an embodied 
experiential argument, is also an experience of risk that becomes salient in the Loi n* 
2004-228 social controversy. When she publicly unveils her shorn head, Cennet‘s state of 
defiant compliance testifies to the felt conditions that provoked this experience. As such, 
Cennet‘s defiant compliance is a risky endeavor; she makes herself publicly vulnerable 
which can orient and attune the public to the oppressive conditions the law creates for her 
as a veiled French-Islamic girl. Thus, Cennet‘s affective state is similar to Natanson‘s 
(1965) conceptualization of argumentation as a moment of risk and embodied 
vulnerability. As Natanson (1965) explains, ―The self is not risked through arguments or 
even through willingness to argue seriously; only when the full range and depth of the 
affective life is shocked into openness is a true risk attempted‖ (17). Cennet becomes 
vulnerable—physically by unveiling her shorn head and affectively by the saliency of her 
affective state salient—as a means to survive. If audiences can apprehend and appreciate 
the felt conditions of Cennet‘s defiant compliance, it may prompt them to question the 
legitimacy and propriety of the law.  
 Examination of the affective dimensions of social controversy reveal how the 
desire to attenuate experiences of risk and the feelings of vulnerability that accompany 
them were motivating factors in the creation, implementation, and justification of strict 
regulations on public conduct. In these cases, anger and fear over the potential risks 




safety. Since these controversies resulted in governmental actions (i.e., eviction of the 
IFC and creation of the national ban), they can be understood and analyzed as acts of risk 
prevention and a form of governmental security. The outcomes of these controversies 
exemplify attempts to weaken and/or reduce a collective‘s exposure to conditions of risk 
as a means to quell their fears, dull their feelings of vulnerability, and, consequently, 
provoke experiences and sensations of safety.  
 Future scholarship on the affective dimensions of social controversy that result in 
restrictions of public conduct, therefore, can benefit from research on risk and national 
insecurity. As Magnusson (2001) explains, ―In the context of democracy, insecurity 
arises from the fear that the norms, institutions, and rules of the regime are incapable of 
protecting individuals, groups, society, institutions, or the democracy itself from those 
imperfectly socialized into either the normative value or the operational functioning of 
the regime‖ (213). Within this scholarship, some researchers focus on how fear, risk, and 
vulnerability can be politically mobilized as a means to rationalize and justify the 
oppressive use of governmental power with the consent of portions of the public 
(Altheide 2010; Beck 1992, 2009; Beck and Sznaider 2006; Berlant 2005; Bigo 2002; 
Fortier 2008; Hudson 2003; Slovic 2010; Walklate and Mythen 2006, 2010). This work 
can help scholars of affect and social controversy to further theorize the connections 
between moments of public conflict and governmental acts of regulation to analyze the 
affective logics that underwrite forms of governing power that enable the creation of 
oppressive conditions for portions of a citizenry while benefitting from a general sense of 




Affect, Citizenship, and the Act of Empathetic Engagement 
The last major insight from this dissertation deals with the relationship between 
affect, citizenship, and the act of empathetic engagement. Throughout this project, the 
connection between affect and citizenship has become salient in two ways. First, given 
that the affective dimensions of social controversy deal with the regulation of public 
conduct, the outcomes of these conflicts help illuminate the normative parameters of 
citizen conduct highlighting the relationship between, what Johnson (2010) calls, ―public 
emotions and the construction of the ‗good‘ citizen‖ (500). These parameters imply that 
there are affective dimensions to citizenship that address how citizens should feel and 
conduct themselves in relation to each other and within specific situations. Second, 
empathetic engagement with specific emotion-based claims and affective states establish 
a civic relationship of recognition between audiences and rhetors that is akin to the act of 
bearing witness—both are ―[t]he vicarious experience‖ of (an)other that assume 
recognition is the first step towards civic support and action (Rentschler 2004, 298).  
In the Abu Ghraib social controversy, the affective objections made were appeals 
to the norms of liberal democracy which dealt specifically with issues of citizenship. 
These objections address what feelings and conduct are legitimate and appropriate for 
U.S. soldiers to enact as well as what American citizens should experience in response to 
the leaked photos. For Sontag and Previtera, the norms of liberal democracy suggest that 
U.S. citizens should feel shame at the blatant enjoyment our soldiers experienced while 
causing their prisoners pain and suffering. This stance is based in the belief that liberal 




prisoners. In other words, joyfully inflicting pain on individuals within our legal custody 
subverts Americans‘ fundamental liberal democratic beliefs and is more indicative of the 
type of state tyranny the U.S. has historically opposed. Thus, the soldiers‘ pleasure is 
inherently undemocratic behavior and not feeling shame in response to its capture in the 
Abu Ghraib photos suggests that Americans have abandoned their liberal democratic 
values. Affective objections to these images are an attempt to reaffirm the norms of 
liberal democracy and prompt the self and state regulation of U.S. citizens‘ conduct and 
governmental policy, respectively.  
 Pataki‘s decision to oust the IFC from the WTC site establishes civic parameters 
of public conduct by asserting that U.S. citizens should feel reverence at sacred sites of 
national trauma. These parameters of citizen conduct suggest that ―the good citizen both 
feels and performs particular emotions‖ within a given set of conditions (Johnson 2010, 
501). In other words, as an enactment of American citizenship, individuals should engage 
in a sensate-visceral experience of awe and melancholy over the 9/11 attacks that 
provoke a sense of profound respect while at Ground Zero. This felt experience should 
galvanize individuals to perform acts of veneration as a type of devote homage to the 
victims of 9/11—the deceased and the U.S. Although not a ―law,‖ reverence and 
veneration become the normative emotional scripts visitors to the WTC site are 
compelled to embody as ‗good‘ U.S. citizens.  
 Positing reverence and veneration at this place of public memory as indicative of 
‗good‘ citizenship conduct implies that Americans should be oriented towards the pain 




midst of tragedy when collectively remembering September 11
th
 at Ground Zero. As 
‗good‘ U.S. citizens, individuals should empathetically engage in this suffering and 
heroism by vicariously experience this pain and courage victims felt on September 11
th
. 
This act prompts individuals to recognize the U.S. and the deceased as blameless victims 
of the 9/11 attacks. When commemorative experiences empathetically engage visitors in 
this manner, they functions as a political form of witnessing. As Rentschler (2004) 
explains, ―To commemorate usually means ‗to feel‘ in common with others, for the 
purpose of remembering a past event, but it can also be the means through which political 
actions are mobilized under the cover of ‗remembering‘‖ (299). By evicting the IFC, 
Pataki politically normalized this empathetic engagement with American pain and 
suffering as the proper form of U.S. conduct when (re)collecting national trauma.  
 Production of this normative conduct, therefore, formally situates the critical 
experience proposed by the IFC as not just disrespectful but also inherently un-American 
conduct at sites of national trauma. Designating experiences of critical thinking as 
illegitimate and inappropriate conduct for U.S. citizens, suggests that Americans should 
not question their government‘s actions at Ground Zero. In this way, ―critique itself [is] 
censored, as if any reflexive criticism can only and always be construed as weakness and 
fallibility‖ (Butler 2004, 42). Although September 11
th
 was a horrible trauma, 
intentionally foreclosing critical experiences at Ground Zero and suggesting ‗good‘ 
Americans should not critique U.S. politics and policy seems unnecessarily severe and 
disconcerting. As Butler (2004) explains, engaging in critical thinking was once a 




conduct. Considering that sites of public memory, such as the WTC site, are significant 
spaces of civic pedagogy that affectively engage visitors in permanent lessons about how 
we, as American citizens, should feel about specific historical events and individuals, 
normalizing reverence as ‗good‘ conduct and critique as ‗bad‘ can have consequences for 
future generations. This affective lesson will be set in concrete and stone on our national 
landscape to ensure it is passed along from generation to generation which begs the 
question—is this the affective lesson we want to bequeath to future generations about 
September 11
th
? ‗Good‘ citizens revere America‘s loss and venerate victims‘ suffering 
and heroism; whereas ‗bad‘ ones question if U.S.‘s politics and policy could have 
contributed to the conditions leading to it.  
 As a result of the Loi n* 2004-228 social controversy, French citizens are now 
legally required to abstain from wearing conspicuous religious attire in public schools as 
a means to ensure integration-based norms of laïcité are upheld there. As mentioned in 
chapter four, these norms assert that while in public spaces, individuals should display 
their French citizenship above all other religious, cultural, and political identities and 
affiliations. This law, therefore, posits that as ‗good‘ citizens, students should feel and 
enact their loyalty—as an experience of faithful allegiance—to France (and France alone) 
while in the national education system. Given this emphasis on public displays of loyalty, 
the national ban creates a visual regime of privilege; it accords privilege based on the 
invisibility of an individual‘s religious conviction and/or belief. For instance, 




privileged under this law since its followers are not required to wear conspicuous 
religious symbols as enactments of their faith (Moruzzi 1994).  
 This law assumes that the more invisible one‘s religious conviction is, the more 
loyal that citizen appears to feel and be; whereas, visible symbols of one‘s faith signify a 
citizen‘s disloyalty to the French republic. As a systematic measure to delineate the visual 
parameters of ‗good‘ citizen conduct in France, the law puts veiled French-Islamic 
students in a harrowing position. They must either unveil—enacting the conduct of a 
‗good‘ French citizen—or remain veiled—appearing to intentionally reject this ‗good‘ 
conduct. This choice implies that hijab is ‗bad‘ citizen conduct which needs to be 
reformed. As Johnson (2010) explains, ―People who are suspected of not having the 
correct feelings, including those accused of making a point of their difference (for 
example, by wearing a veil, or even preferring to speak a foreign language), are 
problematised [sic] and identified as legitimate subjects for critique, fear or suspicion‖ 
(501). Consequently, veiled French-Islamic students‘ painful feelings and experiences in 
relation to this law are rendered unimportant since their conduct is considered wrong in 
the first place. In this case, the only thing that matters is whether or not these girls decide 
to unveil and publicly enact their loyalty as a ‗good‘ French citizen.  
 The implementation of this law suggests that the majority of the French public 
empathetically engaged with the feelings of fear and risk that infused the pro-law stance. 
Engagement with these affective states assumes an orientation towards and appreciation 
of individuals that were fearful of hijab and experienced a sense of vulnerability in 




controversy, the majority of unveiled French-Muslim schoolgirls and their parents were 
described as population steeped in fear of hijab who desperately wanted relief from the 
pressure to veil. As Weil (2004) asserted: 
. . . a large majority [of French-Muslims] do not want to impose the headscarf on 
their daughters but are also discomfited by an suggestion of infidelity to their 
religious tradition. It is members of this . . . group, hitherto vulnerable to pressure 
from friends, neighbors or family members who want to impose the headscarf on 
their daughters, who can now reply: ―I was ready to follow your advice, but now 
it is impossible: I cannot disobey the law!‖ (n.p.) 
 
Empathizing with this population could help attenuate any guilt individuals might feel for 
supporting a law that would intentionally put some young women in a terrible situation. 
As mentioned in chapter four, veiled French-Islamic girls did not have a strong public 
voice, making it difficult to create similar types of empathetic engagements with their 
affective situations.  
 However, Cennet‘s affective state of defiant compliance as it culminated in the 
act of publicly unveiling her shorn head was a salient and intense testament to the 
oppressive conditions the law creates. Empathetic engagement with and apprehension of 
Cennet‘s defiant compliance had the potential to problematize individuals‘ appreciation 
of the fear and risk infused stance of pro-law advocates. As indicative of her attempt to 
survive given the conditions of the law, Cennet‘s state is a form of ‗good‘ citizen conduct 
since she does unveil but her unwillingness to show her hair is an indication of the 
injustice of the national ban and its legalized infringement on veiled schoolgirls‘ civic 
rights.     
The findings of this dissertation suggest that there is a significant connection 




can reveal how these conflicts help establish the collective parameters of citizen conduct 
by establishing specific affects, feelings, and emotions that a ‗good‘ citizen should feel 
and act upon within given situations. This project also highlights how affective states and 
emotion-based claims can empathetically engage individuals. This engagement orients 
individuals to the affective conditions of specific individuals and groups enabling them to 
apprehend and appreciate the particulars of (an)other‘s experience.  
This relationship between affect and citizenship has recently been conceptualized 
by Mookherjee (2005), Fortier (2008, 2010), and Johnson (2010) as ―affective 
citizenship‖. According to Fortier (2010):  ―Studies of ‗affective citizenship‘ for their part 
have revealed how intimate and familial relationships are the basis of differential 
conceptions of citizenship . . . or how governments and politicians draw on the register of 
emotions to define good citizenship – as loyalty and attachment to the nation . . . or as 
compassionate or empathetic to others‖ (19).
49
 This work can be greatly beneficial for the 
further development of the relationship between affect, social controversy, and 
citizenship. Although many of these works celebrate the transformative potential inherent 
within the relationship between affect and citizenship, the ease with which affect has 
been mobilized to legitimate oppressive and violent acts has also been recognized.  
For instance, while Mookherjee (2005) asserts that ―affective citizenship‖ is a 
critical, transformative approach to civic engagement that presumes ―citizens‘ structural 
autonomy is formed not through just one set of affective bonds, but rather through 
commitments to multiple, intersecting communities‖ all of which they are responsible to 
(37). Johnson (2010) concludes her study of Tony Blair and Barak Obama‘s political 
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rhetoric by explaining, that advocating more empathy based civic relations ―offers no 
simple solutions‖ and, thus, scholars need ―to pay attention to who is seen as the 
legitimate object of empathy as well as who is seen as the legitimate object of fear‖ 
(Johnson 2010, 506). This project offers similar findings. Analysis of the affective 
dimensions of social controversy can enable scholars to identify not only whom has 
become the ―legitimate object of empathy‖ but also examine the argumentative rationale 
used to justify this and the opposing line of reasoning used to counter it.  
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, this dissertation has proposed and implemented an affect-based 
form of social controversy criticism as a means to address the affective dimensions of this 
type of conflict. Thus, this project exemplifies how argumentation theory can benefit 
from the inclusion of affect theory. Social controversy is a passionate endeavor; it orients 
and galvanizes individuals to engage in debate over issues that have implications for our 
collective public life. This project is a just a small example of the argumentative 
significance affect has and it is my sincere hope it offers insights the integral role affects, 
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